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← 114 Ill. App. 3d 479 - Clement v. Prestwich

114 Ill. App. 3d 479 - Clement v. Prestwich’s Empirical Analysis

1983

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
7
states following
September 2017
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 3 district · 36 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently September 2017 · most notably Hedlund Manufacturing Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 986 - Brocato v. Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass'n (1988)

4 federal appellate · 3 district · 36 state decisions

2501983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 79 Ill. 2d 282 - Soules v. General Motors Corp. · 92 Ill. 2d 13 - Pelham v. Griesheimer · 62 Cal. App. 3d 389 - Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. · 83 Ill. App. 3d 334 - Christison v. Jones · Chaffee v. Smith

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any prior connection with the assignor or his rights. The commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out of legal malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession. The almost certain end result of merchandizing such causes of action is the lucrative business of factoring malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers. The endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system, restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney and client.” 62 Cal. App. 3d at 397 , 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. (In re Schuyler (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 6, 11 , 434 N.E.2d 1137 .) This relationship is a confidential one which must be highly honored and guarded by the attorney. (Rose v. Frailey (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 514, 517 , 140 N.E.2d 711 ; Christison v. Jones (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 338 , 405 N.E.2d 8 .) The confidence reposed in an attorney is of a personal nature and cannot be delegated by the attorney without the client’s consent. (Cornelius v. Wash (1825), 1 Ill. (Breese) 98 , 100; Christison v. Jones (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 338 , 405 N.E.2d 8 .) A client’s claim for malpractice arises from this personal relationship and is a claim that his attorney has breached a personal duty to the client (Christison v. Jones (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 338 , 405 N.E.2d 8 ), and that the client has been injured as a result of the breach. (Pelham v. Griesheimer (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 13, 18 , 440 N.E.2d 96 ; Cook v. Gould (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 311, 314 , 440 N.E.2d 448 .) We believe that sound public policy prohibits the assignment of these claims since an assignee would be a stranger to the attorney-client relationship, who was owed no duly by the attorney and who suffered no injury from the attorney’s actions.” Clement, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 480-81 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The issues decided in those cases were that an action for professional negligence does not abate with the death of the attorney [citation], and that an action for professional negligence against an attorney does not abate with the death of the plaintiff and may be pursued by the administrator of her estate. [Citation.] The secondary basis of decision in McGill, that legal malpractice claims are assignable, was only briefly analyzed by the court and is not persuasive.” Clement, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 481-82 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.