Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

114 Mass. 303

Commonwealth v. Stratton

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided November 15, 1873

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1873-11-15

<p>One is guilty of an assault and battery who delivers to another a thing to be eaten, knowing that it contains a foreign substance and concealing the fact, if the other, in ignorance of the fact, eats it and is injured in health.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"Although force and violence are included in all definitions of assault, or assault and battery, yet, where there is physical injury to another person, it is sufficient that the cause is set in motion by the defendant, or that the person is subjected to its operation by means of any act or control which the defendant exerts.” (Emphasis supplied.)”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 148 Cal. App. 4th 1311 - People v. Rosen, 52 Md. App. 500 - Taylor v. State

Relies on Commonwealth v. Burke

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2025 · most notably Beausoliel v. United States (1939), Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc. (2000)

5 federal appellate · 3 district · 32 state decisions — followed in 14 states

901873188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Wells, J.*

¶1All the judges concur that the evidence introduced at the trial would warrant a conviction of assault and battery, or for a simple assault, which it includes. And in the opinion of a majority of the court, the instructions given required the jury to find all that was essential to constitute the offence of assault and battery.

¶2The jury must have found a physical injury inflicted upon another person by a voluntary act of the defendant, directed towards her, which was without justification and unlawful. Although the defendant was ignorant of the qualities of the drug he administered, and of the effects to be expected from it, and had been *305assured and believed that it was not deleterious to health, yet he knew it was not ordinary food, that the girl was deceived into taking it, and he intended that she should be induced to take it without her conscious consent, by the deceit which he practised upon her. It is to be inferred from the statement of the case that he expected it would produce some effect. In the most favorable aspect of the facts for the defendant, he administered tc the girl, without her consent and by deceit, a drug or “ foreign substance,” of the probable effect of which he was ignorant, with the express intent and purpose “ to try the effect of it upon ” her. This, in itself, was unlawful, and he must be held responsible for whatever effect it produced. Being an unlawful interference with the personal rights of another, calculated to result and in fact resulting in physical injury, the criminal intent is to be inferred from the nature of the act and its actual results. 3 Bl. Com. 120. Rex v. Long, 4 C. & P. 398, 407, note. The deceit, by means of which the girl was induced to take the drug, was a fraud upon her will, equivalent to force in overpowering it. Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376. Regina v. Lock, 12 Cox C. C. 244. Regina v. Sinclair, 13 Cox C. C. 28.

¶3Although force and violence are included in all definitions of assault, or assault and battery, yet, where there is physical injury to another person, it is sufficient that the cause is set in motion by the defendant, or that the person is subjected to its operation by means of any act or control which the defendant exerts. In 3 Chit. Crim. Law, 799, is a count, at common law, for an assault with drugs. For other instances of assault and battery without actual violence directed against the person assaulted, see 1 Gabbett’s Crim. Law, 82; Rose. Crim. Ev. (8th ed.) 296; 3 Bl. Com. 120, and notes; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 84.

¶4If one should hand an explosive substance to another, and induce him to take it by misrepresenting or concealing its dangerous qualities, and the other, ignorant of its character, should receive it and cause it to explode in his pocket or hand, and should be injured by it, the offending party would be guilty of a battery, and that would necessarily include an assault; although he might not be guilty even of an assault, if the su bstance failed *306to explode or failed to cause any injury. It would be the same if it exploded in his mouth or stomach. If that which causes the injury is set in motion by the wrongful act of the defendant, it cannot be material whether it acts upon the person injured externally or internally, by mechanical or chemical force.

¶5In Regina v. Button, 8 C. & P. 660, one who put Spanish flies into coffee to be drank by another, was convicted of an assault upon the person who took it, although it was done “ only for a lark.” This decision is said to have been overruled in England. Regina v. Dilworth, 2 Mood. & Rob. 531. The Queen v. Walkden, 1 Cox C. C. 282. Regina v. Hanson, 2 C. & K. 912. In the view of the majority of the court, the last only of these three cases was a direct adjudication, and that entirely upon the authority of mere dicta in the other two, and without any satisfactory reasoning or statement of grounds; and the earlier decision in Regina v. Button is more consistent with general principles, and the better law.

¶6 Exceptions overruled.

¶7 This case was submitted on briefs at this session, argued in January, 1874 rod considered by all the judges.

/114/mass/303 · .json · Public domain