Volume 114 — Maine Reports

On motion and exceptions by the defendant. This is an action on an accident insurance policy issued by defendant to Warren Thompson, which, in case of his death, was payable to his wife, the plaintiff. Flea, the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and had various exceptions, all considered in the opinion. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p> Automobile. Condition. Indemnity. Insurance. Negligence. Notice. Waiver. </p> <p>The plaintiff held an insurance policy in the defendant company, issued by a local agent under which he was to be indemnified against loss from the liability imposed by law on account of bodily injuries accidentally sustained by any person through the maintenance or use of a certain automobile owned by himself. The insurance was subject to conditions in the policy, namely, that it did not cover liability for injuries received while the automobile was being used for other than certain specified purposes; that upon the occurrence of an accident, the insured should give immediate written notice thereof to the company at its home office, or to its duly authorized agent; and that the insured should give like notice of any claim made against him on account of such accident, and that if thereafter any suit was brought against him, he should immediately forward to the company every summons or other process served upon him. An accident occurred. The plaintiff gave immediate oral notice to the local agent, who told him he would take care of him, and that a firm of local attorneys would see him. The local agent at once made a full written report to the company or one of its general agents. The company on the day following, by its attorneys in Boston, referred the matter for investigation to the same local attorneys. They investigated and reported. They were, instructed to get the evidence in writing, and in the meantime to attempt to make a settlement. Plaintiff did not report the accident in writing to the company, nor did he when sued on account of the accident send the summons to the company, but gave it to the local attorneys as he had been directed to do by the local agent who issued the policy. In a suit on the policy, held:—</p> <p>1. That the evidence does not sustain the contention that the automobile was being used for a purpose other than those covered by the policy.</p> <p>2. That the failure of the plaintiff to give, written notice of the accident and of the claim made on him, was waived by the acts of the local agent and of the various investigating attorneys.</p> <p>3. That the company is bound by the direction given the plaintiff by the local agent to give any summons served upon him to the local attorneys., as much so as if the direction had come from the home office.</p> <p>4. Under Revised Statutes, chapter 49, section 93, which provides that “the agents of insurance companies shall be regarded as in the place of the-company in all respects regarding any insurance effected by them,” an agent has power to waive the requirement in the policy for a written report of loss or injury; and directions given to the insured by an agent as to procedure touching the subject matter of the insurance, are binding upon the company, whether given before or after liability has been incurred-The agent stands in the place of the company in all respects.</p>

On report. This is a trustee process and is reported to.the Law Court to determine the trustee’s liability. The case is stated in the opinion.

On motion by defendant for a new trial. This is an action for false imprisonment of plaintiff by the defendant. There is also a count for trover. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.

On exceptions by petitioners. This is a petition by the City of Augusta to the Public Utilities Commission, praying that the Public Utilities Commission will review the whole matter and make such apportionment of the expenses for repairs airead}'' made on a certain bridge.

On report. This is a bill in equity, in which complainant seeks a construction and interpretation of certain parts of the last will and testament of Thomas D. Leonard, late of Portland, in said county, deceased. At the conclusion of the hearing of this cause, by agreement of the parties, the case was reported to the Law Court for determination upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On appeal by petitioner.</p> <p>This petition was brought under the provisions of sections 70-71-72-73 and 74 of chapter 6 of the Revised Statutes, to determine whether the petitioner, at the state election held on September 14, 1914, was elected county commissioner of the County of Kennebec for the term beginning January 1, 1915, or whether the defendant was so elected. The petition was heard before a single justice, who ordered, adjudged and decreed that the petition of Howard B. Crosby be dismissed with costs. From this decree, petitioner appealed.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On report. This is an action to enforce a lien for cutting and hauling certain logs. Plea, the general issue with brief statement. At the conclusion of the evidence, the case, by agreement of parties, was reported to the Law Court for determination. Upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible, the Law Court will render such judgment as the law and the evidence require. The case is stated in the opinion.

On motions by defendant for new trial. These two cases, one by father and one by minor son, are brought to recover for injuries received by reason of a collision between the defendant’s automobile, driven by him, and Kenneth P. Moran. Plea, the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in both cases. Defendant filed motions for new trial in both cases. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On exceptions by plaintiff.</p> <p>This is an action of assumpsit on a Holmes note. The defense was the statute of limitations. The case was heard by the court with the right of exception. The note was attested by one of the parties to the transaction. The Justice before whom the case was heard ruled that the attesting witness must be some one other than the party to the note. The plaintiff excepted to the ruling.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On exceptions by plaintiff. This is a petition brought by the plaintiff for the purpose of annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant. At the hearing, the presiding Justice dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff excepted to said ruling. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On report.</p> <p>This is a petition for writ of certiorari, wherein petitioner asks to have the records of the board of mayor and aldermen of the city of Lewiston quashed so far as they relate to the discharge of the petitioner from the police force. The case was reported to the Law Court upon an agreed statement of facts for determination.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On exceptions by plaintiff. This is an action of trover, in which plaintiff seeks to recover the value of a building situate in the town of Vinalhaven, Knox county. Plea, general issue. The defendant was allowed to introduce in evidence the books of the Bodwell Granite Company, to which admission of said books the plaintiff excepted. The case is stated in the opinion.

On motions by defendant. This is an action on the case for alleged deceit in the sale of a farm situate in Skowhegan, in Somerset county. Plea, the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant filed a general motion for a new trial, and also a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The case is stated in the opinion.

On motion for new trial by the defendant. This is an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff to recover damages of the defendant for a breach of a promise of marriage, alleged to have been made by defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Defendant filed a general motion for a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.

On exceptions by defendant. This is a complaint charging one J. Wasilenskis with the possession of intoxicating liquors. The defendant demurred to said complaint. The presiding Justice overruled the demurrer and the defendant excepted to the overruling of said demurrer. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On report.</p> <p>This is an action on the case brought by Albert A. Conant to recoyer for the value of a Ford automobile alleged to have been damaged by the negligence of defendant in a collision on the 27th day of September, 1912, at Hicks Crossing, in Norway. Plea, the general issue. At the conclusion of the evidence, by agreement of parties, the case was reported to the Law Court for determination, upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On motion and exceptions by the defendant. Motion not considered.</p> <p>Action on a policy of insurance issued by defendant to George M. McManus, late of Brunswick, deceased, the plaintiff being the beneficiary named in said policy. Plea, the general issue, with brief statement. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant filed a motion for a new trial and had exceptions allowed to the exclusion of certain evidence.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Beneficially Interested. Credible Attesting Witness. Pecuniary Interest. R. S., Chap. 76, Sect. I. Will. Witness. </p> <p>The question is whether Florence R. Johnson, wife of a legatee under the will of Adelbert I. Clark, was a competent attesting witness to said will.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. A wife is not a competent attesting witness to a will which contains a devise to her husband.</p> <p>2. The term “credible” is not defined by the Statute, but as construed by the common law means competent.</p> <p>3. If the will provides a pecuniary benefit to the attesting witness, though dependent upon the happening of an event which may happen, he has a beneficial interest under it in contemplation of law.</p> <p>4. If the subsequent event upon which the interest depends does not happen, that fact does not relate back and restore competence.</p> <p>5. That Florence R. Johnson, at the time of the execution of the will, was not a credible witness, that she was beneficially interested under the will, and that said will is void.</p>

<p> Appeal. Breach. Condition to Support. Damages. Foreclosure. Mortgage. Redemption. </p> <p>This is an appeal from the decision of the sitting Justice in a cause in equity. The bill is brought to redeem certain real estate from a mortgage given on April 16, A. D. 1900, by one John H. Tuttle, husband of Flora E. Tuttle, to his father and mother, George Tuttle and Mary F. Tuttle, conditioned to support them, or the survivor of them, so long as they might live, on the premises described in the mortgage or at such other place as George Tuttle or Mary F. Tuttle might choose, the same to be at no further expense to John H. Tuttle than on the home farm. Mary F. Tuttle, after the death of her husband, commenced foreclosure of this mortgage on March 22, 1913.</p> <p>The only question is whether the plaintiff has such an interest in the mortgaged premises as will permit her to redeem.</p> <p>Held: she has such right.</p>

<p> Lease. Mutual Consent. Notice to Quit. Rent. R. S., Chap. 96, Sect. s. Termination of tenancy at will. Tenancy at will. Waiver. </p> <p>1. In an action for rent under a written lease, an agreement during the life of the lease, that lessee should have the privilege of vacating any time after the expiration of the lease by paying for the actual time of occupation, is not binding.</p> <p>2. The termination of a tenancy by mutual agreement must be in accordance with R. S., Chap. 96, Sec. 2, and that this section applies only to tenancies at will. .</p>

<p>On report.</p> <p>This is a creditor’s bill in which it is sought to subject the dividends from a deposit of Sarah B. Maxcy with Tyler, Fogg & Co., of Bangor to the payment of the balance due the plaintiff on notes signed by Sarah B. Maxcy, and is brought under Revised Statutes, Chapter 79, Section 6, Paragraph 9. The Justice hearing this cause, all parties assenting thereto, reported the cause to the Law Court on the foregoing evidence, including the agreed statement of facts; the Law Court to decide all questions of law and facts involved and to render its decision accordingly.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Extinguishing Lien. Knowledge. Lien. Mortgage. Relinquishment of Possession. Replevin. Revesting the Lien. </p> <p>The defendant, under a contract, furnished food and shelter for a pair of horses for the mortgagor for several months before the date of the execution and record of the mortgage on the horses. The mortgagee had neither actual nor implied knowledge that the horses were boarded at the defendants stable for more than three' months after the date of the mortgage. In the meantime, the laundry company was permitted to use the horses in the ordinary way in the prosecution of its business as well ■after the date of the mortgage as before. The horses were also boarded by the defendant about three months after the plaintiff had knowledge that they were being furnished food and shelter by the defendant. ■ At this time the plaintiff demanded possession of the horses but the defendant refused to deliver them unless the plaintiff paid for their keeping, not only after but before the mortgage was given.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. That the letting of the horses go out' of the defendant’s custody into that of the mortgagor against the plaintiff’s right as owner, under a recorded mortgage, was such a relinquishment of possession as extinguished and discharged the defendant’s lien up to the time the plaintiff had notice that they were being kept by the defendant.</p> <p>2. That the defendant could not be held for the sum demanded for keeping the horses prior to the date of his knowledge of their being kept by the defendant.</p> <p>3. That by demanding the whole and refusing to take a less sum, the plaintiff was excused from making a tender of the amount which might have been due subsequent to the date of his knowledge of the keeping.</p> <p>4. That the plaintiff having title in the horses had a right to their custody without further ceremony.</p>

<p> Agent. Defendant. Executor. Writ. </p> <p>1. An executor, in an action against him, is a defendant.</p> <p>2. The estate is in the hands of the executor and he is the only person against whom an action is authorized, or can be instituted for a claim against the decedent.</p> <p>3. The executor and the person named as executor are always one and the same.</p>

On exceptions by defendant. This is an action of trespass quare clausum against James R. B. Dinsmore, defendant, for entering the plaintiff’s land, situate in China, Maine, and cutting certain wood thereon. Plea, general issue with brief statement claiming title to the land described and denying that plaintiff had any title thereto. The case was tried before a single Justice, who found in favor of plaintiff. To this, finding, the defendant took exceptions.

<p>On report.</p> <p>This is an action of assumpsit on a policy of marine insurance issued by the defendant to plaintiff on the 20th day of October, A. D. 1908, in which it insured the steam yacht Navis against certain perils therein stipulated, for the period of one year. The plaintiff, at time of the issuance of said policy and at time of damage thereto, was the sole owner of said steam yacht and said policy was in full force. To this policy was attached a so called rider, the terms and conditions of which are to be regarded as substituted for those of the policy to which it is attached, the latter being thereby waived. The yacht, by the terms of the policy, was to be laid up from November 1 to May 1 following, without return of premiums during the period.</p> <p>Plea, the general issue and brief statement. At the conclusion of the evidence, the case was reported to the Law Court, and upon the evidence so far as competent and admissible, to render such judgment as law and justice require; and if judgment is for the plaintiff, the action is to be referred to the Honorable George E. Bird to assess the damages.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Arrested. Complaint. Discharged. Exceptions. False Imprisonment. Guardians. Minors. Police Officers. Waiver. </p> <p>In an action for false imprisonment of two minors who were discharged without taking them before the court, upon signing a release to the officers, with the knowledge and consent of the parents,</p> <p> Held,: </p> <p>1. The parent is the legal custodian of the minor children and is entitled to their custody.</p> <p>2. So far as the boys are concerned, if they or their parents solicited their release, and it was done with their full knowledge and consent, thenj the officers can justify.</p> <p>3. Unless the officers either take the boys into court to be discharged there, if necessary, or have let the boys go at their own request or the request of their parents, with thefir knowledge and consent, then they cannot justify, but arte liable in such case for the original arrest.</p> <p>4. If the officers had arrested the plaintiffs for a misdemeanor, then it would have been their duty to have procured a warrant within a reasonable time for the alleged offense and take them before the court and place them on trial, arid for neglect to do so would have been liable in damages, unless the plaintiffs released them from that obligation or they waived their rights to be taken before the court.</p> <p>5. The law is well settled that an officer may arrest upon reasonable grounds of suspicion that a felony has been committed and that the person arrested was guilty of a felony, and hold thte party arrested for a reasonable time until he can procure a warrant to investigate the case, and if within a reasonable time his investigation shows that there is not reasonable grounds to believe that the party arrested has committed a felony, then he may discharge him without taking him before the court and not be liable.</p>

<p> Breach. Contract. Debt. Forfeiture. Justification. Life Estate. Sale. Warranty Title. Will. </p> <p>In an action of debt brought by the vendors against the vendee to recover the forfeiture stipulated in a written contract for the sale and purchase of real estate, the plaintiff therein agreeing to convey “by good and sufficient warranty title;”</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. That the plaintiffs were bound to furnish a title free from incumbrance.</p> <p>2. That the plaintiffs’ title was based upon a devise In the will of John Fred Loveitt to his son, Edwin W. Loveitt, one of the plaintiffs, which was conditional upon the performance by said Edwin of the terms of a certain agreement whereby he was bound to suitably support and care for his father and mother during their life, and at their decease pay all burial expenses, &c.</p> <p>3. That this constituted a condition subsequent and the plaintiffs’ estate was subject to forfeiture for neglect of performance.</p> <p>4. That as this condition as to payment of burial expenses both of the father and mother had not been complied with, the title was not free from incumbrance and the plaintiff did not offer “a good and sufficient warranty title.”</p>

<p> Affidavit. Exceptions. “For value received.” “Money loaned.” Promissory Note. Revised Statutes, Chapter 89, Section 14. </p> <p>The holder of a promissory note purporting to be for value received against the estate of the deceased maker, seasonably filed her claim, supported by affidavit, in the probate court, stating therein that her claim was for “money loaned by me to William C. Coombs (the maker) as evidenced by the note hereto annexed.”</p> <p> In a suit on the note' it is held, </p> <p>1. That the note was admissible in evidence without extraneous proof that the consideration was ’ for money loaned.</p> <p>2. That, upon the introduction of the note, no evidence having been offered by the defendant, a verdict was properly ordered for the plaintiff.</p>

On report. This is a bill in equity brought by Samuel M. Bowden against the York Shore Water Company, a corporation, asking for an injunction against said York Shore Water Company restraining it and its successors, assigns, attorneys, agents and officers from taking said real estate of said plaintiff, as in said bill set forth, etc. Answer and replication were respectively filed.

On report. Temporary injunction to be made perpetual. Decree in accordance with this opinion. This is a bill in equity to prevent the consummation of a sale of certain church or ministerial property, a lumber lot located at Sheepscot, in the town of Newcastle; to restrain the cutting of lumber therefrom by the grantee, and to- have the sale declared void and for an adjudication as to the present ownership and rights in the property.

This is a petition by Fred E. Daggett to be appointed administrator of the estate of William M. Daggett. The probate Judge for the county of Penobscot denied the petition, and the said Fred E. Daggett appealed to the Supreme Court of Probate to be held at Bangor, within and for the county of Penobscot. At the conclusion of the hearing, the case was reported to the Law Court, upon so much of the foregoing evidence as is legally admissible, for determination.

<p>On exceptions by defendant.</p> <p>An action of assumpsit on a policy of fire insurance issued by defendant, dated October 24, 1912, on certain buildings located in the town of Webster. Plea, the general issue with brief statement.</p> <p>At the conclusion of the evidence on both sides, the presiding Justice directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff for $640.06. To this ruling, the defendant excepted and his exceptions were allowed.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Agency. Contract. Exceptions. Husband and Wife. Repairs on wife’s property made by contract with husband. </p> <p>1. The fact of agency can be established by proof of any facts or circumstances from which agency can reasonably and logically be inferred. The marriage relation of the parties, however, is not alone enough to establish the fact that the one is the agent of the other. But where the question is whether a husband was the agent of his wife in transactions for the repair and improvement of her property, the marriage relation, and the wife’s situation and the condition of her health at the time, are of significance, in connection with the nature of the work contracted for. So, too, is the fact that the husband had transacted similar business with her approval and for which she recognized her responsibility.</p> <p>2. Upon a proper submission of the question to them, the -jury decided that ■the defendant’s husband was her agent in having a furnace put in her house in her absence from home. Held: that there was evidence which reasonably justified the jury in so deciding.</p> <p>3. An excepting party must show that he has beeni prejudiced by the ruling.</p> <p>4. If requested instructions are not pertinent and applicable to the case, though containing a correct statement of abstract principles of law, they may properly be refused.</p> <p>5. Exceptions will not be sustained to a refusal to give special requests, though they may be reasonably applicable to some features of the case, provided ample and correct instructions have already been given.</p> <p>6. The instructions given were pertinent to the only issue involved in the case, were sound in law, and clearly and explicitly presented.</p> <p>7. The requested instructions appear to be a verbatim copy of all the paragraphs of the head note in the case of Steward v. Church, 108 Maine, 83. None of them were peculiarly applicable to the facts in this case, and some of them were wholly inapplicable thereto.</p> <p>8. We do not find any reversible error in the ruling refusing them. The jury had already been fully and amply instructed. It does not appear that the defendant was prejudiced by the ruling complained of.</p>

<p> Bill in Equity. Corporation. Decree. Laws of 1907, Chapter 137, Public Laws of 1905, Chapter 85. Receiver Stockholders. </p> <p>Although the sitting Justice before whom the cause was heard filed no findings of facts, the filling of the decree sustaining the bill and appointing a receiver is ipso facto a finding of fact in favor of the plaintiffs upon some, or all, of the allegations in their bill.</p>

<p> Damages. Personal Injuries. Physician’s testimony. Range of their testimony. </p> <p>This case involves the question of damages only. The case presents a typical illustration of the extremes to which reputable physicians will sometimes go in testifying in behalf of a patient, and the boundless latitude over which pathology, diagnosis and prognosis will permit them to range. A careful study of the evidence shows that the verdict is unconscionably excessive.</p>

On motion for new trial by the defendant. This is an action on the case to recover damages for malpractice in securing a drainage tube which had been inserted in the side of Lillian P. Cyr for the purpose of drainage of the incision in the operation for pleurisy. Plea, the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $3000. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and also had certain exceptions, which do not appear to have been considered.

On exceptions by the ¡ilaintiff, with stipulation that if plaintiff’s exceptions are sustained, the Law Court shall assess damages and order iinal judgment. This is an action on the case, brought by the plaintiff against the Maine Central Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injuries received in consequence of the negligence of the defendant company. Plea, general issue. At the close of the evidence, the presiding Justice directed a verdict for the defendant.

<p> Agreement in writing. Contract. Evidence. Market value. Memorandum book. Sale. Special market. </p> <p>An action of assumpsit for the recovery of damages for alleged breach of a written agreement for the growing of potatoes and the delivery of a certain percentage of the crop between certain dates by plaintiff and payment by defendant at an agreed price for the potatoes so delivered.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. Where, subject to objection, written evidence is read to the jury, and such evidence is not made part of the bill of exceptions and does not appear in the record, exceptions to its admission will be overruled, although at the argument counsel agree to characterize it as a recommendation.</p> <p>2. Evidence of the market value of goods at a time other than that agreed upon for their delivery is not admissible upon the question of damages for non-delivery, where its admission may have been prejudicial to the excepting party.</p>

On report. An action brought by plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him while in the employment of defendant and in consequence of its negligence. Plea, general issue with brief statement, in which it is claimed that Section 8 of Chapter 258 of the Public Laws of 1909 does not apply to those engaged in driving logs. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On exceptions by plaintiff.</p> <p>This is an action on the case brought by George Nelson, administrator, to recover damages for the death of Albert Nelson, a boy thirteen years of age, which occurred in the defendant’s factory on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the presiding Justice directed a non-suit. The plaintiff excepted to said nonsuit. Plea, the general issue.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On exceptions by both plaintiff and defendant.</p> <p>This is an action on the case to recover damages for the instant death of the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to be due to the negligence of the defendant. Plea, the general issue. The defendant demurred to the first count in plaintiff’s declaration. The presiding Justice sustained said demurrer. The plaintiff was allowed to amend her declaration, and to the allowance of the amendment, the defendant excepted. At the conclusion of the evidence, the Justice presiding directed a verdict for the defendant. To which direction the plaintiff excepted.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Reported on agreed statement of facts.</p> <p>This is an action of replevin for a stove, which originated in Lincoln municipal court and reported to the Law Court on an agreed statement of facts.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On motions by defendants.</p> <p>This is an action on the case to recover damages against John R. Graham and his wife Georgie H., for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants’ chauffeur while operating an automobile on Western avenue in Augusta, August 26, 1913. Plea, the general issue. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $2175.00, and the defendant filed a general motion for a new trial. Defendant filed various requests for instructions by the presiding Justice, all of which were refused, and the defendant excepted. Exceptions not considered.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Appeal. Devise. Inheritance Tax. Public Lams of Maine, 1909. Residuary Legatees. Will. </p> <p>This case is before the court on an agreed statement of facts in an appeal from the decree of the Judge of Probate of York county assessing an inheritance tax against Edward C. Luques, one of the residuary legatees under the will of Margaret C. Luques.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. It clearly appears that the intention of the testator was that his widow should have full power of disposal of all the property devised to her in the will, and there was no intention to limit her use or disposal thereof.</p> <p>2. It is a settled rule of law that, if a devisee or legatee have the absolute right to dispose of the property at pleasure, the devise over is inoperative.</p> <p>3. A devise of land generally or indefinitely, with a power of disposing of it, amounts to a devise in fee. And such a devise, without words of inheritance, is treated as equivalent to a devise with words of inheritance.</p> <p>4. The property in question did not vest in appellant in and as of the will of Samuel W. Luques, or at the moment of his death. The right of the widow to dispose of the entire estate stood between the plaintiff and his asserted right.</p> <p>5. An inheritance tax being a tax on the privilege or right of inheriting, could not be levied or collected as against the appellant until such right existed in fact, a condition only to be made certain in this case by the death of the widow.</p> <p>6. A power of appointment is a power of disposition given a person over property not his own, by some one who directs 'the mode in which that power shall be exercised by a particular instrument. In the case at bar the property vested in Margaret C. Luques, arid when her will was made there was nothing left on which a trust could operate. She had disposed of all the property, and hence no power of appointment could have been executed.</p> <p>7. The will speaks from the death of the testator, and in clearest terms expresses his intent and his clearly stated purpose that if the widow had disposed of the property by sale or by will, his wishes were satisfied and at an end.</p>

On report. This is an action on the case to recover damages of defendant for constructing and maintaining a fish weir on a weir privilege claimed by plaintiffs, in the tide water of Herring Cove in the town of Trescott, Washington county. Plea, the general issue with brief statement. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On report.</p> <p>An action of trespass quare clausum to recover damages of the defendant for going upon the dam or abutment and removing some of their logs that were caught against it.. The defendants pled the general issue and filed a brief statement alleging that they were the owners, on their own land, of water mills and a dam to raise water for working said mills below the land of plaintiff described in her writ.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contract to labor and to give one week’s notice of intention to quit. Forfeiture. Private and Special Laws of 1871, Chapter 636, Section 10. Rewsed Statutes, Chapter 40, Section 5J. The test of repeal by implication.</p> <p>1. In the construction of statutes, it is the obvious intent, rather than the literal import, which is to govern.</p> <p>2. The test of repeal by implication of an earlier statute by a later one is whether the latter is so directly and positively inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the former that the two cannot consistently stand together.</p> <p>3. The provisions of chapter 39, Laws of 1911, relating to weekly payment of wages, did not repeal or abrogate the provisions of.section 31, chapter 40 'of the Revised Statutes, whereby an employee, having contracted to give one week’s notice of intentions to leave, and leaving without notice, forfeited one week’s wages.</p> <p>4. The provision in chapter 39, Laws of 1911, requiring that an employee leaving his employment shall be paid his wages in full on the following regular pay day relates to wages to which he is entitled, and not to those which he has forfeited.</p>

On exceptions by defendant. Petition for mandamus 'by a stockholder in Maine Corporation to compel defendant, the clerk of said corporation, to allow him to inspect books and records, etc. To the defendant’s answer to the alternative writ, the petitioner demurred. The presiding Justice sustained the demurrer and ordered the peremptory writ of mandamus to issue. To this ruling, the defendant excepted. The case is stated in the opinion.

On exceptions and motion by defendant. This is an action on the case to recover damages for an alleged interference with a right of way across the land of defendant.

On report. This is an action of trespass by C. O. Brown, of Hartland against the Linn Woolen. Company, a corporation doing business at Hart-land, for the unlawful' eviction of the plaintiff from a saw mill in said Hartland. Plea, the general issue, with brief statement. At the conclusion of the evidence, the case, by agreement of parties, was reported to the Law Court for determination. The case is stated in the opinion.

On report. This is an action of replevin for two Holstein heifer calves, the product of two cows which plaintiff sold to Richardson and took back a mortgage to secure payment of purchase price. Each cow was then with calf, which was dropped about two weeks later. Plea, general issue.

<p> Bond. Contract. Extension of Contract. Mortgage. Performance. Receiver. Sale. </p> <p>Under the common money counts, the plaintiff seeks the recovery from defendant of the sum of six thousand dollars paid by the former to the latter on account of the purchase price of certain real estate which defendant undertook by written obligation to convey to plaintiff. Failure, through inability, of defendant, though requested, to perform the contract and its rescission are claimed.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. Where defendant has never been able to convey title as provided in his contract, the plaintiff is entitled to rescind and recover back moneys paid on account of the purchase price and an institution of an action for money had and received for such moneys is under such circumstances, in itself a rescission.</p> <p>2. In order to effect rescission, the party claiming the right to do so must place the other in statu quo, or do all he can towards it, but in the application of this rule the maxim de minimus will be regarded.</p> <p>3. Where the term of a bond for the conveyance of timberland, which provides for possession by the obligee during the term, has expired and the possession of the obligee during the term, is that of an owner not engaged in timber operations, formal surrender of possession is not required as a prerequisite to rescission.</p>

<p>On exceptions by the defendant.</p> <p>This is an action to recover damages for the alleged failure of defendant to accurately transmit and deliver a telegram left with it at its Lewiston office by plaintiff for transmission to Moline, in the state of Illinois. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff for $106.50. To which ruling and instructions the defendant excepts.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On motion and exceptions by defendant. This is an action brought by the plaintiffs, Harry E. Ross and H. Eugene Collett against the Maine Central Railroad Company to recover the value of three car loads of potatoes shipped by the plaintiffs from Bangor, Maine, over the line of the Maine Central and connecting carriers to Hoboken, New Jersey, the potatoes having frozen enroute. Plea, general issue.

<p>On appeal.</p> <p>Bill in equity asking for the construction of the will of the testator, Chapin C. Brooks, late of Portland, and more especially the meaning and intent of the testator as expressed in Paragraph 3 of said will. The case was heard by a single Justice, and from his decree the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Mandamus. Notice of desire to withdraw from the Association. Petition. Shareholders. </p> <p>1. When the charter of a national banking association has expired by limitation, it may be extended by vote of the shareholders, with the approval of the comptroller of the currency.</p> <p>2. When the charter of a national banking association is extended by vote of the shareholders, a non-assenting shareholder may, within 30 days, withdraw, and have his shares appraised and paid for by the bank.</p> <p>3. The notice of withdrawal given by the shareholder in a national banking assodiation, within 30 days after the extension of its charter, is effective as of the date of the expiration of the original charter.</p> <p>4. If after the extension of the charter of a national banking association a dividend is declared, a shareholder who demands and receives the dividend waives the right to withdraw.</p>

<p>Bill in equity. On appeal by plaintiff.</p> <p>This bill in equity was brought for Anna K. Gilman by Frazier Gilman, her guardian, to set aside a sheriff’s sale to defendant Charles T. Haviland of property belonging to Anna K. Gilman. At the hearing of the cause before the sitting Justice, the bill was dismissed. From this decision the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On report.</p> <p>Bill in equity by Henry H. Pierce against Josiah Pierce and Hugh M. Warren, for the construction of the will of Josiah Pierce. Answers and replication were filed in the case. By agreement of the parties to the cause, it was reported to the Law Court upon the amended bill, answer and agreed statement of facts; and evidence filed herewith, for determination, upon so much of the evidence as may be held by the court to be legally admissible, the court will render such judgment as the law and facts may require.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On exceptions by plaintiff. This is an action on the case to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while employed by defendants in operating a cutting machine. The defendant filed a special demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration and the presiding Justice sustained the demurrer. To this ruling, the plaintiff excepted.

On report. This is a real action brought by George M. Haines, an infant under the age of twenty-one years, who sued this action by next friend, against Frank W. Brown, of Etna, Maine, to recover a parcel of land situate in said Etna and described in the writ. Plea, the general issue and brief statement.

On report. This is a petition by Harry H. Donnell, one of the administrators with the will annexed of the insolvent estate of William T. Donnell, late of Bath, Maine, asking that his private claim against deceased may be examined and allowed by the Judge of Probate and annexed to the list of claims, etc. The cause, by agreement of parties, was reported to the Law Court upon agreed statement of facts, or so much thereof as may be legally admissible; the Law Court to render…

On report. This is an action of asumpsit upon a contract in writing to recover the sum of $450 for 150 barrels of seed potatoes which defendant had, according to the contract in writing declared on in the writ. The potatoes were destroyed by fire. At the conclusion of the evidence, by agreement of parties, the case was reported to the Law Court for determination upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible.

On report. This bill in equity was brought by plaintiff to remove a cloud from certain real estate which the plaintiff conveyed to Jennie B. Lane, who received from plaintiff a mortgage providing for plaintiff’s support upon the premises conveyed. Answer and replication were filed. At the conclusion of the hearing in this cause, the same, by consent of parties, was reported to the Law Court to render such final judgment as the legal rights of parties require.

On exceptions by respondent. This is an appeal to the Supreme Court of Probate from decree of probate court of Waldo county, whereby the will of Henrietta T. Nickels of Searsport, dated November 9, 1911, was allowed and admitted to probate. From this order, the appellant appealed and also had various exceptions to the refusal of court to rule as requested. The case is stated in the opinion.

On report. The property held by the executor in trust under the provisions of item second of the will is to be paid by the executor to Mary M. Bradbury as the sole beneficiary of that trust. Accordingly a decree may be entered to that effect. This is a bill in equity brought by Anna Lear praying for the construction of the second clause of the will of John M. Marr, late of Lewiston, deceased. It is the contention of said Anna Lear that this bequest is void.

On motion and exceptions by plaintiff. This is a writ of entry to recover three parcels of land. The only issue was whether a certain deed from William C. Coombs to his mother, Marcia G. Coombs, dated July 1, 1909, was a valid conveyance. The case was submitted to the jury in the form of one question: “Was this deed which was dated and acknowledged July 1, 1909, delivered by the grantor,.

On motion by defendant for new trial. This is an action on the case against the defendant, a physician, for negligently and unskillfully diagnosing and treating his right leg as a sprain only, when in fact both bones were fractured. Plea, general issue. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $5000, and the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.

On motion for new trial by defendant. This is an action on a fire insurance policy issued on plaintiff’s buildings and personal property. The property was destroyed by fire on the 28th day of November, 1912. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $1534.63, and the defendant filed a general motion for a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.

This is an action on the case in which the plaintiff, by his next friend, seeks recovery of damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff while attempting to board a car operated by defendant and alleged to have been occasioned by its negligence. The plaintiff offered evidence as to how the injuries were received and then rested his case. The defendant then offered testimony in contradiction of the testimony of the plaintiff.

This is an action of trover to recover certain moneys which were in the hands of the defendant at the close of a newspaper contest which was the subject of a contract between the parties. There remained in the hands of the defendant $476.40, a balance of moneys collected by him. The plaintiff made demand upon him for said money.

Writ of entry to recover tract of land in Aroostook county. Part of the land claimed in the plaintiff’s writ is marked on the plan or sketch shown in the opinion of the court and called “disputed tract.” The defendant disclaimed as to all of the land lying westerly of the line marked C D on the sketch or plan and pleaded nul disseizin as to the strip between the line A B and the line C D, called the disputed tract.

Bill in equity brought by a wife against her husband to have her share of the purchase price of certain lands sold by her husband declared to be a trust fund, and to compel him to account to her for said share, the wife alleging in her bill that her husband, in order to obtain her signature to the deed, made false and fraudulent statements to her concerning the lands that were intended to be included in the conveyance.

<p> Contingent Bequests. Rights of After born children. Trust Estate. Will. </p> <p>When a will was made the testator had living one son, Edwin, and one daughter, Anna, both children. Afterwards, before his death, he had another daughter born. After his death another son was born. By a trust provision in the will, one thousand dollars was to be paid to the son Edwin when he should be twenty-one years old, and a like sum was to be set apart at the same time for the daughter, Anna; three thousand dollars was to be paid to Edwin when he should arrive at the age of twenty five, and a like sum was then to be set apart for Anna. Edwin died, still a child, in the lifetime of his father. The will provided that “whenever any sums of money shall be paid to or set aside for my said children as hereinbefore provided, a like sum shall be set aside for each of such children hereafter to be born. * * * It being my meaning to place any child or children hereafter to be born upon the same footing with my children now living.” In a bill in equity to construe the will it is held:</p> <p>1. That the provisions for Anna were not contingent upon Edwin’s living to be twenty-one and twenty-five years old. She was entitled to have the specified sums respectively set apart for her whenever Edwin would have been twenty-one and twenty-five, had he lived.</p> <p>2. That after born children are entitled to share equally with those living at the time the will was made.</p> <p>3. That in construing a will, the court will not advise a trustee as to the propriety or legality of acts already done.</p>

The defendant hired and received of the plaintiff company a certain piano, known as the Kohler & Campbell, style K, agreeing to pay certain monthly instalments until the full sum of three hundred dollars had been paid.

This action was dated May 24, 1911, and entered at the September term of court, Piscataquis county, 1911, and was then continued from term to term until the September term, 1915. At September term, 1915, plaintiff filed a motion to amend by inserting the words “fertilizer for” in their appropriate places. To this, defendant objected on the ground that such amendment would introduce a new cause of action.

<p> Appeal. Construction of the words "of the balance or remainder." Intention of testator. Intention of testator governing over language used. Presumption. Wills. </p> <p>1. The expressed intention of a testator as gathered from the language of the whole will, read, in case of doubt, in the light of surrounding conditions, must control, unless in contravention of positive rules of law.</p> <p>2. Words in a will may be supplied, transposed, altered, or disregarded, when the language is contrary to the apparent intention of the testator, not to discover the intention, but to express it properly when discovered.</p> <p>3. A testator disposed of the residuum of his estate by using the following language: — “Of the balance or remainder of my property both real and personal of which I may die possessed, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife Anne Bates Randall,” held, in a bill for the construction of the will, that the whole will read in the light of existing conditions, discloses an intention on the part of the testator to make his widow the residuary devisee and legatee of all of his estate which remained after satisfying the prior bequests in the will, and that the word “of” may be disregarded.</p>

Action on the case for injuries received by plaintiff while employed as a painter by the defendant corporation in its mill at Madison, Maine.

The printed record discloses that each day three to ten checks of 1he defendant company were signed in blank by some person having lawful authority, the same being left with the clerk in the office of the defendant, she having authority to fill in the blank places. Check in question was supposedly stolen and blank places filled in and cashed by plaintiff, who was admitted to be an innocent holder thereof. Payment of same refused by bank.

<p>Complaint and warrant issued under Revised Statutes, Chapter 41, Section 23. Respondent filled demurrer. The presiding Justice overruled demurrer. Complaint adjudged good. Respondent files exceptions to Law Court.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

Action of assumpsit to recover balance of agreed price of thirty-six dryer felts furnished defendant by plaintiff under written contract. The defendant pleaded the general issue, together with a brief statement claiming the right to. recoup in damages on account of the failure of the plaintiff to deliver these felts according to agreement. During the trial, the defendant offered certain copies of letters written by the defendant to the agent of the plaintiff in Boston.

An action on a policy of insurance in the Maine Standard form issued by defendant to the amount of eleven hundred and fifty dollars on the buildings, and contents, of the plaintiff. At the date of the policy the buildings were subject to a mortgage given by plaintiff and the policy was made payable to the mortgagee as her interest might appear.

The testatrix in her will bequeathed to her nephew five hundred dollars, and subsequently, by a codicil to her will, changed that bequest to two hundred dollars; the nephew died before the testatrix, leaving three children and a wife, the appellant, who was appointed administratrix of his estate in Massachusetts.

Respondent was arrested for alleged violation of section 2, chapter 235, Public Laws of 1915. Case reported to Law Court on agreed statement of facts. Case stated in opinion.

Action of assumpsit upon written guaranty. Defendant pleaded general issue and brief statement. By agreement of parties, cause was reported to the Law Court upon so much of the evidence as was legally admissible, the Law Court to render such final judgment therein as the legal rights of the parties require. Case is stated in opinion.

These are actions in equity brought by Fred V. Edgell as plaintiff against William Pitt Hyde and the- New England Cold Storage Company and First National Bank of Portland in one case, and against William Pitt Hyde and the New England Cold Storage Company and the Forest City Trust Company in the other case, as defendants. Upon hearing the court sustained the allegations in the bills of complaint and found for the plaintiff in both cases.

Action of assumpsit to recover balance due for wages of husband and wife. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff for full amount claimed. Motion for new trial filed by defendant. Case stated in opinion.

Actions of assumpsit by indorsee of two promissory notes against the indorser in each, who was also the payee. Plea, general issue. Plaintiff offered notes.

Action of assumpsit brought before Bangor municipal court; writ dated June is, 1915, returnable at a term of said municipal court holden on the first Monday of September following; said first Monday being the sixth day of said month. At return term defendants appeared specially and filed motion to dismiss said action, by reason of it being made returnable to a term of court more than sixty-five days from the date of said writ. Case stated in opinion.

<p> Acceptance of and Qualification for an Office Incompatible with one then held. Defective Ballots. Incompatible Offices. Marking of Ballots. Right of Pauper to Vote. Test of Incompatibility. </p> <p>1. The office of Mayor of Rockland and that of Judge of the. police court of Rockland are incompatible, and cannot legally be held by the same person at the same time.</p> <p>2. If the mayor of a city is appointed to the office of Judge of the police or municipal court of the same city and accepts the latter office, he thereby vacates and resigns the office of mayor.</p> <p>3. If the holder of any office accepts another and incompatible office, he thereby vacates ipso facto the first office.</p> <p>4. If a person claiming to have been elected mayor of a city is, after the election, appointed to, and accepts, the incompatible office of Judge of the police court of the same city, he thereby vacates his right to the office of mayor, and has no further interest in it, and cannot maintain a petition under Revised Statutes, chapter 6, section 70,' to determine whether he was elected.</p> <p>5. It is only when a petitioner under Revised Statutes, chapter 6, section 70, is entitled by law to hold the office claimed by him that an order may be issued to the party unlawfully claiming, or holding the office to yield it up,</p> <p>6. Ballots on which the name “L. H. Duncan” is written are counted for Lucius H. Duncan.</p> <p>7. Where a voter placed a petitioner’s sticker upon and partly covering the name of the respondent; and also wrote underneath the name of the petitioner in full, the ballot is counted for the petitioner.</p> <p>8. In a case where a voter made a cross in a dark space or square at the left of the open white square, above the party designation, the Justices are evenly divided in opinion on the question whether it should be counted; and, therefore, it is not counted.</p> <p>9. Upon the evidence the Justices are of opinion that the respondent Keep is entitled to three more ballots, and the petitioner, Duncan, to two less, than those presented to the court at the hearing, and that Keep was legally elected alderman.</p> <p>10. Petitions under Revised Statutes, chapter 6, section 70, to determine the validity of elections cannot properly be reported to the Law Court for decision. They are to be heard and determined by a single Justice, from whose decision an appeal lies to all the Justices, as such, and not to the Law Court.</p>

<p>Assessment of Damages. Laws, 1913. Construction of Chapter 130, Public Ways.</p> <p>In a complaint brought under R. S. chapter 23, section 68, to recover damages for a change of grade made in Washington avenue, Portland, in the' summer of 1914, it is held:</p> <p>1. That the change of grade was made in pursuance of an order duly passed by the City Council and duly approved by the Mayor on May 4, 1914, in accordance with the report of the City Commissioner of Public Works filed April 23, 1914.</p> <p>2. That the work was done between July 18 and December 1, 1914, under a contract entered into between the city and the Hassam Paving Company, dated June 11, 1914.</p> <p>3. That this statutory liability on the part of the city was not affected by the fact that on February 5, 1914, the State Highway Commission under sec. 8 of chap. 130 of the Public Laws of 1913, designated Washington avenue as a State highway, nor by the fact that the State made a contract with the City under date of July 2, 1914. That contract did not affect the prior contract between the city and the IJassam Company nor did it change the relations between the city and the complainant.</p> <p>4. That under section 14 of the Act of 1913, the state through its Highway Commission has power to change the grade of any street and on proper proceedings damages may be assessed therefor; but this power was not exercised here. The city’s liability remained unchanged.</p>

<p>Action of trover against sheriff of Penobscot county for alleged wrongful acts of one of his deputies. The defendant pleaded general issue and brief statement, setting forth that his deputy, at the time of the committing of the alleged wrongful acts, was acting in his capacity as State agent of the Humane Society of the State of Maine and not in his capacity as deputy sheriff. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action for deceit in the sale of stock of goods, plaintiff alleging misrepresentations as to kind and quality and appraisal value of said goods. Defendant pleaded general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions filed by defendant to admission of certain testimony and rulings of court.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p> De Facto Officer. De Jure Officer. Municipal Corporations. Writ of Certiorari. </p> <p>1. Under an ordinance of the city of Rockland, providing that the city marshal should, with the approbation of mayor and aldermen, appoint annually one of the police force as a deputy, one not a member of the police force, whom the marshal appointed his deputy, and who served as such, was de facto the deputy marshal during his time of service.</p> <p>2. Where the deputy marshal of the city of Rockland, during the time of his service was merely deputy marshal de facto because an ordinance of the city required that a member of the police force be appointed deputy, while the incumbent was not such a member, he ceased to be such by the appointment of a police officer as deputy, who qualified over the incumbent and performed the duties of the office, since there cannot be an officer de jure and one de facto in possession of the same office at the same time.</p> <p>3. Possession of an office is necessary to give a de facto officer any rights in proceedings to try title to the office, since possession of the office is essential to his title to consideration as an official.</p> <p>4. A person not a member of the police force of the city of Rockland, who was appointed to the office of deputy marshal under an ordinance requiring the appointment of a police officer, after his removal by the mayor and aldermen and the appointment of his successor de jure, could not have certiorari to quash the removal proceedings, since the appointment of his de jure sucecssor terminated even his de facto character, while only parties having an interest in proceedings other than a, public interest are entitled to certiorari.</p>

<p> Effect of Removal of Seals or Wafers from Deed after Execution and Delivery. Probate Deeds. </p> <p>Action of trespass quare clausum wherein plaintiff seeks to recover damages on account of defendant tearing down fence and permitting defendant’s cattle to trespass upon the close of the plaintiff. The printed record shows that the plaintiff and her predecessors in title had been in possession of the disputed close under warranty deeds for several years and no question was raised as to their title. In making up the chain of title, plaintiff offered an administrator’s deed, to which objection was raised by defendant, on account of certain irregularities in not complying ■with the provisions of the statute relative to probate deeds. The plaintiff also offered original deed conveying title to her, to which deed defendant offered objections, on the ground that said deed was mutilated, that it did not purport to bear any legal seals and for that reason was void.</p> <p>Defendant offered no evidence of title in himself or any one under whom he claimed or authority from the plaintiff to do the acts complained of, but relied for his defense upon the fact that the plaintiff had neither title nor possession to the disputed premises.</p> <p> Held: </p> <p>1. That under and by virtue of section 30, chapter 73, Revised Statutes, referring to the sales of real estate by license of the probate court that “if the validity of such sale is contested by one claiming adversely to the title of the wife, ward, or deceased aforesaid, or by a title not derived through either, the sale is not void on account of any irregularity in the proceedings, if it appears that the license was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction and the deed duly executed and recorded.”</p> <p>2. That the declaration by the signers of an instrument that they had signed and sealed, the declaration of the subscribing witnesses that it was signed, sealed and delivered in their presence, the certificate of the Notary Public who took the acknowledgment that they acknowledged it to be their free act and deed, that the under part of the seals or wafers remained on said instrument, that the signature of the grantor was written to avoid writing on the seal or wafer, all considered together are sufficient proof, without something to overcome it, that the instrument was what it purported to be, a deed duly sealed, and that the attempted removal of the seals was after the delivery of the deed.</p> <p>3. Such deed or instrument would be a sufficient deed to convey title to the land or premises described therein.</p>

<p>Action on the case to recover damages for injury to certain cattle in the possession of plaintiff. Defendant pleaded general issue and brief statement alleging negligence on the part of plaintiff. Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions filed to certain rulings of Justice presiding, and also general motion for new trial.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Indictment brought under section 5, chapter 123, Revised Statutes. By agreement of parties, the indictment was reported to the Law Court:</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p> Fellow Servant. Incompetent Fellow Servants. Master providing Necessary and Proper Appliances. When Vice-Principal may become a Fellow Servant. </p> <p>1. In an action for injuries received by a servant when an elevator fell, evidence held insufficient to show that the one in charge of the engine and foot brake controlling the elevator was incompetent because he had lost one of his feet.</p> <p>2. A construction company which operated an elevator inside of a building it was erecting some distance from the engine which supplied the motive power, having established a system of bells to regulate operation, and printed the directions in plain_ hand, was not negligent in providing that method of operation.</p> <p>3. Where plaintiff’s fellow servant, who rang the bell to notify the engineer that they desired the elevator to descend, failed to give the proper signal for a loaded cage, and plaintiff was injured by the falling of the cage, there can be no recovery, the negligence being that of a fellow servant.</p> <p>4. Where the vice principal of the defendant master temporarily took the place of the engineer who operated the engine running an elevator, such vice principal under the circumstances became a fellow servant of the other employes for whose negligence in operating the elevator there can be no recovery, it not appearing that he was an incompetent person.</p>

<p>Action of debt brought by collector of taxes to recover tax of personal property of -a non-resident. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions to rulings and instructions of presiding Justice and motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action of trespass for alleged assault and battery. Plea, general issue and brief statement. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant company. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action of trover for conversion of a certain wooden building or cottage. Plea, general issue. Case reported to Law Court upon such evidence as competent and legally admissible; Law Court to render final judgment.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action of asumpsit to recover for alleged services rendered by plaintiff to defendant. Plea, general issue. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiff filed exceptions to one instruction of court in his charge to the jury, and after court had adjourned, counsel for plaintiff, without consent of Justice presiding, made up bill of exceptions and asked that the same be heard.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action upon three promissory notes. Plea, general issue and brief statement. Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions and motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

Action of assumpsit to recover price of certain goods sold and certain profits claimed to be due under an alleged contract. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial and exceptions filed. Case stated in opinion.

<p>Action by Robert H. Gray, an infant under the age of twenty-one years, who sues this action by Belle A. Gray, his next friend, to recover damages on account of the injuries received by plaintiff, through the alleged negligence of defendant. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions and motion for new trial filed by defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant. Plea, general issue. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial filed by 'defendant.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>

<p>Action on the case to recover damages for alleged false arrest and imprisonment. Plea, general issue and brief statement. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant filed exceptions and motion for new trial.</p> <p>Case stated in opinion.</p>