Hughes

Supreme Court of the United States

May 4, 1885.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1885-05-04

ORIGINAL. After announcement of the judgment in this cause, ante, 147, the respondent moved to tax as costs, 1, a docket fee, and 2, his disbursements for printing briefs of counsel, and objections to filing a reply to the relator to the return of the respondent.

2 counsel of record

Cited in Ballentine's (1916)’s definition of “Coupon bond” · Black's (1910)’s definition of “Coupon bonds”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Petition denied / appeal dismissed · 9–0 · Decided 1885-05-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1968 · most notably Warder v. Brady (1940), Tennessee Bond Cases Stevens v. Memphis & C. R. Co. (1885)

9 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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J. N. Dolphe, for the motion.

WAITE, C. J.

¶1

It has never been the practice of this court, in cases brought before it under its appellate jurisdiction, to tax as costs disbursements by counsel or parties for printing briefs. We see no reason for adopting a different rule in cases within our original jurisdiction. A proceeding in this court, under its original jurisdiction, against a judge of an inferior court of the United States to obtain a writ of mandamus requiring him to proceed in a cause pending in court before him, is a civil cause, and a docket fee is, therefore, taxable in favor of the attorney of the prevailing party as part of the costs. The objections to the filing of the reply were in the nature of pleadings in the cause. The disbursements for printing such objections are, therefore, taxable as costs of printing the record.

¶2

The motion, so far as it relates to the printing of briefs, is denied, but in all other respects granted.