Matter of Reading Company 95-1987 Reading Company 95-1988’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance[.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Action Manufacturing Co. v. Simon Wrecking Co. · New Mexico ex rel. N.M. Env't Dep't v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency

2. “[W]e do find a conflict here between Conrail’s common law claims for contribution and restitution and the remedies expressly provided in the statute. The conflict arises because the state law remedies obstruct the intent of Congress. As we explain more fully below, when Congress expressly created a statutory right of contribution in CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g), it made that remedy a part of an elaborate settlement scheme aimed at the efficient resolution of environmental disputes. Permitting independent common law remedies would create a path around the statutory settlement scheme, raising an obstacle to the intent of Congress. We conclude therefore that Conrail’s common law claims are preempted by CERCLA § 113(f).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 91 F. Supp. 2d 743 - Lenox Inc. v. Reuben Smith Rubbish Removal · 13 F. Supp. 2d 1095 - Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.

3. “The fact, however, that a direct action might be brought under § 107(a) does not open the door for a PRP to bring an action for contribution under the same section. Indeed, the fact that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits an action for contribution to be brought “in the absence of a civil action under ... section [107]’’ reinforces our conclusion that Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking contribu tion — at whatever time in the cleanup process the party, seeking contribution, decides to pursue it.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 297 F. Supp. 2d 740 - EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. United States