¶1specially concurring.
¶2At one time I, too, had somewhat the same concerns as Justice Bakes and Justice Shepard.
¶3An ounce of caution being worth a pound of cure, by expending a modicum of energy in betaking myself to the clerk’s office, I discovered in the original file a plaintiff’s motion filed in this Court on April 29, 1987, requesting that we temporarily suspend the appeal and remand the case for the purpose of allowing the trial court to pass upon plaintiff’s motions filed in the trial *201court to modify the divorce decree, particularly the property dispositions thereof by including the military retirement benefits. The motion was based upon a statutory change in Idaho law, ch. 68, 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws 122, effective March 24, 1987, and the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act. When the motion came before the Court membership, only two votes, Huntley, J. and Bistline, J. favored the remand. Hence there was none.
¶4Clearly the plaintiff, through her counsel, was correct in seeking the remand so that the trial court would again be vested with jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
¶5This may present, if I may coin a phrase, an outstanding example of (certain members of) the judiciary being judicially estopped.
¶6. Prior Idaho case law is convincing that when a given case is pending before the appellate court, all jurisdiction is vested solely in that appellate court, until and unless it remands the case back to the inferior court from which it came.