¶1(specially concurring).
¶2I concur in the result reached by the majority determining that an order of the trial court disqualifying Defendant’s retained counsel in a criminal proceeding does not constitute a final appealable order within the contemplation of NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(A)(l) (Repl.Pamp.1991), and SCRA 1986, 12-201 (Repl.1992). I write separately, however, to point out that although our decision here is grounded upon the rationale applied by the United States Supreme Court in Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268-69, 104 S.Ct. 1051,1056, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984), determining that an order disqualifying counsel is a collateral order which fails to qualify as a final appealable order, nevertheless, in New Mexico, by constitutional provision, statute, and Supreme Court rule, a party may seek immediate review of such order by extraordinary writ or writ of error. See N.M. Const, art. VI, § 3 (Repl.Pamp.1992); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-5 (Repl.Pamp.1991); SCRA 1986, 12-503, -504 (Repl.1992).
¶3In Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 616-17 n. 8, 845 P.2d 130, 139-40 n. 8 (1992), our Supreme Court, citing Flanagan, noted that an order disqualifying counsel in a criminal case may be reviewable, in an appropriate case, under the collateral order doctrine by a writ of error. See also State ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 706, 410 P.2d 732, 734-35 (1966) (writ of prohibition may issue in criminal proceeding); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 420-22, 60 P.2d 646, 661-62 (1936) (discussing authority of Supreme Court to issue writ of superintending control).
¶4Although the basis for dismissal of Defendant’s appeal here does not reach Defendant’s challenge to the propriety of the order of disqualification, an order disqualifying Defendant’s counsel of choice is a drastic remedy which should be employed only after the trial court weighs the rights and interests involved and when less severe sanctions or alternatives are found to be inadequate. See Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 161, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1984) (en banc); In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); Ussery v. Gray, 804 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex.Ct.App.1991); see also United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1986) (burden is on prosecution to demonstrate that infringement on the defendant’s choice of counsel is justified); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 244, 629 P.2d 231, 320 (1980) (even violation of professional ethics will not automatically result in disqualification of counsel), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901, 101 S.Ct. 1966, 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981); Zepeda v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App.4th 829, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 263 (1992) (court’s power to disrupt relationship between attorney and client is narrow); Anaya v. People, 764 P.2d 779, 781-83 (Colo.1988) (en banc) (declining to adopt harmless error standard of review where order of disqualification of- counsel is found to have been erroneously entered).
¶5Since the right to be represented in a criminal case is of constitutional dimension, United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1015 (10th Cir.1992), prior to disqualifying an attorney, the trial court must balance a defendant’s interest in being represented by counsel of his choosing, the public interest in the effective administration of justice, and the basic concepts of fundamental fairness. See United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir.1982), modified on other grounds by Flanagan, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288; United States v. Rogers, 471 F.Supp. 847, 853 (E.D.N.Y.1979); People v. Brady, 275 Cal.App.2d 984, 80 Cal.Rptr. 418, 423 (1969).
¶6In the instant case, the order of disqualification which is challenged on appeal does not constitute a final appealable order, nor does it satisfy the criteria of a valid interlocutory appeal, and Defendant did not seek to test the propriety of the trial court's order by applying for an extraordinary writ or writ of error.