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← 115 U.S. 550 - Thompson v. Allen County

Thompson v. Allen County’s Empirical Analysis

115 U.S. 550 · 1885

Citation profile

116
cited by 116 later decisions
9
cited 9 times by the Supreme Court
15
states following
August 2006
most recently cited

35 federal appellate · 16 district · 31 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 116 later decisions (9 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2006 · most notably Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Pangilinan (1988), United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. (1888)

35 federal appellate · 16 district · 31 state decisions — followed in 15 states

2501885189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on State Railroad Tax Cases Taylor Collector et al. v. Secor et al. · Meriwether v. Garrett · Rees v. City of Watertown · Heine v. The Levee Commissioners

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 116 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We see no more reason to hold that the collection of taxes already assessed is a function of a court of equity than the levy or assessment of such taxes. A court of law possesses no power to levy taxes. Its power to compel officers who are lawfully appointed for that purpose, in a case where the duty to do so is clear and is strictly ministerial, rests upon a ground very different from and much narrower than that under which a court of chancery would act in appointing its own officer either to assess or collect such a tax. * * * The power to enforce collection when the tax is levied, or to cause it to be levied by existing officers, is a common-law power, strictly guarded and limited to cases of mere ministerial duty, and is not one of the powers of a court of chancery. * * * No such power has ever yet been exercised by a court of chancery. The appointment of its own officer to collect taxes levied by order of a common-law court is as much without authority, as to appoint the same officer to levy and collect the tax. * * * Not only are the decisions here reviewed of our own court clearly opposed to the exercise of this power by the court of equity, but the decisions of the highest court of the state of Kentucky are equally emphatic. It is the powers derived from the statute law of that state under which alone this tax can be collected.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We are of the opinion that ihis court has not the power to direct a tax to-be levied for the payment of these judgments. This power to impose burdens and raise money is ihe highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only. * * * It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. * * * The appropriate remedy of the plaintiff was and Is a writ of mandamus. This may be repeated as often as the occasion requires. It is a judicial writ, a part of a recognized course of legal proceedings. * * The plaintiff alleges, however, in the present case, that. he has issued such a writ on three different occasions; that, by means of the aid afforded by the Legislature and by the devices and contrivances set forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless; that, in fact, they afford him no remedy. The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is in its execution only. The want of a remedy and the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy are quite distinct, and yet they are confounded in the present proceeding. * * * The legal remedy is adequate and complete, and time and the law must perfect its execution.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““There does not,” said the court, “appear to be any authority founded on the recognized principles of a court of equity on which this bill can be sustained. If sustained at all, it must be on the very broad ground that, because the plaintiff finds himself unable to collect his debt by proceedings at law, it is the duty of a court of equity to devise some mode by which it can be done. It is, however, the experience of every day and of all men that debts are created which are never paid, though the creditor has exhausted all the resources of the law. It is a misfortune, which, in the imperfection of human nature, often admits of no redress. The holder of a corporation bond must, in common with other men, submit to this calamity, when the law affords no relief.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.