115 Wash. App. 634 - Durrah v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]his complaint would be insufficient if it were to be measured by chapter 46 of the Code alone. The facts averred, however, whatever the view of the plaintiff or his counsel in bringing the suit, make a perfect and complete case for a court of equity under chapter 47, section 551, of the Code. The last subdivision of section 551, omitting parenthetical clauses, reads as follows: "Any person in possession, by himself or his tenant, of real property, and any private or municipal corporation in possession by itself or tenant of any real property,... may maintain a civil action against any person or persons, corporations or associations, claiming an interest in said real property, or any part thereof, or any right thereto adverse to him, them, or it, for the purpose of determining such claim, estate, or interest," etc. It is unnecessary to argue that the rights here created and the jurisdiction here conferred are strictly equitable in character. It has been so held by the Supreme Court of the United States in several similar cases. The complaint, therefore, states a good cause of action, and the demurrer was properly overruled.[ [21] ]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Durrah v. Wright

2. “In the early case of Spithill v. Jones , ..., and many subsequent cases ..., we held that the remedy against one in possession of land was ejectment, since any other remedy would deprive the party in possession to his right of trial by jury. But these cases were overruled on that point in the recent case of Brown v. Baldwin ... In [ Brown ] we held that one out of possession claiming land by an equitable title could maintain an action to quiet title against one in possession, and that in such an action full and adequate relief will be granted even to the extent of awarding possession, if such an award be necessary. It was not, of course, there decided that all actions to recover real property were actions of equitable cognizance and triable as such—on the contrary actions to recover real property which present purely legal controversies are still triable as actions at law—but it was decided that where the claimant's rights were of an equitable nature, he need not resort to the fiction of ejectment and have his case presented to a jury merely because the defendant was in possession of the property.[ [34] ]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Durrah v. Wright

3. “The founders of this state brought with them to their new abode the usages to which they had been accustomed in the land from which they emigrated. Among them was trial by jury. That mode of trial had long been considered the right of every Englishman, and it had come to be regarded as a right too sacred to be surrendered or taken away. Even in England it was fundamental or constitutional, so far as any right can be where there is no written frame of government. Its extent and its privileges, how and when it was to be enjoyed, were perfectly understood, and in bringing it with them the founders of the Commonwealth doubtless intended to bring it as they had enjoyed it. None of the frames of government or constitutions under which we have lived have contemplated any extension of the right beyond the limits within which it had been enjoyed previous to the settlement of the state or the adoption of the constitution.... [The constitutional provision] look[s] to preservation, not extension. It is the old right, whatever it was, the one previously enjoyed, that must remain inviolable.... [ [11] ]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Durrah v. Wright