Ellingham v. Morton’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
8
cited by 8 later decisions
4
states following
February 2009
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In my view, the common law principle of not recognizing fractions of days in computing time is as much a fiction as the rule that a person is deemed to attain a given age on the day preceding the anniversary of his birth [citations omitted]. New York courts indeed have, in the appropriate case, considered fractions of a day in computing time. ‘The law does not regard fractions of a day, except in cases where the hour itself is material, as is the case where priority of judgments is in question [citations omitted].’ [Citations omitted.] ‘As a general rule the court does not inquire into the fractions of a day, except for the purpose of guarding against injustice.’ [Citations omitted.] “In the instant case, the precise hour of defendant’s birth is material because it is at that time, on his anniversary, that he turned 16. Injustice would be done if he is forced to face the criminal justice system rather than the juvenile delinquent justice system before he was truly an adult under the statute. ‘[Cjriminal statutes must be “strictly construed against the party seeking their enforcement and in favor of the person being proceeded against.” ’ [Citations omitted.] Under the circumstances, defendant should be given the benefit of the fractional hour of his birth in relationship to the time the crime was committed, and the writ should be granted because at that time the criminal court lacked jurisdiction over him.” 116 App. Div. 2d at 1033-34 (Doerr, J., dissenting).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““In People v. Stevenson, 23 A.D.2d 472 , 262 N.Y.S.2d 238 , revd. on dissenting opn. below, 17 N.Y.2d 682 , 269 N.Y.S.2d 458 , 216 N.E.2d 615 , the Court of Appeals rejected the common law rule that a person reaches his next year of age on the day before his birthday and held that he does not do so until the day of his birthday. This, however, did not change the common law principle that in determining a persons age, fractions of days are not computed, (see Parker v. State of Maryland, 61 Md. App. 35 , 484 A.2d 1020, 1022 ; State v. Brown, 443 S.W.2d 805, 807 , supra; see also, People v. Anderson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 563 , 64 Ill. Dec. 136, 142-143 , 439 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 ). Nor do we think it ought to be changed, for it furnishes a rule of uniformity and certainty that is most desirable (see Leo v. Maro Display, Inc., [ 122 R.I. 737 ], 412 A.2d at p. 222 ).” (Emphasis added.) 116 App. Div. 2d at 1033.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.