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← 116 Ill. 2d 133 - People v. Lucente

116 Ill. 2d 133 - People v. Lucente’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

134
cited by 134 later decisions
4
states following
June 2025
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 9 district · 118 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 134 later decisions — most recently June 2025 · most notably 223 Ill. 2d 187 - People v. Sutherland (2006), 133 Ill. 2d 173 - People v. Eyler (1989)

4 federal appellate · 9 district · 118 state decisions

68019871990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Franks v. Delaware · McCray v. State of Illinois · 22 Cal. 3d 67 - People v. Cook · State v. Burnett · 45 Ill. 2d 140 - The People v. Bak

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 , 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672 , 98 S. Ct. at 2676 .”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"While it is true that the defendant’s ultimate burden is to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant-officer made deliberate or reckless false statements, Franks does not require that the defendant disprove every other possibility at the preliminary stage. If an'informant’s identity — or very existence — is unknown, a defendant obviously lacks the very information necessary to determine the source of the false statements. If such a preliminary showing were demanded, no hearing could ever result in cases in which all the information to establish probable cause came from an unnamed informant. One need not be overly cynical to realize that such a rule would enable the police to insulate perjury from discovery by the simple expedient of a fabricated informant, and thereafter 'remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile’ [citation], *** [Such an inflexible application of Franks] would permit the very evisceration of the probable-cause requirement which Franks seeks to prevent.” Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 149-50 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"Franks is intended to create a limited right to veracity challenges. In striking the balance between the concerns discussed above, the trial judge must keep in mind the presumption of validity of the search warrant and the limited nature of the exception to that presumption created by Franks. The judge should also consider that, in passing on the motion, the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not being determined. The end sought by the motion is the suppression of evidence through the application of the exclusionary rule as a sanction against the officers for an alleged fourth amendment violation. *** *** [T]he trial court’s judgment [will not be disturbed if it] is exercised within permissible limits.” (Emphasis in original.) Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 153 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.