116 Ind. App. 545 - Mendenhall v. Mendenhall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘* * * As was said in the case of Walker et al. v. Walker et al. (1898), 150 Ind. 317, 328 , 50 N. E. 68 , 71: “ ‘Where the wife proves recreant to her marriage obligations, and has destroyed the marital union by acts of adultery or other gross misconduct, and her husband is thereby entitled to a decree of divorce, the court granting the same, has the discretionary power, and, under proper circumstances warranting the same, will generally exercise it, and allot to the injured husband such a portion of the property or means which he had settled upon the wife as will place him in the position, to some extent at least, which he would have occupied had the union continued.’ “ ‘This rule was approved in Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 1946, 116 Ind. App. 545 , 64 N. E. 2d 806 , and in the case of Wallace v. Wallace, [ 123 Ind. App. 454 , 110 N. E. 2d 514 , 111 N. E. 2d 90 ] supra. Therefore, without holding so, we do not come to the arbitrary conclusion that a husband is not entitled to alimony in this state given the proper surrounding circumstances.’ ””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 123 Ind. App. 454 - Wallace v. Wallace · 151 Ind. App. 26 - Stigall v. Stigall

2. ““In its decree the court ordered the appellant to return to the appellee certain U. S. War Bonds .which he had purchased and caused to be issued payable to himself and wife jointly. The appellant contends that, even though the consideration paid for said bonds was the separate property of the appellee, it is presumed that he intended to make her an absolute gift of one-half interest therein. We recognize this to be the general rule, Radabcmgh V. Radabcmgh, supra, but such presumption, of course, vanishes in the face of direct evidence to the contrary. The evidence most favorable to the appellee on this point indicates that he never intended his wife to have any present vested interest in the bonds in question, during his lifetime. He bought them out of his separate estate and retained possession of them until they were removed by the appellant from a strongbox without his knowledge and to which box she had gained access without his free-will consent. On these facts we hold that there was no delivery, actual or constructive, and that the appellant had no vested interest in the bonds in controversy and the court was perfectly free to make such disposition of them between the parties as it concluded would meet the ends of justice.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 131 Ind. App. 38 - Smith v. Smith

3. ““Having once acquired such jurisdiction in any manner recognized by law and the period of inhibition having expired, there seems to be no logical reason to render a court powerless to proceed because such jurisdiction was acquired in some other manner than by service of summons. It is our opinion that any procedure amounting to the legal equivalent of service of summons satisfies the requirements of the statute. In the case before us the appellant, upon learning of this action, employed counsel and in his company voluntarily appeared and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.” (Our emphasis.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 130 Ind. App. 659 - WATSON ETC. v. Dept. of Public Welfare