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116 Mass. 108

Brown v. Smith

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided October 5, 1874

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1874-10-05

<p>A conveyance of real estate made by a mortgagee both in his own name and a» attorney of the mortgagor, and which declares that it is made by virtue of every other power and authority them thereto enabling, as well as by virtue of and in execution of the power of sale contained in the mortgage deed, operates as an assignment of the mortgagee’s interest, even if the fee is not conveyed by reason of a defect in the execution of the power; and if the assignee is in possession oí the premises after condition broken, the owner of the equity of redemption can not maintain a writ of entry against him.</p>

Relies on Parsons v. Welles

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-10-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently October 2011

11 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Gray, C. J.

¶1The deed executed by Fay in his own name, as Well as in the name and as the attorney of the mortgagor, is expressly declared to be made by virtue of every other power and authority them thereto enabling, as well as by virtue and in execution of the power contained in the mortgage deeds. The affi*111davit as to the execution of the power of sale does not affect the legal operation of the deed in other respects. If it was not a valid execution of that power and therefore did not convey an absolute foe, it at least passed the mortgagee’s title to the grantee. Mrs. Smith, under his subsequent deed to her, has either an absolute title in fee, or a title in mortgage; and it is unnecessary and immaterial to the judgment in this action to consider which it is; for in either alternative, she being in possession after breach of the condition of the mortgage, the mortgagor, or any other person claiming title under him, cannot maintain a writ of entry against her. Parsons v. Welles, 17 Mass. 419.

¶2The verdict directed for the demandant upon the ground that she took no title under the sale by Fay must therefore be set aside, and a New trial ordered.

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