116 So. 3d 1240 - Franks v. Bowers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he Legislature set out its factual findings in the preamble of chapter 88-1, which initially enacted the [Medical Malpractice Recommendations of the Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems], In fact, the preamble in chapter 88-1 states in part: [I]t is the sense of the Legislature that if the present crisis is not abated, many persons who are subject to civil actions will be unable to purchase liability insurance, and many injured persons will therefore be unable to recover damages for either their economic losses or their noneconomic losses. ... Ch. 88-1. This preamble clearly states the Legislature’s conclusion that the current medical malpractice insurance crisis constitutes an “overpowering public necessity.” Moreover, the Legislature made a specific factual finding that “[mjedical malpractice liability insurance premiums have increased dramatically in recent years, resulting in increased unavailability of malpractice insurance for some physicians.” § 766.201(l)(a). The Legislature’s factual and policy findings are supported by the Task Force’s findings in its report.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 211 So. 3d 19 - Eileen Hernandez, M.D. v. Lualhati Crespo

2. “(2) Upon the completion of presuit investigation with preliminary reasonable grounds for a medical negligence claim intact, the parties may elect to have damages determined by an arbitration panel. Such election may be initiated by either party by serving a request for voluntary binding arbitration of damages within 90 days after service of the claimant’s notice of intent to initiate litigation upon the defendant.... [[Image here]] (7)(f) The defendant shall pay the claimant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as determined by the arbitration panel, but in no event more than 15 percent of the award, reduced to present value. (g) The defendant shall pay all the costs of the arbitration proceeding and the fees of all the arbitrators other than the administrative law judge. (h) Each defendant who submits to arbitration under this section shall be jointly and severally liable for all damages assessed pursuant to this section.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Santiago v. Baker

3. “It is therefore clear from a full review of the Medical Malpractice Statute that the legislative quid pro quo for patients in exchange for both a substantial limitation on noneconomic damages to a maximum of $260,000 per incident and the right to a jury trial was that a defendant would be required to admit liability. This elearly expressed public policy in the statute, however, has been expressly contravened by the Financial Agreement in this case, which eviscerates statutory rights without providing the injured patient with any of the added benefits or incentives provided for by the Legislature. Further, by requiring arbitration without in turn requiring the counterbalance of the defendant admitting liability, the Financial Agreement undermines the public policy set forth in the statute of reducing attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and delay.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 211 So. 3d 19 - Eileen Hernandez, M.D. v. Lualhati Crespo