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← 116 U.S. 167 - Smith v. Whitney

Smith v. Whitney’s Empirical Analysis

116 U.S. 167 · 1886

Citation profile

342
cited by 342 later decisions
67
cited 67 times by the Supreme Court
21
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

74 federal appellate · 32 district · 54 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 342 later decisions (67 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2017 · most notably Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy (1961), Parker v. Levy (1974)

74 federal appellate · 32 district · 54 state decisions — followed in 21 states

54018861890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Plowden Weston v. The City Council of Charleston · Wales v. Whitney · United States v. Schurz · Kurtz v. Moffitt · Martin v. Mott

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 342 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““A writ of prohibition is never to be issued, unless it clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Of questions not depending upon the construction of the statutes, but upon unwritten military law or usage, within the jurisdiction of, courts-martial, military or naval officers, from their training and experience in the service, are more competent judges than the courts of common law. This is nowhere better stated than by Mr. Justice Perry in the Supreme Court of Bombay, saying: ‘And the principle of the noninterference of the courts of law with the procedure of courts-martial is clear and obvious. The ground work of the jurisdiction, and the extent of the powers of courts-martial, are to be found in the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War, and upon all questions arising upon these her Majesty’s judges are competent to decide; but the Mutiny Act and Articles of War do not alone constitute the military code, for they are, for the most part, silent upon all that relates to the procedure of the military tribunals to be erected under them. Now this procedure is founded upon the usages and customs of war, upon the regulations issued by the Sovereign, and upon old practice in the army, as to all which points common-law judges have no opportunity, either from their law books or from the course of their experience, to inform themselves. It would therefore be most illogical, to say nothing of the impediments to military discipline which would thereby be interposed, to apply to the proceedings of courts-martial those rules which are applicable to another and different course of pract”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““ The question of fraud being out of the case, and the court-martial having properly acquitted the claimant on the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, imposed this sentence: t ‘ To be suspended from rank, duty and pay for the period of three years.’ The record then went to the President and was by him referred to the Attorney General. Oh the 11th of February, 1885, the President returned’ the record to the court-martial ‘ for reconsideration as to the findings upon, the first charge only, and as to the sentence, neither of which are believed to be pommensurate with the offences as found by the court in the first and third specifications under the first charge.’ The President also communicated to the court the opinion of the Attorney General, $ whose views,’ he added, ‘ upon the matter submitted for reconsideration have my concurrence.’ “The court-martial adhered to its determination>that the facts found did not constitute the offence charged, but imposed a second sentence upon the accused, the language of which is as follows: ‘The court, upon mature reconsideration, has not found the accused guilty of such degree of wrongful or deceitful conduct as to justify a finding of guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and has therefore respectfully adhered to its findings upon the first charge.’ Put the court imposed the following sentence: ‘To be sus'-pended from rank and duty for one year, with forfeiture of all pay for the same period, and”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.