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← 117 F.3d 742 - Hamilton v. Leavy

Hamilton v. Leavy’s Empirical Analysis

117 F.3d 742 · 1997

Citation profile

88
cited by 88 later decisions
August 2024
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 10 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 88 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Sharrar v. Felsing (1997), Dawes v. Walker (2001)

27 federal appellate · 10 district ·

4601997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Farmer v. Brennan · Whitley v. Albers · Rhodes v. Chapman

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 88 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “For an inmate to prevail on an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, two requirements must be met. First, the prisoner must demonstrate “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” [Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ]. This element is satisfied when the alleged “punishment” is “objectively sufficiently serious.” Id. Second, the prison officials involved must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 838 , 114 S.Ct. 1970”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the 'mere scintilla' threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.