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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 23-30424 September 6, 2024
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Michael R. Holmes,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Corbett Reddoch; Gerald A. Turlich, Jr., in his official
capacity as sheriff of Plaquemines Parish,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-CV-12749
______________________________
Before Wiener, Elrod, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:
This civil rights lawsuit, that involves 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana
state law, arises out of the investigatory stop and subsequent arrest of Plaintiff-Appellee Michael Holmes by Defendant-Appellant Corbett Reddoch, a
Plaquemines Parish Deputy Sheriff. Following a three-day trial, the jury
found in favor of Holmes on, inter alia, his unlawful arrest claim under the
Fourth Amendment. Reddoch appeals, contending that the district court
erred in denying his motions for (1) judgment as a matter of law, and (2) a
new trial. We AFFIRM.
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I. Background 1
In September of 2018, Holmes attended a public fair located at Our
Lady of Perpetual Help School in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Holmes, a
member of a camera club in Metairie, wanted to test out a new camera lens
he had recently gotten. 2 He arrived at the fair at approximately 4:00 p.m. in
the afternoon. After his arrival, he and a friend, Amos Jay Cormier, III,
engaged in a “pleasant conversation” about local politics. Cormier testified
that Holmes was “his normal cordial polite self” during that conversation—
“a very civilized man, a civilized gentleman.” Cormier testified that, to the
best of his knowledge, Holmes had not been drinking. At some point between
4:00 and 4:30 p.m., Holmes saw another friend of his, James Olsen, and
struck up a conversation about photography. Similar to Cormier’s testimony,
Olsen explained that Holmes was his “usual” self and “sober.”
Holmes then began testing his new camera lens by taking pictures of
an amusement ride that had a colorful mural on it. He climbed up one of the
slides to gain a suitable vantage point and took all of the pictures he would
take that day at the fair between 5:12 p.m. and 5:14 p.m. 3 Holmes then visited
the various fair booths, during which time he observed a girl he wanted to
invite on future photography club field trips. He testified that he had already
_____________________
1
“We credit the non-moving party’s evidence and disregard all evidence favorable
to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega,
708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
2
This was not itself unusual, as the fair was a popular community event, featuring
a roller coaster and game and food booths, among other attractions, at which visitors would
often take photographs. Holmes had attended the fair several times before. The previous
year, Holmes took pictures of the band performing at the fair and emailed them to a parish
priest.
3
Each photograph that Holmes took at the fair that day was shown to the jury.
Some of those photographs also captured children sitting on the ride and waiting in line to
get on the ride.
2
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announced to the club that he planned to take his niece’s children and other
children on an upcoming club trip to take photographs at an amusement park.
He approached a woman whom he believed to be the girl’s mother,
introduced himself by name, and they exchanged contact information. He did
not take a picture of the child.
Some time later, Holmes was standing approximately “35 to 40 feet
from the sheriff’s dunking booth,” watching people throw baseballs at the
dunk booth target. As he was watching, someone tapped him on the shoulder.
He turned around and saw it was a Plaquemines Parish deputy sheriff—later
determined to be Reddoch—who asked for Holmes’s identification. Holmes
“very calmly asked [Reddoch] why,” to which Reddoch only responded
“[f]ollow me.” Holmes began to comply with the officer’s instruction, but
then stopped after following Reddoch for a few paces. Reddoch noticed that
Holmes had stopped, turned to approach Holmes, and again asked for
Holmes’s identification. Holmes asked a second time for an explanation,
then “got the impression that something was up,” and so he “put [his] hands
down by [his] side with [his] palms open so [Reddoch] would see that [he]
was no threat.” Reddoch then “stepped up close” to Holmes’s left side,
grabbed his wrist, and, as Holmes testified:
[Reddoch] had me by my left wrist forcefully and he had his
other arm across my shoulder blade and the back of my upper
arm, my humerus against [his] tricep muscle, and he stepped
in front of me. He was on my left. He had ahold of me like this.
He put his arm against my shoulder blade, pulled my left arm
up and stepped in front of me and tripped me and threw me to
the ground.
Once Holmes was face down on the ground, Reddoch “kneeled on
[Holmes’s] back with all his weight.” After other deputies arrived and
assisted in handcuffing Holmes, Reddoch escorted Holmes back to the
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entrance of the fair. Holmes continued to ask Reddoch why he had been
arrested, to which Reddoch replied: “You were taking pictures of children.”
Holmes was only charged with resisting arrest. Holmes testified that,
following his arrest, Reddoch told him: “We’re going to throw you in prison
and I’m going to tell—make sure all the other prisoners know why you’re
in[.]”
Holmes filed suit in federal district court, asserting various theories of
liability under state and federal law. Pertinent to this appeal, he made claims
under the Fourth Amendment for Reddoch’s investigatory stop and his
arrest of Holmes. On remand from the first appeal in this matter, 4 in which
another panel of this court reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Reddoch, the case ultimately proceeded to trial. After
Holmes finished his case-in-chief, Reddoch moved for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to
Holmes’s federal claims for his unlawful stop and subsequent arrest, the
motion was denied. At the close of trial, Holmes and Reddoch filed crossmotions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, which were also
denied. The following federal-law claims then proceeded to verdict: (1)
unreasonable stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) unreasonable
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (3) excessive force, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and (4) retaliation for protected speech, in
violation of the First Amendment.
The jury found that (1) Reddoch unreasonably stopped Holmes, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but that he was entitled to qualified
immunity; (2) Reddoch unreasonably arrested Holmes, in violation of the
_____________________
4
Holmes v. Reddoch, No. 21-30164, 2021 WL 5913297 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2021)
(unpublished).
4
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Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not shield him from
liability; (3) Holmes failed to prove his Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) Holmes failed to prove his
First Amendment retaliation claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The
jury also found in favor of Holmes on his state-law claims of battery, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Reddoch filed a post-verdict
motion for a new trial under Rule 59, which the district court denied.
Following the district court’s entry of judgment in accordance with the
verdict, Reddoch timely appealed.
Reddoch appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for
judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, primarily challenging whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict with respect to
Holmes’s claims for unlawful investigatory stop and unlawful arrest under
the Fourth Amendment, as well as the jury’s award of punitive damages
under § 1983. He does not contest the jury’s verdict as to the state-law
claims.
II. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying
Reddoch’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment
as a matter of law “de novo and appl[y] the same deferential standard as the
district court does in reviewing the jury’s verdict.” Johnston v. Ferrellgas,
Inc., 96 F.4th 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2024). “A district court must deny a motion
for judgment as a matter of law unless the facts and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors
could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc.,
693
F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The court “must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
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the nonmovant, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, and leaving credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury.” Johnston, 96
F.4th at 857 (citation omitted). Additionally, in conducting such a review, we
“credit the non-moving party’s evidence and disregard all evidence favorable
to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Abraham,
708
F.3d at 620 (internal alterations accepted) (quoting Brown v. Sudduth,
675
F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012)). “After a jury trial, [the] standard of review is
especially deferential.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brown,
675 F.3d
at 477).
“Courts of appeals are ‘wary of upsetting jury verdicts’ and will do so
only if there is no ‘substantial evidence’ that supports the verdict.” Johnston,
96 F.4th at 857 (first quoting Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd.,
650 F.3d
1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 2011), then quoting Baisden,
693 F.3d at 499).
“Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that
reasonable and fair-minded [jurors] in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions.”
Id. (quoting Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum,
Inc.,
211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000)).
B. Discussion
On appeal, Reddoch contends that there was insufficient evidence on
which the jury could conclude that his investigatory stop and arrest of
Holmes were unconstitutional. Reddoch broadly asserts (1) that there was
probable cause to arrest Holmes; and (2) that, in the alternative, Reddoch
was entitled to qualified immunity. We address each of those assertions in
turn.
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1. Whether Reddoch Had Probable Cause to Arrest Holmes 5
“As a baseline, ‘the constitutional claim of false arrest requires a
showing of no probable cause.’” Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th
Cir. 2024) (brackets omitted) (quoting Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton,
568 F.3d
181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Probable cause . . . requires ‘a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.’”
Id. (quoting Winfrey v. Rogers,
901 F.3d 483, 495 (5th Cir. 2018)).
The jury rejected Reddoch’s contention that he had probable cause to arrest
Holmes for any crime. On appeal, Reddoch asserts that the evidence shows
that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes for: (1) resisting arrest, in
violation of
La. Stat. Ann. § 14:108; and (2) disturbing the peace, in
violation of
La. Stat. Ann. § 14:103. 6 Reddoch thus says that the district
court erred in denying his Rule 50 motion regarding Holmes’s federal false
arrest claim because that arrest was predicated on probable cause for
Holmes’s violation of these state statues.
Louisiana’s “resisting arrest” statute states, in pertinent part:
Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with,
opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual
_____________________
5
Reddoch also asserts that the jury erred in concluding that the investigatory stop
violated the Fourth Amendment. We confine our discussion of this portion of the jury’s
verdict to whether the district court erred in denying Reddoch’s motion for a new trial.
This is because the jury ultimately found for Reddoch on the unreasonable investigatory
stop claim by concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
6
Reddoch also maintains that the arrest was supported by probable cause because
Holmes had two traffic attachments from Jefferson Parish. The district court limited the
admissibility of these traffic attachments to the issue of damages only and did not permit
the evidence to be introduced on the issue of probable cause. This pretrial evidentiary
ruling is not on appeal. Regardless, the district court did not err in excluding such evidence
on the claim, because Reddoch became aware of the traffic attachments only after arresting
Holmes and taking his ID. That purported justification for arrest is wholly without merit.
7
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acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a
lawful arrest, lawful detention, or seizure of property or to
serve any lawful process or court order when the offender
knows or has reason to know that the person arresting,
detaining, seizing property, or serving process is acting in his
official capacity.
The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition
to its common meaning, signification, and connotation mean
the following:
[. . . .]
Refusal by the arrested or detained party to give his name and
make his identity known to the arresting or detaining officer or
providing false information regarding the identity of such party
to the officer.
La. Stat. Ann. § 14:108(A)–(B)(1), B(1)(c) (emphasis added). It is
undisputed that Reddoch approached Holmes at the fair. Reddoch testified
that he asked if he could speak with him, to which Holmes responded with an
aggressive and expletive-laden refusal. In contrast, Holmes testified that
Reddoch had walked up to him and immediately demanded to see his
identification, to which Holmes asked: “Why?” On cross-examination,
Reddoch testified that Holmes’s angry outburst could be heard from
approximately 50 feet away. But despite the fact that, according to Reddoch,
the purportedly expletive-inflected response from Holmes was made in front
of a group of children, and approximately fifty feet away from another officer
in the vicinity, no one testified that they heard that alleged exchange. And,
Reddoch admitted that he never included Holmes’s angry outburst in any
incident report. The jury was thus entitled to conclude that Reddoch’s
testimony was not credible and to accept Holmes’s version of events. Under
the applicable standard of review, the jury’s decision as to which version to
believe is entitled to significant deference. See Abraham,
708 F.3d at 620
(“We credit the non-moving party’s evidence and disregard all evidence
8
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favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.”)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Accepting, then, that Reddoch walked up to Holmes and immediately
demanded his identification, to which Holmes replied, “Why?,” Reddoch’s
assertion that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes for violation of § 14:108
fails. This is because, according to his testimony, Holmes never refused to
identify himself—he merely wanted to know why an officer was making that
demand. According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment is not
offended when a state statute only requires a detainee to state his or her name.
See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 184–85 (2004)
(“[T]he statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license
or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or
communicates it to the officer by other means . . . the statute is satisfied and
no [Fourth Amendment] violation occurs.”) (citing analogous statute from
Nevada). And this court has recognized the principle that “the police cannot
arrest an individual solely for refusing to provide identification.” Turner v.
Lieutenant Driver,
848 F.3d 678, 695 (5th Cir. 2017). Unsurprisingly,
§ 14:108B(1)(b)-(c) conforms to these precedents, as it only criminalizes the
refusal to provide a name after being lawfully detained or arrested. According
to the jury, relying on Holmes’s testimony, Holmes did not refuse to provide
his name prior to his arrest. He only asked for an explanation in response to
a request that, according to our precedents, he need not have heeded. The
jury and the district court reasonably rejected Reddoch’s contention that §
14:108(B) provided him with probable cause to arrest Holmes.
Reddoch’s second justification—Holmes’s purported disturbance of
the peace, in violation of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:103—fails for the same
reason. Louisiana’s disturbance-of-the-peace statute provides, in pertinent
part:
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Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such
manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public:
[. . .]
Addressing any offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any
other person who is lawfully in any street, or other public place;
or call him by an offensive or derisive name, or make any noise
or exclamation in his presence and hearing with the intent to
deride, offend, or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing
his lawful business, occupation, or duty[.]
§ 14:103(A)(2). When we accept Holmes’s version of events, as the jury
reasonably did, Holmes’s behavior did not provide Reddoch with probable
cause to arrest him under this statute. That is because, according to Holmes,
Reddoch approached him and immediately demanded that he produce his
identification, prompting Holmes to calmly ask why Reddoch was making
that request. The jury rejected Reddoch’s contention that Holmes launched
an angry tirade at Reddoch—a credibility determination that was accepted by
the district court in its decision to reject Reddoch’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law 7 and that we must also accept on appeal. See Abraham, 708
F.3d at 620 (observing that the court “disregard[s] all evidence favorable to
[the moving party] that the jury is not required to believe”).
In sum, Reddoch’s contention that the evidence elucidated at trial
shows that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes fails. The district court
thus did not err in denying Reddoch’s Rule 50 motion on these bases.
2. Whether Reddoch was Entitled to Qualified Immunity
_____________________
7
“As the finder of fact in this case, the jury was empowered to weigh the evidence
and determine that Holmes did not resist arrest—either physically or by asking ‘why’
Reddoch was stopping him and asking for his identification.”
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Alternatively, Reddoch contends that Holmes “failed to meet his
burden of overcoming Deputy Reddoch’s defense of qualified immunity
because he failed to show that Deputy Reddoch violated clearly established
law.” Thus, says Reddoch, the district court should have granted his Rule 50
motion. Holmes, on the other hand, asserts that Reddoch forfeited the issue
of qualified immunity by failing to assert it as a justification in his Rule 50
motion at trial. The issue of Reddoch’s entitlement to qualified immunity,
says Holmes, was thus properly submitted to the jury. We agree.
“A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time
before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the judgment
sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) (emphasis added). When, as here, a district court “does
not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a),
the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the
court’s later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50(b) (emphasis added). We have observed that “courts prohibit parties
from using a Rule 50(b) motion to assert a ground that was not included in
the original motion.” Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also In re Isbell
Records, Inc.,
774 F.3d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014)(“Since a Rule 50(b) motion
is technically only a renewal of the Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter
of law, it cannot assert a ground that was not included in the original
motion.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and alterations omitted);
Arsement v. Spinnaker Expl. Co.,
400 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2005) (“If a party
fails to raise an issue in its Rule 50(a)(1) motions at trial, it may not do so in
its post-trial Rule 50(b) motion.”).
The record confirms that Reddoch did not predicate either of his Rule
50 motions during trial on qualified immunity as to the federal false arrest
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claim. 8 Neither does Reddoch explain why—or how—the district court
could have erred in denying a motion on a basis that was not raised. The issue
was thus properly submitted to the jury, and the district court did not err in
denying Reddoch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on that basis. 9
III. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying
Reddoch’s Motion for a New Trial
Reddoch next asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion for a new trial under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 49 and 59. That
is because he claims that the verdict is “irreconcilably inconsistent” as to (1)
its conclusions on Holmes’s false stop and false arrest claims, and (2) its
award of punitive damages under § 1983.
_____________________
8
The record is ambiguous but ultimately does not favor Reddoch. Both of
Reddoch’s Rule 50 motions were made orally at trial. In the first, Reddoch moved for
judgment for “the claims for malicious prosecution or false arrest.” Reddoch did not
mention qualified immunity when making the motion. Reddoch mentioned qualified
immunity only later in response to a subsequent question from the district court about
Holmes’s malicious prosecution claim. The district court accordingly granted the motion
“as to qualified immunity” on the federal malicious prosecution claim but denied the other
claims. Reddoch’s second motion then simply renewed the first “motion as previously
urged.” On appeal, Reddoch also did not state in his brief that he raised qualified immunity
in either motion. Reddoch thus did not “specify … the law and facts” entitling him to
judgment on the false arrest claim on the basis of qualified immunity as required by Rule
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2).
9
To be sure, the determination of whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity is not the exclusive province of district courts: “[I]n certain circumstances where
there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury, properly
instructed, may decide the question.” Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mesa v. Prejean,
543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.
2008)); see also McCoy v. Hernandez,
203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that if the
district court has not decided the issue of qualified immunity before trial, then “the defense
[of qualified immunity] goes to the jury which must then determine the objective legal
reasonableness of the officers’ conduct”). This is exactly what happened below: the jury
was instructed on qualified immunity and decided whether or not Reddoch was entitled to
it for each claim.
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A. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
Fornesa v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 897 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2018). As we
have explained:
In reviewing such a denial, all the factors that govern our
review of the trial court’s decision favor affirmance, and we
must affirm the verdict unless the evidence—viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict—points so strongly
and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court
believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
conclusion.
Baisden, 693 F.3d at 504 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
(quoting Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada,
591 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 2009)). Thus,
“when the district court has denied a new trial motion,” this court’s “review
is particularly limited.” Cowart v. Erwin,
837 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Alaniz,
591 F.3d at 770).
B. Discussion
Reddoch argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
a new trial because the verdict is “irredeemably illogical and inconsistent”
under Rules 49 and 59. In Reddoch’s view, the “issues of reasonable
suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest” are not “distinct causes of
action.” Reddoch says that “if [he] was reasonable in his belief that his
detention of [Holmes] was not unlawful, then he was also reasonable in his
belief that his arrest of [Holmes] was lawful.” The district court rejected that
argument, concluding that the stop and subsequent arrest of Holmes were
distinct actions under the Fourth Amendment. We agree.
To begin, Reddoch fails to cite any authority for this contention, so he
has forfeited the argument for his failure to adequately brief it. See Fed. R.
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App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 285 n.9 (5th Cir.
2017); L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc.,
17 F.3d 106, 113 & n.27
(5th Cir. 1994). But, even on the merits, Reddoch’s argument is inapposite.
In essence, he asserts that, because the jury found him to be entitled to
qualified immunity for the unreasonable stop, it necessarily follows that he
was entitled to qualified immunity for the subsequent arrest. First, the
standards for conducting a lawful stop and for conducting a lawful arrest
under the Fourth Amendment are different: “Police may detain a suspect
and briefly investigate when they have reasonable suspicion, based on specific
and articulable facts and rational inferences, that justifies the intrusion. This
standard is less stringent than the probable cause standard required for a full
arrest.” United States v. Abdo,
733 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
citation omitted); see also United States v. Vickers,
540 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir.
2008) (“Reasonable suspicion requires less information and certainty than
the probable cause needed to make an arrest.”).
Second, we recognize that an unlawful stop and an unlawful arrest are
independent causes of action under § 1983. See Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 67 F.3d
1174, 1180 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397 (1997) (“Assuming arguendo
that the deputies had a reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop,
we nevertheless find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
[the officer] did not have probable cause to arrest [petitioner], and that his
doing so violated her constitutional right to be free from false arrest.”). When
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury’s
conclusions make sense: Although Reddoch’s investigatory stop of Holmes
to discuss a complaint he had received about a man allegedly taking
photographs of children at the fair was not supported by reasonable
suspicion, Reddoch was reasonable in his belief that the investigatory
detention was lawful (put differently, he was entitled to qualified immunity).
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However, he unlawfully arrested Holmes, and he was unreasonable in his
belief that he could effect a lawful arrest of Holmes for any crime. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Reddoch’s motion
for a new trial on that basis.
Finally, Reddoch argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for a new trial because the jury’s award of punitive damages under
§ 1983 was inconsistent with its determination that Reddoch was entitled to
qualified immunity for his stop of Holmes. Reddoch avers that this was error
because (1) the jury’s determination that Reddoch’s stop of Holmes was
shielded by qualified immunity necessarily means that Reddoch’s
“motivations” could not be “evil, reckless, or callous,” as required for an
award of punitive damages; and (2) Reddoch’s entitlement to qualified
immunity for the stop compels the conclusion that he was immune for the
arrest as well, and so there is no basis to award punitive damages under §
1983. Therefore, says Reddoch, the district court should have granted his
motion for a new trial.
“A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 action when an
official’s conduct is ‘motivated by evil intent’ or demonstrates ‘reckless or
callous indifference’ to a person’s constitutional rights.” Cowart, 837 F.3d at
455 (quoting Sockwell v. Phelps,
20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994)). Punitive
damages in § 1983 actions are designed not only to deter the official in
question from future unlawful conduct, but also to deter those other officials
who are similarly situated. See id. at 456. “Finally, the ‘discretionary moral
judgment’ of whether to award punitive damages when the legal threshold is
met belongs to the jury, not this court.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S.
30, 52 (1983)).
Even putting aside the fact that Reddoch forfeited this argument
because he failed to cite any authority in support of his theories for why
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punitive damages were inappropriate, see L & A Contracting Co., 17 F.3d at
113 & n.27, his contentions are meritless. First, Reddoch’s argument about
his immunity to liability for the investigatory stop of Holmes ignores entirely
Reddoch’s actions during and after the arrest. 10 For example, Reddoch knew
that taking pictures of children at the fair was not a crime, but told Holmes:
“We’re going to throw you in prison and I’m going to tell—make sure all the
other prisoners know why you’re in.” Taking the evidence together, the jury
was entitled to draw the inference that Reddoch manufactured the charges of
resisting arrest and breach of the peace as post-hoc rationalizations for his
arrest of Holmes. In sum, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude
that Reddoch acted with at least “reckless or callous indifference” to
Holmes’s constitutional rights. See Cowart, 837 F.3d at 455. Therefore, the
jury did not abuse its discretion by awarding punitive damages under § 1983
for Reddoch’s false arrest of Holmes on this basis.
For his second assignment of error to the jury’s award of punitive
damages, Reddoch merely reasserts the argument that, because the jury
found that he was entitled to qualified immunity for the investigatory stop,
he was necessarily entitled to qualified immunity for his arrest of Holmes.
Reddoch thus says that, because both of the § 1983 claims for which he was
found liable are properly barred by qualified immunity, punitive damages
were inappropriate. For the same reasons explained above, we reject this
argument.
_____________________
10
Once again, this contention seeks to conflate the investigatory stop and the
subsequent arrest as one event for Fourth Amendment purposes.
16
Case: 23-30424 Document: 75-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/06/2024
No. 23-30424
IV. Conclusion
Reddoch offers no persuasive reason for disturbing the jury’s verdict,
the propriety of which we must afford a high degree of deference. The
judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
17
