117 Md. App. 55 - Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We agree. In resolving this issue, we shall address an issue we have not heretofore fully explained. “We initially note that this case was tried by a jury, and the jury’s verdicts were completely consistent. It convicted appellant of both the underlying felony and the handgun offense.... “Had the jury in the case at bar acquitted appellant of the underlying felony but convicted him of the handgun offense, its verdicts would have been inconsistent. We, however, would have been required to affirm the handgun conviction .... It is important to note that Ford involved jury verdicts. There are later cases in which courts have held that other types of inconsistent verdicts are impermissible. “In Garland v. State, 29 Md.App. 27, 28 , 349 A.2d 374 (1975), rev’d, 278 Md. 212 , 362 A.2d 638 (1976) ... the defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and unlawful use of a handgun. We ultimately reversed the conviction for second degree murder. As to the handgun conviction, we stated: ‘It follows that with the reversal of the conviction for the underlying felony, the conviction for the handgun violation, predicated of necessity upon it, must also be reversed.’ Id. at 32, 349 A.2d 374 . That statement is technically correct. Garland, however, did not involve a jury inconsistency. It was, as is also clear in the case sub judice, an inconsistency created by an appellate court’s vacating of the underlying felony.” Id. at 69-70, 699 A.2d at 480-81 (foot-note omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Galloway v. State

2. “We stated in Ford [v. State, 330 Md. 682 , 625 A.2d 984 (1993),] that transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder [Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 529 , 671 A.2d 501 (1996)] (disapproving application of the doctrine of transferred intent to attempted murder in State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600 , 546 A.2d 1041 (1988)). The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death. Poe made it clear, 341 Md. at 530 , 671 A.2d 501 , that when the unintended victim is not killed, the transferred intent doctrine will not apply: In Ford, we made clear that if a defendant intends to kill a specific victim and instead wounds an unintended victim without killing either, the defendant can be convicted only of the attempted murder of the intended victim and • transferred intent does not apply. This is not true where, as in the case sub judice, the defendant intends to murder one victim and instead kills an unintended victim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 151 Md. App. 648 - Harrison v. State

3. ““As we view this area of the law, inconsistent verdicts from juries are tolerated because of the unique role of juries in our judicial system. Inconsistent verdicts, however, are not generally tolerated in a non-jury context. “The trial below resulted in jury verdicts that were completely consistent. With our action in the case sub judice, vacating the underlying felony, we, not the jury, have created the inconsistency. With no jury aura present, there is no reason for us to tolerate any inconsistency in the verdicts. Accordingly, we shall also vacate appellant’s conviction on the handgun charge.... ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Galloway v. State