¶1 By the verdict on the several issues it is found that the defendants being in possession of the 1-md under a bond to make title executed in 1886 and having defaulted in their payments, and the period (1890) within which payments were to be made having expired, entered into an agreement in 1892 with the plaintiffs (who had acquired the interest of the obligor to make title) that they would pay rent for the years 1892 and 1893. Not having done so this is an attempt to subject the crop of 1893 to the lien for the stipulated rent for that year.
¶2 The court below properly held that “after forfeiture, the plaintiffs could by contract become landlords of the defendants so as to avail themselves of the landlord’s lien, the amount of rent however to go as a credit upon the purchase price agreed to be paid for the land.” This is substantially the same point decided in Crinkley v. Egerton, 113 N. C., 444, in which this Court sustained a similar ruling of his Honor, who tried the present case. The. plaintiffs having the right to demand possession of the premises it was com- ' *258 petent for them to agree with the defendants that for the time specified the latter might remain in possession as tenants paying rent and if such contract aiforded any opportunity for oppression the relief the defendants are entitled to is not to hold the contract void but the equitable order (which the court made) directing that the amount of rents so paid should be credited on the notes given for the purchase money. Had the parties embraced this provision in their contract, there could have been no complaint. Crinkley v. Egerton, supra.
¶3 This in no wise conflicts with Taylor v. Taylor, 112 N. C., 27, relied on by the defendant’s counsel but which was noticed and distinguished in Crinkley v. Egerton, supra. In Taylor v. Taylor, it was merely held that a vendee, or mortgagor in default was not ipso facto a lessee whose crop vested in the landlord under The Code, 1754. That is so in the absence of an agreement to hold as tenant, paying rent. There is nothing in any statute forbidding freed an to thus contract when the parties deem it to their mutual interest to do so, and when by the terms of the contract itself or the decree of the court, the rent is applied upon the purchase notes there is no ground upon which equity can intervene. Taylor v. Taylor, further holds that while an abandonment of a contract of purchase can be made by parol, the vendee thenceforth remaining in possession as a tenant, the evidence of abandonment must be positive, unequivocal and inconsistent with the contract of purchase. That has no application here for it is not contended that the contract of purchase is abandoned, but the contract simply is that the plaintiffs being entitled to possession the defendants are allowed to remain in possession, paying rent. Thereafter the parties may agree to rescind the contract of purchase, or continue the renting till the rents pay off the purchase money, or talce other steps as may *259 seem good to them. Such contracts as that herein made, not being contrary to any statute nor against public policy nor forbidden by equity, the courts are not authorized to abridge the freedom of contracting by declaring them void.
¶4 No Error.