Romero v. Byers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 12 district · 65 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In a series of New Mexico eases culminating in Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566 , 829 P.2d 645 (1992), this Court set out the test for determining whether a duty is owed to a plaintiff. In New Mexico, negligence encompasses the concepts of foreseeability of harm to the person injured and of a duty of care toward that person.... Duty and foreseeability have been closely integrated concepts in tort law since the court in [Palsgraf ] stated the issue of foreseeability in terms of duty. If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant. Solon, 113 N.M. at 569 , 829 P.2d at 648 (quoting Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541 , 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983)) (emphasis added by Solon). In determining duty, it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff — that he was within the zone of danger created by [the tortfeasor’s] actions; in other words, to whom was the duty owed? ... A duty to an individual is closely intertwined with the foreseeability of injury to that individual resulting from an activity conducted with less than reasonable care by the alleged tort-feasor. Id. (quoting Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61-62 , 792 P.2d 36, 38-39 (1990)) (emphasis in original).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co. · Lozoya v. Sanchez

2. “Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, ... and the act, or neglect, or default, is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Thi of New Mexico at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato · Thi of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC v. Spradlin

3. “The statutory language instructs the jury to award fair and just damages, and allows the jury to consider the pecuniary injury to the decedent's statutory beneficiaries as an element of the worth of the life of the deceased. The presence or absence of pecuniary damages is a factor to be considered in arriving at a monetary figure for the value of the deceased's life. The plain language of Section 41-2-3 compels this conclusion because the phrase "taking into consideration the pecuniary injury or injuries resulting from such death to the surviving party or parties ..." is not a limiting phrase, but indicates that more than the single factor of pecuniary loss should be considered by a jury to determine fair and just compensation. The jury has long been instructed that, "In determining the monetary worth of the life of the deceased, you should consider the age, earning capacity, health, habits and life expectancy of the deceased." Just as the jury in a personal injury case must determine the monetary worth of non-pecuniary losses, so too must the jury in a wrongful death action determine fair and just compensation for the reasonably expected non-pecuniary rewards the deceased would have reaped from life as demonstrated by his or her health and habits.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 822 So. 2d 911 - Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey