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117 N.Y. 111

22 N.E 562

26 N.Y.St.Rep. 843

Thayer v. . McNaughton

New York Court of Appeals

Decided October 29, 1889

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1889-10-29

The complaint herein alleged, in substance, that plaintiff was retained as attorney by the E. & S. L. E. Co., and rendered services of the value of $300; that defendants entered into an agreement with that company whereby they undertook to pay the claims of its unsecured creditors, including plaintiffs, with moneys placed in their hands for that purpose, but have not paid said claim. The relief demanded was payment and an accounting.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““There was no evidence before the court, when the order of reference was made, that the statutory conditions existed, upon which a compulsory reference could be ordered. There was nothing in the nature of the action, or in the pleadings,- tending to show that the examination of a long account on either side would become necessary on the trial.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Roberson v. Murray

Relies on Camp v. . Ingersoll

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-10-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently May 1956 · most notably Cassidy v. . McFarland (1893), Durwood v. Dubinsky (1956)

29 state decisions

19018891890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Andrews, J.

¶1 Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the conditions under which a compulsory reference may be ordered. It can only be done where the trial will require the examination of a long account on either side, and will not require the decision of difficult questions of law. This must appear in order to justify the court in ordering a reference against the consent of either party. There was no evidence before the court when the order of reference was made,, that the statutory conditions existed upon which a compulsory reference could be ordered. There was nothing in the nature of the action or in the pleadings tending to show that the examination of a long account on either side would become necessary on the trial. The most that can be claimed is, that it is possible that the accounting demanded of the defendants of the trust fund placed in their hands to pay the unsecured *114 ■creditors of the Rochester and State Line Railroad Company will require an account of outstanding debts and of payments made by the trustees which may consist of numerous items. But this was not averred or shown, and it is quite consistent with what is alleged in the pleadings that the debts and payments may be few in number, and that the only serious controversy on the trial will relate to the account of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s account, as appears from the complaint, consists of but three or four items of services on one retainer, and clearly no long account is involved in proving the services or their value.

¶2 It is not enough to justify a compulsory reference that the case may, by possibility, involve the examination of a long account. There must be enough alleged or shown to justify an inference that that will be the course of the trial. The same rule applies to equitable as to legal actions. In neither case can a compulsory reference be ordered unless the trial will require the examination of a long account. In equity actions the reference may be. of the whole issues, or any one of them, or to report upon specific questions of fact. But the power of the court to order the reference is limited by the general condition contained in the first clause of section 1013, which is alike applicable to cases triable by the court and cases triable by jury. (Camp v. Ingersoll, 86 N. Y. 433; Barnes v. West, 16 Hun, 68; Read v. Lozin, 31 id. 286.)

¶3 We think the order of reference was not authorized by any facts appearing before the court, and that as it was made against the protest of the defendant, it should be reversed.

¶4 Orders of Special and General Terms reversed, with costs.

¶5 All concur, except Ruger, Oh. J., not voting.

¶6 Orders reversed.

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