117 Ohio App. 3d 839 - State v. Gaul’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A motion for acquittal should not be granted where the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 9 O.O.3d 401 , 381 N.E.2d 184 , syllabus. ‘The purpose of a motion for judgment of acquittal is to test the sufficiency of the evidence, and, where the evidence is insufficient, to take the case from the jury.’ Dayton v. Rogers (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 162, 163 , 14 O.O.3d 403, 404 , 398 N.E.2d 781, 782 . It should be granted where the evidence is so slight or of so little probative value that reasonable minds must have reasonable doubts as to the defendant’s guilt. See Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d at 264 , 9 O.O.3d at 402-403 , 381 N.E.2d at 185-186 . The grounds for acquittal are strongest where the state entirely fails to produce any evidence to support an essential element of the charge. State v. Kline (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 208, 213 , 11 OBR 330, 336-337, 464 N.E.2d 159, 164-165 . See State v. Manago (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 223 , 67 O.O.2d 291 , 313 N.E.2d 10 .” “R.C. 2921.44(E) provides: “ ‘No public servant shall recklessly fail to perform a duty expressly imposed by law with respect to his office, or recklessly do any act expressly forbidden by law with respect to his office.’ “One of the essential elements of the charge is that the accused was under a duty expressly imposed by law. If such a duty can be identified, t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Livesay

2. “[l]ike the preceding statute, R.C. 321.04 [providing that the county treasurer is `liable and accountable' for the misdeeds of his subordinates] does not expressly require the treasurer to do anything. There is no duty explicitly imposed such that the treasurer may be prosecuted under R.C. 2921.44 (E) for failing to do what he was instructed to do. Without such an explicit directive in the text of R.C. 321.04 , that statute cannot serve as the basis for a charge of criminal dereliction of an express duty imposed by law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (2006)

3. “[t]hese fiduciary duties to preserve public moneys cannot serve as the basis of a criminal charge for dereliction of duty under R.C. 2921.44 (E) because they are merely implied in the general grant of authority to make the investments in R.C. 135.35 (A). R.C. 2921.44 (E) requires the underlying statute to expressly impose a duty upon the accused; an implied duty is therefore insufficient to support a charge of dereliction of duty.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (2006)