¶1*724Carl H. McIntyre, Jr., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Dawn Bowen, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.
¶2William J. Sanchez, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
¶3Before TJOFLAT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and O’NEILL*, Senior District Judge.
¶6The Attorney General of the United States appeals a decision from the Southern District of Florida granting habeas corpus relief to Herve Auguste, a French citizen ordered to be deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). We vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions that the district court dismiss Auguste’s claim as moot.
¶7I.
¶8Under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (‘VWPP”), 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994), an alien from a qualifying country who meets certain requirements not relevant here may enter the United States without a visa for no more than ninety days if the alien waives “any right ... to contest, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, any action for deportation against the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2). On October 13, 1994, Auguste entered the United States pursuant to the VWPP after signing a waiver form. He remained in the United States beyond his ninety-day period, which expired on January 12, 1995. While in the country, he obtained a fraudulent work permit and Social Security card and signed a contract to purchase a hotel in Pompano Beach, Florida, for $7.3 million.
¶9The Border Patrol eventually located him in his residence and took him into custody on September 4, 1995. That day, Walter Cad-man, District Director of the INS, issued an order of deportation because Auguste violated the conditions of his admission to the United States under the VWPP by staying beyond ninety days. No hearing was held.1 Cadman scheduled Auguste’s deportation for September 12,1995.
¶10On September 12, Auguste filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He alleged, inter alia, that his waiver of any right to a deportation hearing was not “knowing and intelligent.” The district court granted a stay of deportation and, after conducting emergency hearings on September 12 and 15, found “the record woefully inadequate to support a finding that Herve Auguste made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his due process right to deportation proceedings.” It therefore granted Au*725guste’s petition and ordered that formal deportation proceedings be conducted and Auguste be released on bond pending conclusion of the proceedings. The Attorney General appeals from this judgment.
¶11II.
¶12At the time Auguste filed his petition in the district court, judicial review of INS orders of deportation was governed by section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994). That section provided, inter alia, that “any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings.” § 1105a(a)(10). Auguste sought relief pursuant to this provision.2
¶13On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Div. C, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546. Section 306 of the IIRIRA completely restructured judicial review of deportation orders, which were renamed “orders of removal.” That section repealed section 106 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1105a) in its entirety, see § 306(b), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 3009-612, and replaced it with a new section 242, see § 306(a), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 3009-607 to -612 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West Supp.1997)). Amended section 242(g), titled “Exclusive Jurisdiction,” now states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under [the INA],
¶14Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 3009-612 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(g)).
¶15This section went into effect on April 1, 1997. See INS v. Yang, — U.S.-, n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 350, 352 n. 1, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996); Ramirez-Centeno v. Wallis, 957 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (S.D.Fla.1997). Pursuant to the IIRIRA, section 242(g) applies “without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under [the INA].” § 306(c)(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 3009-612. Auguste’s petition is clearly a “claim by [an] alien arising from the decision ... by the Attorney General to ... execute removal orders against [the] alien under” the INA, as contemplated by section 242(g). Thus, since April 1, 1997, no court has had jurisdiction to review Auguste’s deportation order, except as provided by newly amended 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252.
¶16Under the INA, as amended by the IIRIRA, the only form of judicial review of orders of removal is the method of review provided by chapter 158 of Title 28 of the United States Code, with several modifications. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(1).3 This review can only be initiated in a court of appeals. See *72628 U.S.C. § 2342 (1994); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(2). Auguste did not comply with this procedure,4 as he filed his petition with the district court.5 We therefore lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶17At oral argument,6 Auguste’s counsel argued that section 1252(g) did not deprive us of jurisdiction in this case. He made two arguments, one statutory and one constitutional. As a matter of statutory interpretation, he argued that section 1252(d) provided jurisdiction. That section states:
A court may review a final order of removal only if—
(1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right, and
(2) another court has not decided the validity of the order, unless the reviewing court finds that the petition presents grounds that could not have been presented in the prior judicial proceeding or that the remedy provided by the prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order.
¶188 U.S.C.A. § 1252(d) (emphasis added). Far from creating some new method of judicial review in addition to the “only” method prescribed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(1), this section merely provides two procedural rules for a court already invested with jurisdiction (i.e., a court of appeals reviewing an order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)). Any other interpretation would render meaningless the restrictions on judicial review contained in both sections 1252(a)(1) and 1252(g).
¶19Auguste’s counsel also argued that the Constitution prohibits Congress from removing all judicial review of orders of removal. He based his arguments on the principle of separation of powers and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Another panel of this circuit recently addressed and rejected these exact arguments in a similar challenge to a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1214. See Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 355 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam). In that case, the panel analyzed the constitutionality of section 440(a)(10) of the AEDPA, which removed all judicial review from final orders of deportation against aliens who have committed certain criminal offenses. See id. at 354.
¶20We find that this analysis applies with equal force in the instant case. “[T]he responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches [as opposed to the judicial branch] of the Federal Government. Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1449, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For this reason, section 1252 “not only does not violate Article III, it is illustrative of the concept of separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution.”7Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355.
¶21*727The due process argument is equally unavailing. “The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative and the executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as congress may see fit to authorize or permit.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537, 72 S.Ct. 525, 532-33, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, because the deportation of an alien is neither a criminal proceeding nor punishment, “[n]o judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.” Id. at 537, 72 S.Ct. at 533. In short, section 1252 does not deny an alien due process “[b]ecause the Constitution does not give aliens the right to judicial review of deportation orders.” Boston-Bollers, 106 F.3d at 355. We therefore conclude that section 1252 constitutionally deprives us of jurisdiction to hear Auguste’s claim.
¶22III.
¶23Our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal leaves us with two options. We could simply dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and allow the district court’s order to stand unreviewed. Alternatively, we could vacate its order and remand the ease with the instruction that the district court dismiss Auguste’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Circuit recently faced this same dilemma. See Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C.Cir.1997). We find its analysis of the former disposition instructive:
To hold that we lack jurisdiction to enter any order affecting the judgment of the District Court would create an anomalous situation: a judgment of the District Court, with respect to a matter over which it now has no jurisdiction to hear, would escape appellate review, because the newly amended section 242 took effect after the issuance of the decision in the District Court. We doubt that Congress meant to countenance such a result. Rather, given the firm command of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), we believe that Congress intended to afford this court residual jurisdiction to clear the decks of cases in which the District Court has entered judgment, but in which there can be no review by the Court of Appeals due to its lack of jurisdiction pursuant to IIRIRA.
¶24Id. at 1213. We are persuaded by this analysis and adopt it as our own.
¶25We further agree with that court that exercising this “residual jurisdiction” is “something akin to an appellate court’s jurisdiction when a ease becomes moot between the time a district court judgment is entered and the time it arrives at the appellate court for review.” Id.We therefore choose the disposition appropriate in such cases. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th Cir.1997).
¶26Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case with the instruction that the district court dismiss Auguste’s petition.
¶27SO ORDERED.