118 Md. App. 317 - Wiegmann v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[MASTER PATRICK]: Based on the evidence I’ve heard today, it is quite clear to me that the defendant is in contempt. So I am going to hold you in contempt. I’m going to sentence you to forty-five (45) days’ incarceration. I’m going to set a purge figure of Thirty-Five Hundred Dollars ($ 3,500.00), Mr. Wiegmann. ■ That means, if you pay the thirty-five hundred dollars, you do not have to serve the time. That’s the difference between civil and criminal contempt.[ 1 ] In light of your claim to live in Georgia, I am going to recommend that the incarceration be immediate from the courtroom, and that an immediate Order be entered. I’m going to enter a judgment for the arrears, which is Fourteen Thousand, Nine Hundred and Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($ 14,993.65). Payments through the Department of Social Services, secured by a wage lien. Future service by first-class mail. Mr. Wiegmann: Your Honor? The Master: Yes, Mr. Wiegmann? Mr. Wiegmann: Ah, I want to, like to file my exceptions now. The Master: Mr. Wiegmann, you can file those prior to your exceptions. I’m going to recommend that an immediate order be entered, so we can— Mr. Wiegmann: Also, a motion for stay of sentence pending the outcome of the exceptions hearing. And a request for filing fees and costs be paid by the State for my transcripts and other related fees, since I was not—, Public Defender’s—. (To the Deputy) Hold on a second. Hold on a second. Get, get away from me until I’m done. The Master: Excuse”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wiegmann

2. “We recently observed that “the authority of the master[ ] is limited by the Maryland Rules and the statutes providing for the use of masters in domestic relations cases.” Wise-Jones v. Jones, 117 Md.App. 489, 499 , 700 A.2d 852 (1997). This suggests that the master’s authority must derive either from a statute or a rule. We look to Maryland Rules 9-207 and 2-541(c), which govern the powers of a domestic master. Pursuant to Rule 9-207(a)(l), matters of contempt for noncompliance are routinely referred by the clerk to a master “as of course,” unless the circuit court directs otherwise. Rule 9-207(a)(l) specifically authorizes a master to preside at a hearing regarding contempt for noncompliance with an order relating to the payment of alimony or child support. Further, Maryland Rule 9-207(b) provides: “The master shall have the powers provided in Rule 2-541(c) and shall conduct the hearing as provided in Rule 2-541(d).” In turn, Maryland Rule 2-541 (c), states, in part, that a master has the power to regulate all proceedings in the hearing, including the powers to: (1) Direct the issuance of a subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents or other tangible things; (2) Administer oaths to witnesses; (3) Rule upon the admissibility of evidence; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Convene, continue, and adjourn the hearing, as required; (6) Recommend contempt proceedings or other sanctions to the court; and (7) Make findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wiegmann

3. “[A]n arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to fhe actual control and will of the person making the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to be arrested. It is said that four elements must ordinarily coalesce to constitute a legal arrest: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under a real or pretended authority; (3) accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person; and (4) which is understood by the person arrested. We have defined an arrest in general terms as the detention of a known or suspected offender for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 133 Md. App. 654 - Dixon v. State