Sandul v. Larion’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It was clearly established at the time of Sandul’s arrest that his actions were within the contours of his First Amendment rights. Applying the objective reasonableness standard, a reasonable officer should have known that the words and gestures émployed by Sandul amounted to protected speech. Well-established Supreme Court precedents demonstrate Sandul’s constitutional right to free speech, with the exception of fighting words. See, e.g., Cohen, supra (holding that absent a compelling and particularized reason, the First and Fourteenth Amendments preclude States from prohibiting the public display of a four-letter expletive); and Chaplinsky, supra (holding that the only types of speech denied First Amendment protection are words which by their very utterance inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace). These cases should leave little doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that the mere words and gesture “f_k you” are constitutionally protected speech. “ ‘[Sjtate employees may not rely on their ignorance of even the most esoteric aspects of the law to deny indi viduals their [constitutional] rights. Long, 929 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Wentz v. Klecker, 721 F.2d 244 (8th Cir.1983)). As a reasonable officer, Larion should have known that the words and gestures used by Sandul were constitutionally protected, and that under the First Amendment, the disorderly conduct ordinance could only apply to “fighting words.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Novak v. City of Parma · 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099 - Nichols v. Chacon

2. “[TJhose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument (internal citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell · 342 F. Supp. 2d 634 - World Wide Street Preachers' Fellowship v. City of Owensboro

3. “Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality-with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Leonard v. Robinson