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← 119 F.3d 1342 - Weeks v. Bowersox

Weeks v. Bowersox’s Empirical Analysis

119 F.3d 1342 · 1997

Citation profile

37
cited by 37 later decisions
5
states following
March 2018
most recently cited

17 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently March 2018 · most notably Byrd v. Collins (2000), Carriger v. Stewart (1997)

17 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions

220199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Boykin v. Alabama · Coleman v. Thompson · Townsend v. Sain · Brady v. United States · Murray v. Carrier

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evi-dentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that- (A) the claim relies on- (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “In my view, there is an inherent paradox in the notion that someone who has stood in open court and declared, “I am guilty,” may turn around years later and claim that he deserves to pass through the actual innocence gateway. Because a guilty plea waives the defendant’s right to prove his actual innocence at trial ... a strong argument can be made that a guilty plea should absolutely foreclose a post-conviction claim of actual innocence.... Unless the habeas petitioner has newly-discovered evidence that his guilty plea was a false declaration of guilt, he should not pass through the actual innocence gateway.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “A state prisoner who attempts to exhaust his state remedies may run afoul of state procedural requirements. A state prisoner who fails to adhere to state-defined procedures or fails to meet state-imposed time requirements in the state courts may default on his claims in the state courts.... Generally, federal courts will not consider a state prisoner’s federal habeas claim if the state court found the claim to have been defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 , 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2564 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.