¶1On Motion for Rehearing.
¶2The original motion for rehearing and the second motion for rehearing and the amended motion for rehearing (the amendment being filed March 24, 1969) are each and all hereby denied. They appear to be predicated on the insistence that the Georgia statute set forth in Code Ann. § 30-220 et seq. in relation to the modification of an alimony decree of a Georgia court is the exclusive remedy available for that purpose; that the statute evidences a public policy of Georgia which prevents the beneficiary of the Georgia decree from enforcing by suit in this state a foreign judgment obtained by her in the foreign state wherein she and her children then resided modifying the Georgia decree, and that in such case the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution does not apply in respect of such enforcement of the foreign judgment. The contention of appellant is that such enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of this state and, therefore, that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and set aside.
¶3With this contention we cannot agree. In our opinion it is unsound and without merit.
¶4Public policy may be fixed and established by statutory enactments and judicial decisions and judicial records. Glosser v. Powers, 209 Ga. 149 (71 SE2d 230); Cummings v. Johnson, 218 Ga. 559 (5) (129 SE2d 762), quoting from Building Service &c. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 537 (70 SC 784, 94 LE 1045). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Durden, 9 Ga. App. 797 (72 SE 295).
¶5Code Ann. § 30-220 et seq. is a Georgia statutory enactment relating to the change or modification of a final alimony decree. *494It reflects the public policy of the state in relation to its subject matter. This statute undoubtedly refers only to a petition brought in a Georgia court with personal residence venue jurisdiction in Georgia to revise a Georgia alimony judgment. See Bugden v. Bugden, 224 Ga. 517 (162 SE2d 719). This case does not relate to a foreign judgment, but does support in principle the view that the statute (§ 30-220) being statutory only, is subordinate to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. The question involved in Bugdenis not involved here. This case has to do with the application and effect and implementation of the South Carolina judgment under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
¶6Under the Constitution of Georgia its supreme law is the Constitution of the United States. Code Ann. § 2-8001. The public policy of the State reflected by its statutes is subordinate to the Federal Constitution. The full faith and credit clause of that Constitution is found in Article IV thereof Code § 1-401).
¶7Code Ann. § 30-220' et seq. is not superior to or co-ordinate in authority with the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, nor can it be so construed or applied.
¶8The decree of the South Carolina court is controlling and cannot be ignored or set aside on the claim that it is contrary the public policy of this State as evidenced by Code Ann. § 30-220 et seq.
¶9The public policy of a state is reflected not only by its statutory law but, as indicated above, also by its judicial decisions. The Georgia court decisions on the question of the effect and enforceability of a foreign alimony judgment in Georgia are numerous in holding that such a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Georgia courts and will be enforced here. See, among others, the following cases: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204 (3) (26 SE2d 283), and cases cited; Henderson v. Henderson, 209 Ga. 148 (71 SE2d 210); Creaden v. Krough, 75 Ga. App. 675 (44 SE2d 136); Tobin v. Tobin, 93 Ga. App. 568 (92 SE2d 304); Johnson v. Johnson, 115 Ga. App. 749 (156 SE2d 186), transferred from Supreme Court, 223 Ga. 147 (154 SE2d 13).
¶10Thus, the Georgia judicial decisions, which are evidence of *495the public policy of this State, and the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, are consistent and in accord with each other; indeed, the decisions apply and implement the clause, so that in the case sub judice the full faith and credit clause must prevail and control in the disposition of the motions for rehearing and the amendment thereto.
¶11The statute adopted by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor March 17, 1969 (House Bill No. 791), amending Code § 30-220 (Ga. L. 1964, p. 713), does not require a different result.
¶12Motions for rehearing denied and original opinion adhered to.