119 Ind. App. 481 - Neuwelt v. Roush’s Empirical Analysis
1949
Citation profile
35 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently July 1979 · most notably Graham v. State (1970), Carroll v. State (1975)
35 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on McKee v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York · L.S. Ayres Company v. Hicks · Pfisterer v. Key · 115 Ind. App. 660 - Connor v. Jones · Roush v. Roush
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"It is generally held that when an objection has once been distinctly made and overruled, it need not be repeated to the same class of evidence, since it may be assumed that the court will adhere to the ruling throughout the trial."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“v “. . . It is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that the testimony of a witness which is opposed to the laws of nature, or which is clearly in conflict with principles established by the laws of science, is of no probative value and a jury is not permitted to rest its verdict thereon (numerous cases cited). This rule is frequently applied to the testimony of one who says he looked but did not see an object, which, if he had looked, in the very nature of things, he must have seen. However, where a court cannot say as a matter of law that the testimony of a witness is contrary to scientific principles, the law of nature or the physical facts, the question of whether such testimony does so conflict is one of fact for the jury to determine (cases cited). The appellant has made certain mathematical calculations based on distance and speeds as appear in the testimony of the appellee and seeks to demonstrate thereby that the appellee would have reached the curb in safety before the appellant’s automobile reached any point in the street where the appellee possibly could have been hit. Therefore, says the appellant, the appellee’s testimony concerning the manner in which the accident happened must be disregarded because it contravenes the law of mathematics and being so disregarded there remains no evidence to support the verdict. This argument presupposes that the appellee’s estimates of the dis- ■ tance he was from the curb when he first saw appellant’s automobile, th”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““Contributory negligence becomes a question of ' law only when the evidence most favorable to the ■ plaintiff and all proper inferences, therefrom .are such that reasonable minds will agree that the injury complained of was the proximate result ' of the plaintiff’s own negligence. D. Graff and Sons v. Williams (1945), 115 Ind. App. 597 , 61 ,N. E. 2d 72. Where the facts are in conflict, or of such a character that reasonable minds may draw different inferences from them, then the question is one of fact to be determined by the. jury, Gatewood et al. v. Lynch (1939), 107 Ind. App. 168 , 23 N. E. 2d 289 ; Associated Truck Lines, Inc. v. Velthouse (1949), 227 Ind. 139 , 84 N. E. 2d 54 ; Northwestern Transit, Inc. v. Wagner (1945), 223 Ind. 447 , 61 N. E. 2d 591 .””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.