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119 Mass. 60

Gibbs v. Ames

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided October 22, 1875

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1875-10-22

Tort. The declaration alleged that the defendant falsely, maliciously, wilfully and wrongfully prosecuted the female plaintiff, and falsely charged her with the crime of larceny of bonds, to the value of six thousand dollars, and of other personal property, the property of the defendant; and wrongfully and maliciously removed her by force from the State of Maine, and caused her to be removed, she being at the time about to be confined in child-bed, and wrongfully imprisoned,…

Relies on Cardival v. Smith · O'Brien v. Barry

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1875-10-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently June 1937

1 district · 4 state decisions

201875188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Wells, J.

¶1The female plaintiff was brought before a trial justice upon a criminal charge. She was required to plead to the complaint, to answer further thereto at a subsequent day, and to give surety in $6000 for her appearance for that purpose. In default of bail she was committed by order of the magistrate, and a mittimus therefor in due form was issued. Upon the day fixed for the trial she was discharged, the magistrate finding and1 adjudging her to be “ not guilty of said charge.” All this appears from the records of the trial justice.

¶2*66This was a sufficient prosecution and acquittal therefrom to furnish a foundation for the common action for malicious prosecution, notwithstanding any insufficiency of the complaint, or defect of process by which she was brought before the court, or want of jurisdiction of the magistrate arising from such defect. 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 449, 452, and cases cited. 1 Am. Lead. Cas. (4th ed.) 215, 216, notes to Munns v. Dupont. O'Brien v. Barry, 106 Mass. 300, 304. Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass. 158. The magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the complaint, which was not the case in Bixby v. Brundige, 2 Gray, 129, and Whiting v. Johnson, 6 Gray, 246.

¶3Ordinarily the preferring of a complaint, if done maliciously and without probable cause, would be sufficient to charge the complainant with liability for the prosecution to which it gave rise; because that is its natural and legitimate sequence, and its presumed purpose. But the form of this complaint is such that, as it prayed for process only against the other person named as an offender, some other evidence was rightly required to charge the defendant with an intention to prosecute the female plaintiff. The instructions required the jury to find that the defendant intended to cause, and participated in, her subsequent arrest. That fact, being found, involves him in responsibility for the subsequent proceedings as its natural and ordinary sequence, just as much as if there had been a proper complaint and warrant to justify the arrest, as he asserted in his affidavit that there were. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 450. Judgment on the verdict.

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