119 Md. App. 139 - Valiton v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Valiton, I've talked to you at some length about the options of a court trial as opposed to a jury trial and at a jury trial I explained to you that you and I would help select the jurors who are picked from the voter rolls here in Allegany County. And I went over with you some of the strategy and options that were available in either a court trial or a jury trial and did I to the best of your knowledge explain the options available to you. MR. VALITON: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it's my understanding, since you relied somewhat on my view of the proceedings, that in light of my statements to you that you have elected to choose, you choose to be tried by the Court, is that correct? MR. VALITON: That's correct. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that it [sic] basically I told you what the options were and suggested that this was a decision you had to make, is that correct? MR. VALITON: Correct. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And have you made this decision voluntarily of your own free will to forego a jury trial and be tried by His Honor, []? MR. VALITON: I have. THE COURT: All right, gentleman, thank you very much. Just to follow that up, and perhaps you noted it, but let me do it. Mr. Valiton, jury trial, of course, meaning twelve persons selected at random from Allegany County. The jury has to conclude unanimously guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before anyone can be convicted. That is the further right of jury trial. You understand that through [DEFENSE COUNSEL], is that co”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Boulden v. State

2. “"[p]erhaps appellant's failure to object immediately, standing alone, would not convince us that appellant waived his right to assert a challenge on appeal with respect to the untimeliness of the jury trial waiver inquiry. We need not reach that issue, however. In this case, a lengthy continuance of the trial followed the jury trial waiver inquiry. During the four-week hiatus, appellant did not lodge any objection or complaint to the court concerning the jury trial waiver. Even if appellant was initially unaware of the content of Rule 4-246, or later had second thoughts, or felt intimidated or pressured while he was in court, he certainly could have raised the matter during the intervening four weeks that preceded the presentation of the defense case. Instead, appellant failed to challenge the timing or validity of the jury trial waiver. It is appellant's silence during the four week continuance that most distinguishes this case from Martinez . "”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Boulden v. State

3. “apparent that the Court focused on the validity of the waiver, and determined only that jury trial waivers are not reliable when conducted post-trial. At that stage of the proceedings, shortly before sentencing, it noted that a defendant may feel inhibited from asserting that the waiver was involuntary or he may proceed, hoping to be rewarded by agreeing to the waiver.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Boulden v. State