¶1(dissenting). I respectfully dissent, inasmuch as I cannot agree with the ma*141jority’s startling assertion that the photographs of the complainant had probative value.
¶2This case arose out of the robbery of a Detroit gold and jewelry store on June 13, 1980. The complainant testified that three men entered his store, robbed him, and beat him badly. Pictures of the complainant, taken four or five days after the robbery and assault, were admitted into evidence over defendant’s objection. Defendant presented an alibi defense.
¶3On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of the complainant.
¶4In People v Sullivan, 97 Mich App 488, 492; 296 NW2d 81 (1980), this Court set forth the proper standard for admission of such photographs:
"The admission of photographs of victims of crime is committed to the discretion of the trial court. People v Eddington, 387 Mich 551; 198 NW2d 297 (1972). The issue to be addressed in the admission of photographic evidence is whether the photograph is substantially necessary or instructive to show material facts or conditions or is merely calculated to excite passion and prejudice. People v Falkner, 389 Mich 682, 685; 209 NW2d 193 (1973).”
¶5In People v Browning, 106 Mich App 516, 523; 308 NW2d 264 (1981) this Court said:
"This test, which requires the photographs 'to be substantially necessary or instructive’ upon a material fact before being admissible, is nearly identical to that enunciated by our Supreme Court in People v Becker, 300 Mich 562, 565; 2 NW2d 503 (1942), where that Court held that, '[t]he general rule upon the admissibility of this kind of evidence is that it is admissible if helpful in throwing light upon any material point in issue’.”
¶6*142My learned colleagues correctly point out that the photographs were "strong evidence” that an aggravated assault or serious injury had been inflicted in the course of the robbery — which would require the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. However, this matter was not at issue.
¶7Defendant presented an alibi defense. He did not deny that the complainant had been robbed and assaulted and did not contest the extent of the complainant’s injuries. Defendant merely contended that he was not the person who had robbed and beaten the victim. Thus, the complainant’s physical condition after the robbery was not a material fact. The photographs had no probative value, and their introduction was apparently calculated to excite passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Testimony from the complainant and another witness provided overwhelming evidence of both an aggravated assault and serious injury; consequently, the prosecution did not need the photographs to establish this element of the offense.
¶8I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.