¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶2The majority correctly concludes under this court’s Hamisch decisions
[T]he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’ ’4
¶3Notwithstanding my belief that this court should adopt Belton, I reach the same result as the majority. The district court properly ruled that the evidence seized from Camacho’s vehicle was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
¶4 State v. Harnisch, 113 Nev. 214, 931 P.2d 1359 (1997), clarified on rehearing, 114 Nev. 225, 954 P.2d 1180 (1998).
¶5453 U.S. 454 (1981).
¶6113 Nev. 952, 959, 944 P.2d 791, 795 (1997) (Maupin, J., dissenting), rehearing denied, 114 Nev. 779, 961 P.2d 750 (1998).
¶7 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 142).