Borer v. Chapman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

75 federal appellate · 27 district · 52 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 217 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The date of that entry [of the nunc pro tunc order] is by a fiction of law, made and considered to be the true date of the judgment for one purpose only, and that is to bind the defendant by the obligation of the judgment entered as of a date when he was in full life; but the right of the complainant in this bill to enforce that judgment by the present proceeding certainly did not begin until after the judgment in that form was actually entered. Until that time, the right was in abeyance; the litigation had, until then ended, been continuously in progress. It cannot be that the statute of limitations will be allowed to commence to run against a right until that right has accrued in a shape to be effectually enforced.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Wurts · In re Stafford

2. ““The administration of the estate of Gordon, in California, was merely ancillary; the primary administration was that of the testator's domicile, Minnesota. Chapman was not a citizen of California, nor resident there; he was no party to the administration proceedings; he was not bound to make himself such. If he had chosen he could have proved his claim there and obtained payment, but he had the right to await the result of the settlement of that administration, and look to such assets of Gordon as he could subsequently find in Minnesota, whether originally found there or brought there from California by the executors or legatees of Gordon’s estate.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Feidler v. Bartleson · Hagan v. Lantry

3. ““It is upon the ground of such a trust that the jurisdiction of courts of equity primarily resis in administration suits, and in creditors’ bills brought against executors or administrators, or after distribution against legatees, for tlie purpose of charging 1hem with a liability to apply the assets of the decedent to the payment of Ms debts. As a part of the ancient and original jurisdiction of courts of equity, it is vested, by the constitution of the United Stales and the laws of congress in pursuance thereof, in the federal courts, to be administered by the circuit courts in controversies arising between citizens of different states. It is the familiar and well-settled doctrino of tills court that this jurisdiction is independent of that conferred by the states upon their own courts, and cannot be affected by any legislation except- that ol' the United States. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 ; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 28 ; Bank v. Jolly, 18 How. 503 ; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170 ; Green’s Adm’x v. Creighton, 23 How. 90 ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 , 430. In Payne v. Hook, ubi supra, the rule was declared in these words: ‘We have repeatedly held Unit the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different states cannot be impaired by the law's of the states which proscribe the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. If legal remedies are sometimes modified to suit Hie changes ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Martin v. Fort