concurrence">Melvin Mayfield, Judge,

concurring. I agree that under the holding of Baker v. State, 276 Ark. 193, 637 S.W.2d 522 (1982), the physician-patient privilege did not prohibit the psychologist, who treated the witness Marcella Shelley, from testifying as to his diagnosis of her mental or emotional condition so long as he did not testify as to any communications made by her to him for the purpose of this diagnosis or treatment.

Appellant’s abstract shows that at an omnibus hearing held four days before the trial began, the psychologist refused to testify as to the mental or emotional condition of Mrs. Shelley because of the physician-patient privilege. In his argument on this point, the appellant’s attorney gave page references to the transcript where the trial court said he would not order the psychologist to testify and where the attorney stated that he had information that if the psychologist were required to testify he would say that Mrs. Shelley had a histrionic personality with a strong likelihood of fantasizing. I believe the essence of that testimony was admissible and that the jury should have been allowed to hear it.

I realize that these page references did not constitute an abstract as required by Rule 9, and that it is not practical and we are not required to search the transcript to find out what it says. In this case, I was willing to make the limited search necessary to consider the point argued, but an attorney who fails to properly abstract takes a big risk because we simply do not have the time to read the transcript in every case.

On the narrow grounds above indicated, I concur in the reversal and remand of this case.

James R. Cooper, Judge,

dissenting. Although I fully agree with Judge Cracraft’s dissenting opinion, because of Judge Corbin’s concurring opinion I feel compelled to write. First, it is worth emphasizing that Judge Cracraft noted that the abstract supplied did not include “unprivileged relevant testimony” (emphasis mine). I agree that it did not, but even more important, nothing was proffered so that the trial court could have determined the relevancy of the testimony it is claimed that Dr. Stevens would have given. Judge Corbin’s concurring opinion states that the trial court refused to order Dr. Stevens to proffer his testimony into the record. Any such request of the trial court is not included in the briefs furnished this Court. It is true that the Attorney General’s office, in a supplementary abstract, provided us with an abstract of the pretrial motion, and the argument before the trial court concerning Dr. Stevens’ records, but that exchange between counsel and the trial court does not include a request that Dr. Stevens be required to proffer the records and his testimony.

Judge Corbin indicates that Judge Cracraft and I would require that counsel do the impossible, i.e., abstract nonexistent testimony. That is an inaccurate reading of the dissenting opinion; the dissenting opinion of Judge Cra-craft simply states that, since the Court does not know, from the abstract, what Dr. Stevens might have said, we will not search the record to find out. This becomes even more obviously reasonable when the trial court was never asked to require Dr. Stevens to answer in a proffer.

For the reasons stated in Judge Cracraft’s dissenting opinion, and for the reasons stated herein, I would affirm. Further, I find no merit to the other points raised by the appellant.

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