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12 Cal. 107

Heyman & Co. v. Landers

California Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1859

California Supreme Court · decided 1859-01-15

This was an action to recover damages for the wrongful issuance of an injunction or restraining order. The facts, as detailed by the opinion of the Court, are as follows : On the third of November, 1856, the plaintiffs brought suit against one Arronson, of Sacramento, to recover the sum of ten thousand and one hundred dollars, and issued an attachment and levied upon his property.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““. ... The only damages which the law allows for the detention of money under its process is the legal interest. The rule of damages, in such cases, like the one which obtains in actions upon promissory notes, is a fixed and arbitrary one. The actual loss occasioned may be much greater than the interest, but the consequences beyond that the law does not inquire into (Sedgwick on Damages, chap. 8). It would indeed often be impossible to determine the actual damages resulting from the detention of money, the party entitled to it may in consequence have been compelled to borrow on ruinous rates of interest: he may have become embarrassed in his business operations, ruined in credit, and perhaps driven into insolvency; but of these possible consequences the Courts cannot take notice. The legal interest in such cases is the only measure which can be followed with certainty, and, as a general rule, with safety.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Gray v. American Surety Co. of New York

““The order [for injunction] could only take effect upon the filing of the complaint, and the bond or undertaking required, and it was unnecessary to delay the application to the judge until after the complaint had been filed. When a restraining order or an injunction is sought upon the complaint itself, it is the usual practice to present the complaint, in advance of the filing, to the judge, and obtain the order or allowance of the writ; and with this practice the statute does not conflict.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Elmore County Irrigated Farms Ass'n v. Stockslager

Relies on Summers v. Farish

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1859-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently June 1974

1 district · 8 state decisions

201859186018701880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Field, J.,

¶1after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the Court —Terry, C. J., and Baldwin, J., concurring.

¶2The appellants makes the following points : First. That the restraining order was void, because made before the complaint in the suit of the creditors was filed; Second. That the Court has never decided that the plaintiffs in that suit were not entitled to the restraining order; and, Third. If the defendants are liable upon the undertaking, the rule of damages must be the legal interest of ten per cent, a year upon the money in Court.

¶3The first point is untenable. The order could only take effect upon the filing of the complaint, and the bond or undertaking required, and it was unnecessary to delay the application to the Judge until after the complaint had been filed.- When a restraining order or an injunction is sought upon the complaint itself, it is the usual practice to present the complaint, in advance of the filing, to the Judge, and obtain the order or the allowance of the writ; and with this practice the statute *111does not conflict. The order or writ can then be issued with the summons. Prac. Act, sec. 113.

¶4The second point is also untenable. The Court, in adjudging that the judgment of the plaintiffs against Arronson was valid, and not fraudulent or collusive, and that they were entitled to the money in Court in substance, if not in terms, decided that the other creditors were not entitled to the restraining order.

¶5But the third point is well taken. The only damages which the law allows for the detention of money under its process is the legal interest. The rule of damages, in such cases, like the one which obtains in actions upon promissory notes, is a fixed and arbitrary one. The actual loss occasioned may be much greater than the interest, but the consequences beyond that the law does not inquire into (Sedgwick on Damages, chap. 8). It would indeed often be impossible to determine the actual damages resulting from the detention of money; the party entitled to it may in consequence have been compelled to borrow on ruinous rates of interest; he may have become embarrassed in his business operations, ruined in credit, and perhaps driven into insolvency; but of these possible consequences the Courts cannot take notice. The legal interest in such cases is the only measure which can be followed with certainty, and, as a general rule, with safety. The judgment, therefore, must be modified. The allowance of the three hundred dollars was proper (Summers v. Parish, 10 Cal. 353). This sum added to the interest on the money deposited in Court at the rate of ten per cent, a year from December 15, 1856, to April 29,1857, must constitute the amount to which the judgment is to be reduced.

¶6The cause is remanded to the Court below, with directions to modify the judgment in accordance with this opinion; the costs of the appeal to be allowed to the respondents.

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