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12 Cal. 298

Ritter v. Patch

California Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1859

California Supreme Court · decided 1859-01-15

This was an action to restrain the defendant, as Tax Collector of the City and County of San Francisco, from the collection of a large amount of State and county tax, assessed upon the property of the plaintiff. The bill avers a number of irregularities in the assessment, and in general terms charges, that if the defendant is allowed to enforce the collection of the tax, “ great and irreparable injury will be done him,” (plaintiff).

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1859-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently June 1980

1 district · 7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Baldwin, J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the'Court—Terry, C. J., concurring.

¶2Injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding to collect a tax on personal property.

¶3Waiving other obstacles of a very serious import, which oppose the plaintiff’s proceeding, we think that the bill states no sufficient ground for equitable interposition. The remedy by injunction is unauthorized in cases like this, except where the injury is irreparable, if, indeed, that furnishes a sufficient ground for interference. This must appear in the bill by some issuable averment, and be sustained, if denied at the hearing. It is not shown that the Tax Collector would not be able to respond in damages. On the contrary, he asserts that he and his sureties are amply able to answer in any damages incurred by proceeding to collect the tax. The tax is no cloud upon the title of real estate, and its collection, by distress or seizure of chattels, is no more than an ordinary trespass, if the tax be illegal, or the conduct of the officer unauthorized. The New York cases (1 Abbott, 4 ; Ib. 79; Ib. 250) go much further than it is necessary for us to go, in this respect. But, if the ■ principle contended for be adopted, Chancery might restrain, from anything we can see to the contrary, every threatened, unauthorized invasion of real or personal property. This would be to throw into Chancery a great portion of all the torts committed or threatened.

¶4Judgment reversed and bill dismissed.

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