12 Cal. 3d 158 - People v. Hyde’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 122 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 126 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be searched.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 50 Md. App. 20 - Santiago v. State · 43 Cal. 3d 1321 - Ingersoll v. Palmer

2. “Like all searches subject to the Fourth Amendment, an administrative screening must be measured against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. In the case of administrative searches, however, `there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.' ( Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) supra, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 ].) It is ironic, therefore, that by adopting the administrative search doctrine to evaluate the validity of airport screening procedures we must undertake a similar process of balancing to that which would have followed from a reliance upon Terry [v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 ( 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 )].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Cal. 3d 1321 - Ingersoll v. Palmer

3. “It is now settled ... that there is no fixed standard of reasonableness that applies to all types of governmental action which is subject to the mandates of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, we deal with a type of official conduct that (1) has objectives qualitatively different from those of the conventional search and seizure in the criminal context and (2) cannot feasibly be subjected to regulation through the traditional probable cause standard of justification, we may assess the reasonableness of the particular type of search and seizure by examining and balancing the governmental interest justifying the search and the invasion which the search entails. [Citations.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 43 Cal. 3d 1321 - Ingersoll v. Palmer