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12 F.2d 938

In re Meyers

New York Western District Court

Decided April 26, 1926.)

New York Western District Court · decided 1926-04-26

1 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as.(7) are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Krauskopf v. Mojica (In Re Mojica), Netherton v. Netherton (In Re Netherton)

“It is considered that the words in section 17a, cl. 2, Bankr.Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 , as amended Act Feb. 5,1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798 [U.S.Comp.St. Supp.1903, p. 411], ‘for maintenance or support of wife or child,’ do not refer to a debt incurred for the services of a physician called by the husband to attend the wife while she is in normal relation to her husband. If so, a person supplying goods for a wife or child or rendering a service necessary for support or maintenance, at the request of the husband, without delinquency on his part, would be beyond the scope of the act. The grocer, the marketman, clothiers of all descriptions, physicians, dentists, in fact all who, by service or sale, contribute to the support of the family, and thereby to the support of a wife or child, would have claims not dischargeable under the act. The provision has probable application to cases where the person applying for discharge from his debts had so betrayed his moral and legal duty as a husband or parent that another was justified in providing the maintenance and support denied by the one upon whom the law places the primary duty. Without attempting to define the limits of the section, it is held that it does not apply to medical attendance furnished upon the express or implied contract of the husband or parent to pay therefor while the recipient is a member of the family, and while there is no breach of duty on the part of the person contracting the debt toward the o”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Netherton v. Netherton (In Re Netherton)

Relies on Vadner v. Vadner · In re Ostrander

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1926-04-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently June 1983

4 federal appellate · 1 district ·

401926193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Bankruptcy <®=421 (5) — Judgment againsthankrupt for maintenance of wife after abandonment not a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Act, § 17 [2], being Comp. St. § 9601).

¶2Under Bankruptcy Act, § 17(2), being Comp. St. § 9601, a judgment recovered against bankrupt for maintenance and care of his wife when ill and after he had practically abandoned her and refused such maintenance and care, is not a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, and its enforcement will not be enjoined.

¶3In Bankruptcy. In' the matter of William F. Meyers, bankrupt. On motion to restrain enforcement of judgment against bankrupt.

¶4Denied.

¶5Florence Farrington, of Buffalo, N. Y., for bankrupt.

¶6Lawrence, Lathrop & Whiting, of Buffalo, N. Y. (Thomas E. Lawrence, of Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for claimant.

¶7HAZEL, District Judge.

¶8The bankrupt, a man about 30 years of age, is a fireman on a railroad and earns about $200 a month. Shortly after his marriage in 1924, his wife became ill and was obliged to go to the hospital, and, after leaving it, she went to the home of claimant, because, as she avers in her affidavit, the bankrupt, her husband, refused to support her. She was boarded, nursed, and maintained by claimant until March, 1925. She also states, in her affidavit dated April 17, 1926, that her husband had provided no home for her when she left the hospital, and in this emergency she was obliged to live with claimant, who charged her $7 per week for board and maintenance. After-wards the bankrupt paid $7 on account, but the balance of $81.94 he refused to pay, and filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy a judgment was recovered against him for the amount due, on which a garnishee execution was issued.

¶9This motion is to restrain payments on the garnishee execution on the sole ground that, under section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. § 9601) the debt is dischargeable. By subdivision 2 of section 17 it is provided that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts except liabilities “ … for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child.” This provision has been construed as not including a liability for goods purchased for use of wife or child, nor for medical attendance or board furnished to wife or child, upon the express or implied contract of the husband. This exclusion, however, does not release him from liability .for maintenance and support of his wife, where the evidence discloses a practical abandonment of the wife by the husband, whose moral and legal duty it was to support her.

¶10The claim in question does not arise from any contract. or business transaction, or a debt incurred while normal relations existed between husband and wife. In re Vadner (D. C.) 259 F. 614, 42 Am. Bankr. Rep. 465. The husband having refused to support his wife or provide a home for her, as shown by the affidavit of his wife and also the affidavit of claimant, the latter was justified in providing the support denied by the husband. In re Ostrander (D. C.) 139 F. 592, 15 Am. Bankr. Rep. 96. It was the unquestionable duty of the husband to support and maintain his wife during her entire illness, and, having refused to do so, the liability established by the judgment, in my opinion, comes within the excepted provision. He was not relieved from this duty by notifying claimant that he would not be responsible for her bills while at claimant’s home.

¶11Nor am I inclined to accept the second version of the wife, contradicting her first affidavit, in relation to her husband refusing to support her or furnish her with a home. It is therefore held that the claim of the judgment was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It was not incurred upon an express or implied contract of the husband to pay therefor, but arose out of an involuntary liability and primary duty growing out of the marriage relation.

¶12So ordered.

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