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12 Ill. 74

Buckmaster v. Cool

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided November 15, 1850

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1850-11-15

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fr eg it, commenced in. the Madison Circuit Court, by appellee against appellant, and charges that the trespass complained of was committed on the 1st day of September, with a continuendo to the 1st day of February, 1850. The appellant pleaded the general issue and two special pleas. Issue was taken upon the pleas, but as the decision of the Court does not turn upon the pleadings, it is unnecessary to recite them.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1850-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently February 1924

8 state decisions

3018501860187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Treat, C. J.

¶1We c~ainot iftqthrè~ into~ the propriety of the

¶2decision of the Circuit Court refusing to grant á new trial. It does not affirmatively appear, as-it should" in order to present that- question, - that" all' of the material evidence is in the record. It - is stated in the conclusion of the bill of exceptions, that it contains' “'an outline of all the testimony in-the case.” ' This language does not imply, that all of the facts proved on the trial, and which may legitimately have been considered by the jury, are previously set-forth. It "is'not equivalent'to'the usual statement in a bill of exceptions, that it contains the substance of the -testimony-given bn the trial.

¶3Nor can we: inquire into 'the- correctness of the instructions complained of. The- record- furnishes no "evidence,' that' the defendant exceptéd to the giving of the "instructions.

¶4It remains to be considered, whether the-Court erred in excluding certain testimony offered ’ by the defendant. The ease showed,- that several persons raised crops in a common field surrounded by a defective fence. ' During the' season, brie of them erected an inside fence sufficient to protect the crops. In Se|> tember, the plaintiff purchased'eighteen acres of corn growing in the field; and, in November, the servants of the defendant removed a'portion of the inner fence, by means'bf which stock entered-into the field and destroyed the'corn. The action "was brought to:r'ecovér the valúe of the'corn thus'destroyed. The defendant offered-to prove, that the -plaintiff was bound to'keep the outside fehce in repair. We cannot perceive, how the admission of this testimony could have "beiiefitted"the defendant. The fact that-it was the duty of the plaintiff to keep the outer fencé in proper condition, did not justify the defendant in removing the inner bnO. Fo-r aught -appearing in the case, the plaintiff had an undoubted right to rely on the 'inside fence for the protection bf -his property-. The defendant proposed to prove, "in mitigation of damages, that the- plaintiff might, after the- taking away of the inner fence, .at a.small expense and by the-exercise of ordinary care, have saved his corn.. This evidence was. properly excluded. If the. fence;was. removed -by the- direction- of the defendant, he was responsible for all of the- consequences directly resulting from the act. . He .could not avoid-that-responsibility, by showing thab.the plaintiff failed to repair the breach that his servants .had committed... It was not a trifling- trespass* * as in the .case of the.opening.of a gate* which .the owner sees, open before any injury ensues, .and neglects ..-to close. The defendant also offered .to. prove,, the price-which the plaintiff-paid for the corn, at public, auction, two months, prior to its destruction. This testimony may not have been wholly irrelevant, but, we think, it had too remote a connection with, the real question in issue, to justify the reversal of the judgment, because of its exclusion. The corn w9s.stan.ding. in the field-when purchased by the plaintiff, but was cut and put in shock by Mm before it was destroyed. The- price .that, he paid for it, was .not, therefore, any just or certain criterion, of the value at the time:of its destruction. The defendant further, .proposed-to-;prove* that he had the. right to go upon Jbe field. Such, right, if it existed,■did not authorize him to remove the fence, or relieve him.from liability for the consequences. The gist of. the .action.;ivas -the ¡ removal of the fence, .not the entry on the close.

¶5The judgment of .the Circuit, Court, js.affirmed, with costs.

¶6Judgment qffvrrned. ■

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