¶1dissenting:
¶2I cannot agree with the result reached by the majority. Section 128 of the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 3, par. 280) provides for the filing of a petition for revocation and section 130 of such act (par. 282) directs notice and a hearing thereon. To say that the court has no jurisdiction between the time of filing the petition and the final hearing resulting in the order of discharge reads into the statute something which is not there. It is a clear attempt to legislate.
¶3A petition to sell the right to drill through the instrumentality of an oil-and-gas lease was filed, an order to sell had been entered, the public sale had been held, the lease had been duly bid in and the sale reported, all before the filing of the petition for revocation of the conservator’s letters. The only thing remaining to be done was the formal approval of the sale, after the expiration of the statutory period for the filing of objections. No objections were filed to the report of sale within the period provided by statute nor was there any charge of fraud, overreaching or inadequacy of consideration.
¶4The case of Ehrgott v. Seaborn, 363 Ill. 292, is no authority for the holding in this cause, but merely followed the rule that there is no sale until approval of the report of sale. In that case the sale had been made and a report of sale filed. Objections followed and it was shown that a substantially increased offer had been made. The court found that it was to the interest of the parties that the premises be resold, disapproved the report and ordered a resale. It should be noted that the procedure there followed was in accordance with the statute.
¶5I am of the opinion that the court had not only the power, but the duty, to complete the transaction rather than let it dangle in midair by revoking letters. If objections were filed they should have been passed on. If no objections were filed, then it was the duty of the court, as it did, to enter the order approving the sale.
¶6The court retained jurisdiction until the conservator’s office was terminated. Section 287 of the Probate Act (par. 441) specifically provides that all acts of a personal representative done according to law prior to revocation of letters are valid. It seems to me that in the absence of fraud or inadequacy of consideration, and none is alleged or proved, the order entered by the county court was entirely proper and should have been affirmed.