12 Ill. 2d 502 - Light v. Light’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 89 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 96 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Policy considerations argue strongly that such decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. Unless they receive interstate recognition, the insulated judicial systems of the several States may become sanctuaries within which obligations that have been fully and fairly adjudicated in another jurisdiction may be escaped. These policy considerations have found expression in the decisions of many State courts which, on the grounds of comity, have given full effect, including equitable enforcement, to foreign decrees awarding alimony in the future. . . .” “The practical problems that might arise in the enforcement of a decree subject to modification by the courts of more than one forum are no more difficult under the full-faith-and-credit clause than they are when foreign judgments are given full effect as a matter of comity. If anything, they are less complicated than those that have necessarily been assumed in the enforcement and modification of decrees relating to the custody of children. (People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 ; May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 . Mr. Justice Traynor’s opinion in Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d (Cal.) 19, blueprints a pattern for their solution that is as appropriate under the full-faith- and-credit clause as it is when interstate recognition is based on comity. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 24 Ill. App. 2d 400 - Allain v. Allain

2. ““The Uniform Act * * * is intended to make it easier to enforce judgments across State lines. To that end it establishes a procedure for registering the foreign judgment in an appropriate court in this State (sec. 2), and authorizes the levy of execution at once upon a judgment so registered. (Sec. 6.) Sale under the levy is postponed, however, until the judgment debtor has an opportunity, after service of process, to assert whatever defenses he may have to the enforcement of the judgment. (Secs. 4, 5, 8, 13.) Upon default, or if the asserted defenses are not sustained, the registered judgment becomes a final judgment of the court in which it is registered. The judgment so rendered is binding either personally or quasi in rem, depending on the kind of service had upon the defendant. (Secs. 7, 12.)””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 54 Ill. App. 3d 633 - Chatham v. Chatham

3. ““Under the Uniform Act, unless the registration is set aside after a hearing, it is the registered judgment that becomes the final judgment of the Illinois court. [Citation.] Such a provision is essential to the act’s purpose of protecting the priority of the creditor who levies on the foreign judgment. The act thus contemplates that the vitality of the foreign judgment is to be determined as of the date that it is registered. And in this case the judgment was registered under the statute several months before the ten-year period expired.” (Emphasis added). Light, 12 Ill. 2d at 508-09 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 341 Ill. App. 3d 689 - Logemann Holding, Inc. v. Lieber