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12 Kan. 105

Ray v. Brenner

Supreme Court of Kansas

Decided July 15, 1873

Supreme Court of Kansas · decided 1873-07-15

Error from Doniphan District Garni. In December, 1872, Ray filed his motion in the district court to revive (as against Brermer) a judgment rendered in his favor in 1862 against one Foreman as principal, and Brenner as surety. The motion was denied, at the December Term 1872, and Bay brings the case here. Other facts will be found in the opinion. It was only necessary for an execution to issue, in order to make the surety Brenner liable in this case on the judgment.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The true rule is thus laid down by Thiebold in his work on Principal and Surety, p. 114: ‘The obligation of the surety, also, in general becomes extinct by the extinction of the obligation of the principal debtor. An exception to this rule takes place whenever the extinction of the obligation of the principal arises from causes, such as bankruptcy and certificate, which originate with the law, and not with the voluntary acts of the creditor.’ ” (p. 107.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Failor v. Wehe

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently September 1982

1 district · 7 state decisions

30187318801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Brewer, J.:

¶2In March 1862 plaintiff recovered judgment in the district court against Austin R. Foreman as principal, and Adam Brenner as surety. On this judgment executions were issued, the last being of date August 3, 1864. They were returned unsatisfied. Foreman died in November, 1864, and his estate was administered in the probate court of that county, and final settlement after a lapse of three years made in January 1868. The estate was solvent, and if this judgment had been presented for allowance it could have been collected; but it was not presented to the administrator, nor the court. In 1872 the plaintiff sought to recover the judgment as against Brenner, it .having become dormant by lapse of time. The district court refused to order a revivor, and of this the plaintiff here complains.

¶3"We think the court below erred in its rulings. They seem to have been based upon the idea, that because the principal debtor’s obligation had been discharged, that of the surety must also be; that the judgment could have been presented for allowance, and if presented would have been paid; that the plaintiff was guilty of laches in not presenting it, and therefore the surety is released from further liability. The true rule is thus laid down by Thiebold in his work on Principal and Surety, p. 114: “The obligation of the surety, also, in general becomes extinct by the extinction of the obligation of the principal debtor. An exception to this rule takes place whenever the extinction of the obligation of the principal arises from causes, such as bankruptcy and certificate, which originate with the law, and not with the voluntary acts of the creditor.” In 2 Am. Lead. Cases, 402, it is said that “the better opinion would seem to be that he (the creditor) is not responsible for suffering a judgment to expire, or abandoning a lien acquired by an attachment, or execution, unless the execution of the writ has gone far enough to *108operate as a virtual payment or satisfaction of the debt.” In U. S. v. Simpson, 3 Pen. & Watts, 437, the surety was held liable, although a judgment against the principal had been allowed to expire, and the land which it bound was sold under executions issued by other persons. Mundorff v. Singer, 5 Watts, 172; Farmers' Bank v. Reynolds, 13 Ohio, 84. These cases are much stronger than the one at bar. Liens were lost, while here no lien ever existed. All that can be said is, that the creditor omitted to proceed. No act of his extinguished the obligation of the principal debtor. That resulted through operation of law. The obligation to see that the debt was paid rested on the principal and' surety, and not on the creditor. If the surety wished it collected from the principal, he should have paid the judgment, been subrogated to the lights of the creditor, and then himself presented the judgment for allowance against the estate of the principal. If he failed to do this in time to realize anything from the estate, he must suffer the consequences: 2 Am. Lead. Cases, 388; Phillips v. Solomon, 42 Geo., 192; Hollingsworth v. Farmer, 44 Geo., 11; Davis v. Graham, 29 Iowa, 514; Bucksalew v. Smith, 44 Ala., 638; Crawford v. Saulden, 33 Geo., 173.

¶4The order of the district court will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

All the Justices concurring.
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