Volume 12 — Maryland Appellate Reports

<p>September Term, 1970.]</p>

HUSBAND AND WIFE — DIVORCE — <italic>Statute Empowering Court To</italic><italic>Determine Ownership Of Personal Property And To Apportion</italic><italic>Accordingly Did Not Authorize Court Of Equity, Sitting As A</italic><italic>Divorce Court, To Award The Property Of One Spouse To The Other</italic><italic>Or Otherwise To Dispose Of It</italic>. The Court <italic>held</italic> that where personal property was owned equally by the parties, Chancellor was powerless to do anything more under the terms of Art. 16, Sec. 29 than to make an equal division between the parties of the jointly owned property or, in the alternative, to order a sale of the property and to order the proceeds to be equally divided between the parties. pp. 102-105 ALIMONY — <italic>Withholding Alimony To The Wife Not Abuse Of</italic><italic>Discretion Where Chancellor Had Carefully Considered All</italic><italic>Applicable Criteria And It Did Not Appear That Wife's Income And</italic><italic>Assets Were Insufficient To Care For Her Needs</italic>. pp. 105-106 ALIMONY — <italic>Where Absolute Divorce Is Granted And The Decree</italic><italic>Does Not Contain An Award Of Alimony Or Reservation Of</italic><italic>Jurisdiction To Award Alimony At Future Time, Right To Alimony Is</italic><italic>Forever Barred</italic>. In the instant case the Chancellor, on remand, will have opportunity to review and clarify his intention concerning the retention of jurisdiction to consider a future application for alimony. Any review should take into account the fact that parties had been married for 32 years; that marriage was dissolved because of husband's transgressions; that 56 year old wife has had no business or professional experience; and that although her assets are substantial by present day standards there may be uncertainties in her future financial status. pp. 106-108 DIVORCE — <italic>Counsel Fee — No Abuse Of Discretion In Not</italic><italic>Awarding To The Wife Counsel Fees In Light Of Her Financial</italic><italic>Status</italic>. p. 108

AUTOMOBILES — <italic>Purpose Of Statute Prohibiting Person In Charge</italic><italic>Of Motor Vehicle From Permitting It To Stand Unattended Without</italic><italic>Stopping Engine, Locking Ignition, Removing Key, Setting Brake,</italic><italic>And, When On Grade, Turning Wheels To Curb Is To Insure The</italic><italic>Safety Of The Public, In Other Words To Protect Against Theft Of</italic><italic>Or Tampering With Motor Vehicle And To Prevent Motor Vehicle From</italic><italic>Moving Under Own Momentum Should The Brakes Fail</italic> — <italic>Code (1957</italic><italic>Ed.) Art. 66 1/2, § 247 (Now Sec. 11-1101</italic> — <italic>1970 Repl.</italic><italic>Vol.)</italic>. pp. 112-113 AUTOMOBILES — "<italic>Unattended Motor Vehicle</italic>" — <italic>Term Has Been</italic><italic>Held To Mean "Without Anyone Present [In The Vehicle] Who Is</italic><italic>Competent To Prevent Any Of The Probable Dangers To The Public"</italic><italic>— Statute Complied With When Operator Of Vehicle Leaves With It</italic><italic>A Person Who May Be Ordinarily Capable Of Coping With The Kind Of</italic><italic>Emergencies That May Be Expected To Arise Under The Particular</italic><italic>Circumstances Of The Case</italic>. The Court <italic>held</italic> that as a matter of law there was no violation of Art. 66 1/2, § 11-1101 where the driver left the motor vehicle, leaving the ignition keys in the car, with three other persons in the motor vehicle, two being eighteen years old and one was fifteen years old. Under the circumstances of this case none of the attendants left with the car were required to be competent motor vehicle operators. Where person left with car was capable of preventing an unauthorized person from taking car, fact that he did not, does not mean that car was unattended. pp. 113-114 AUTOMOBILES — NEGLIGENCE — <italic>Violation Of Statute —</italic><italic>Foreseeability — Person Generally Not Liable In Damages Merely</italic><italic>Because He Failed To Make Provision Against A Happening Which He</italic><italic>Could Not Reasonably Be Expected To Foresee — Passenger</italic><italic>Suddenly Driving Off In Vehicle Was Extraordinary Result Not To</italic><italic>Be Reasonably Foreseen By Driver Of Motor Vehicle</italic>. p. 114 AUTOMOBILES — NEGLIGENCE — <italic>Proximate Cause — Negligence Not</italic><italic>Actionable Unless It, Without The Intervention Of Any Independent</italic><italic>Factor, Causes The Harm Complained Of — Assuming Driver</italic><page_number>Page 110</page_number><italic>Was Negligent In Leaving Motor Vehicle, The Proximate Cause Of</italic><italic>Passenger's Injuries As A Matter Of Law Was The Independent,</italic><italic>Unexpected, Extraordinary Negligent Action Of Another Passenger</italic><italic>Suddenly Driving Off And Striking A Utility Pole</italic>. pp. 114-115