12 Md. App. 384 - In Re Arnold’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . [I] t is clear that the Legislature intended no departure in philosophy from that underlying previous juvenile court enactments in Maryland, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, viz., that juvenile proceedings are of a special nature designed to meet the problems peculiar to the adolescent (In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520 [ 248 A. 2d 364 (1968)]); that the proceedings of a juvenile court are not criminal in nature and its dispositions are not punishment for crime (In The Matter of Cromwell, 232 Md. 409 [ 194 A. 2d 88 (1963)]); that the juvenile law has as its underlying concept the protection of the juvenile, so that judges, in making dispositions in juvenile cases, think not in terms of guilt, but of the child’s need for protection or rehabilitation (In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517 [ 255 A. 2d 419 (1969)]) ; that the juvenile act does not contemplate the punishment of children where they are found to be delinquent, but rather [is] an attempt to correct and rehabilitate them in ‘a wholesome family environment whenever possible,’ although rehabilitation may have to be sought in some instances in an institution (Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524 [ 140 A. 2d 914 (1958) ] )”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 23 Md. App. 496 - In Re Appeal No. 179 · 21 Md. App. 572 - Thomas v. State

2. ““We are not unmindful that, ‘disposition in a juvenile case is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile judge, to be disturbed on appeal only upon a finding that such discretion has been abused.’ Hamill, supra.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 17 Md. App. 705 - Matter of Johnson · 179 Md. App. 512 - In Re Julianna B.

3. “Indeed, to otherwise conclude would render meaningless the highsounding provisions of the juvenile law which entreat the juvenile judge in making disposition not to think in terms of the juvenile’s guilt, not to punish him for his delinquent acts, but rather to assess his need for supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation and thereafter make disposition under [the Act] “most suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.” We think the juvenile judge in this case failed fully to appreciate and apply these principles in taking appellant from his parents and committing him to a training school.... However relevant the nature of the delinquent act and the circumstances surrounding its commission may be in making a proper disposition, those factors cannot be applied, without regard to, or wholly apart from, the child’s best interests and those of the public viewed in light of the purposes underlying the juvenile law. In other words, to make disposition ‘most suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child’ ... requires that the juvenile judge consider more than the delinquent act itself, no matter how extreme or violent it may have been.... Moreover, the record fails to reflect that the court, in making its disposition, had in mind that Maryland law clearly contemplates the retention of a delinquent child in his home where possible, consistent with his own as well as the public interests. [T]he Legislature has indicated its preference that a delinquen”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 179 Md. App. 512 - In Re Julianna B.