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12 Mich. 292

Gard v. Stevens

Michigan Supreme Court

Decided April 19, 1864

Michigan Supreme Court · decided 1864-04-19

<p>Guaranty, when continuing. — TIio following was lield not to be a continuing guaranty, but to be limited to a single purchase or transaction: “St. Joseph, Sept. 18th, 1858. Joseph G-ard, Dear Sir: If you will let the bearer have what leather he wants, and charge the same to himself, I will see that you have your pay in a reasonable length of time. J. E. Stevens."</p> <p>Guaranty : application of payments. — Held further, that the first moneys after-wards received by the creditor on the debtor’s general account, should be applied in payment of the leather sold on the guaranty.</p> <p>Practice : Oases made. — Where a case is made after judgment in the Circuit Court for a review on both the law and the facts, it is presumed to contain, all of the evidence, unless there is something on the face of the case itself indicating • the contrary.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ If you will let the bearer have what leather he wants, and charge the same to himself, I will see that you have your pay in a reasonable length of time.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Fogel v. Blitz

Relies on Whitney v. Groot · Rogers & Lambert v. Warner & Bostwick

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1864-04-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently July 1985

15 state decisions

401864187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Manning J.:

¶1The action is assumpsit for the price of leather sold to one Gates, on the following guaranty :

¶2“St. Joseph, Sept. 18, 1858.

¶3Joseph Gaud, Lear Sir:

¶4If you will let the bearer have what leather he wants, *296and charge the same to himself, I will see that you have your pay in a reasonable length of time. Tours, &c.,

¶5J. E. Stevens.’’

¶6As plaintiff sold leather to Gates at several different times, and for different amounts, the first question is. whether the guaranty is limited as to time. We think it limited to a single purchase or transaction. We must hold this, or that it is unlimited both as to time and amount. Every person is supposed to have some regard to his own interest; and it is not reasonable to presume any man of ordinary prudence would become surety for another without limitation as to time or amount, unless he has done so in express terms, or by clear implication. If the guaranty was limited in express terms, either as to time or amount, but not as to both, it might be said it was the intention of the guarantor to leave it open as to the other, or that a further limitation could not be implied. But where . it contains no express limitation as to either, and there is nothing in the instrument itself from which it can be inferred that it was the intention of the guarantor to leave it open as to both, we think it must be understood as referring to a single transaction. The case of Rogers v. Warner, 8 Johns. 119, and Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 81, we think are correct in principle, and not in conflict with any of the cases cited on the argument by plaintiff’s counsel.

¶7We are further of opinion that the first moneys after-wards received by plaintiff on Gates’s general account should be applied in payment of the leather sold on the guaranty.

¶8It was objected on [the argument that it does not appear from the case that it contains all the evidence. That is, as we understand the objection, that it is not so stated in the case itself. It is not necessary that it should be. When a case is made for review of both law and facts, it is presumed to contain all of the evidence, unless. *297there is something on the face of the case itself indicating the contrary.

¶9The judgment below must be reversed, and a judgment be entered for defendant, with the costs of both Courts.

Martin Ch. J. and Campbell J. concurred.Christiancy J. did not sit in this case.
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