12 N.Y. Crim.

Volume 12 — New York Criminal Reports

27 opinions

12 N.Y. Crim. 89People v. Barberi (1896)
1. Criminal law—Insanity. The law presumes everyone to be sane and responsible for his acts until the contrary is shown by the evidence. 2. Same. When insanity is set up as a defense to an alleged criminal act, and the defendant offers evidence tending to prove he was insane at the time of the homicide, the legal presumption of sanity is rebutted, and the prosecution must prove sanity by a preponderance of evidence. 8. Same. If defendant’s evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to her sanity at Ihe time of the killing, the prosecution must remove that doubt by a preponderance of evidence. 4. Same. In order to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree where the defense of insanity is interposed, the question to be determined is, whether the defendant, by the testimony in the case, has met the requirements of the statute and satisfactorily shown that, at the timé of the com. mission óf the alleged criminal act, she was laboring under such a defect of reason as either not to know the nature and quality of the act she was doing, or not to know the act was wrong. 5. Same—Epilepsy. It does not follow that, because a person is an epileptic, he is incapable of a violalion of law and must be excused from criminal liability. It is only at times that epileptics are unconscious or irresponsible. •6. Evidence—Expert. Where the opinion, of an expert is speculative, theoretical, and states only the belief of the witness, while yet some other opinion is consistent with the facts stated, it is entitled to but little weight in the minds of the jury. V. Same. The jury are under no obligation to adopt the medico-legal views of experts. •8. Same. No expert opinion is to be given any weight that is predicated upon facts not established by the evidence. 9. Criminal law—Reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is such a doubt that a reasonable man might entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence. It is one which arises from the evidence and its character, or from the absence osatisfactory evidence in the case.
12 N.Y. Crim. 122People v. Hawker (1897)
Statute—Ex Post Facto Law. Sectisn 153, c. 661 of 1893, as amended by c. 398 of 1895, is constitutional so far as it operates prospectively, and upon persons convicted of felony after its passage, but is unconstitutional in so far as it applies by its terms to persons so convicted before the law went into operation.
12 N.Y. Crim. 196People v. James (1896)
Criminal Law—No Information or Warrant. Before a party is placed on trial in a court of special sessions, or in a police court, he should be charged by an information, clear and definite, and the crime should be followed by a warrant specifically stating the crime alleged.
12 N.Y. Crim. 236People v. Thorn (1897)
1. Indictment—Demurrer. Where an indictment contains different counts, each of which technically describes a different offense, but it is apparent, from the general tenor of the indictment, that each count relates to the same transaction, and that the introduction of separate counts is not for the purpose of proving distinct offenses, and where the acts of conspiracy were manifestly initiatory to and were merged into and consummated by the crime of murder, such an indictment is good. 2. Same—Mercer. Where there is a conspiracy to commit a felony, and such crime is subsequently consummated, pursuant to the conspiracy,, the conspiracy merges in the felony, so as to prevent a prosecution for the conspiracy itself, as an independent crime. 3. Same—Committed in two counties. Where a crime has been partly committed in one county and partly in another, the case falls within the provisions of § 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and either county has jurisdiction.
12 N.Y. Crim. 242People v. King (1897)
Appeal by the plaintiff, The People of the State of New York, from a judgment of the County Court of Richmond county in favor of the defendant, upon the decision of the court sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to an indictmennt.
12 N.Y. Crim. 244People v. Boudouin (1897)
Demurrer to indictment.
12 N.Y. Crim. 247People v. Burns (1897)
The defendant was brought before the police justice of the city of Syracuse without a warrant, and no written or verified information, pleaded guilty to said charge and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment in the Onondaga penitentiary for sixty days.
12 N.Y. Crim. 263People v. Kaufman (1897)
1. Indictment —Obscene literature. It is not necessary to set out matter in an indictment, which the grand jury asserts to be too obscene for recital. It is only necessary to identify the obscene book or publication sufficiently to apprise the defendant of what particular book or publication is intended, giving as an excuse for not setting forth the obscene matter that it is so gross as to be offensive .to the court and improper to be placed upon its records. 2. Same. If anything more is requisite for the protection of the defendant’s rights, it may be left to the discretion of the court to compel the public prosecutor to furnish such further information or specification as may be needful. 3. Same. A person, indicted for selling an obscene book, cannot be convicted upon proof that he purchased the book for another person. 4. Same—Instructions. Where the court merely charges that, if defendant sold the obscene book, he was guilty, and if he did not, he was innocent, without referring, to defendant’s statement that the person to whom he delivered the book gave him the money to go out and buy it, a refusal to charge that, if defendant’s testimony was true, there was no sale, is erroneous.
12 N.Y. Crim. 282People v. Schmidt (1897)
Demurrer to an indictment for making unlawful sales of intoxicating liquors. The above-named defendants are indicted for violating the liquor tax law.
12 N.Y. Crim. 287People v. Young (1897)
1. Courts—Extraordinary term. The governor has power to appoint an extraordinary trial term of the supreme court and to name a justice to preside. 2. Same. The Constitution does not confer exclusive power upon the appellate division in each department to appoint all terms of the supreme court therein and to designate justices to preside thereat.
12 N.Y. Crim. 294People v. Garabed (1897)
1. Municipal corporations—Ordinances—Pines. A village ordinance, imposing only a penalty for violations, may be enforced by criminal proceedings. 2. Same—Warrant. In such case, it is not necessary that the warrant for information allege that defendant had willfully and unlawfully done the act complained of, ■J 3. Same—Imprisonment. In such case, § 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply. 4. Same—Constitutionality. An ordiance, forbidding any person to heat a drum or tambourine in the streets or make any noise with any instrument for any purpose what ever, without the written permission of the president of the village, is constitutional. Joseph Garabed was convicted of violating a village ordinance, and from the judgment of conviction he appeals
12 N.Y. Crim. 310People v. Farrell (1897)
1. Indictment—Same oeeense. Where two indictments are based on the same alleged crime, the second necessarily supersedes the first. • 2. Same—Quashing. Where the direction contained in section 256 of the Oriminal Code has, through inadvertence or otherwise, been disregarded by the grand jury, the testimony has been offered and received which would not be competent or material or legal in the trial of a case, the court will not interfere with the finding, if, apart from such evidence, there is enough to sustain the indictment, unless it is clearly manifest from the minutes that the illegal evidence received had influenced the minds of the jury and had brought about an indictment insufficiently supported by other and admissible evidence.
12 N.Y. Crim. 312People ex rel. Shortell v. Markell (1897)
Habeas corpus against superintendent of the Onondaga County Penitentiary, to inquire into the validity of the imprisonment of relator, who had been convicted in the police court of the city of Syracuse on a plea of guilty of being intoxicated in a public place in violation of Laws 1896, c. 112, § 40.
12 N.Y. Crim. 318People v. Durante (1897)
Excise law—Liquor tax certificate—Chattel mortgage. A liquor tax certificate is property which may he the subject of a chattel mortgage, within the meaning of § 571 of the Penal Code
12 N.Y. Crim. 321People v. Hendrickson (1897)
1. Criminal law—Grand larceny. In order to justify a conviction for the offense of larceny, the taking musta mount to a trespass and accompanied by a felonious intent conceived at the time of taking or after. 2. Same—Corpus delicti. It is proper to establish the corpus of the crime by showing circumstances from which a legitimate inference of a felonious taking may be inferred. This may be accomplished by showing subsequent possession of the property, or such a relation to its disappearance as raises the presumption that the party charged appropriated it. 3: Same. In such case, the proof should exclude the existence of other agencies for the removal of the property than the defendant. 4. Same. Where the circumstances relied upon are made to do duty both for the establishment of the fact that a crime has been committed, and also for the establishment of the criminal agency by which it was committed, and both rest upon inference to be derived from such circumstances, the charge must fail. 5. Same—Charge. A charge, which ignores the element of a felonious intent to appropriate the property to the possessor’s own use, is erroneous.
12 N.Y. Crim. 326People v. Garrahan (1897)
1. Criminal law—False representations. Upon the trial of an indictment for obtaining money by fraudulent representations as to the solvency of a corporation in which defendant was selling stock, testimony of the complainant that he, pursuant to the instructions of defendant, made similar statements, as to its solvency, to other persons, is admissible as bearing upon the question of fraudulent intent. 2. Same—Evidence. Where the record does not disclose that the prospectus contained the statements which the defendant claimed to be important, the court will not presume that any substantial rights of defendant were affected by the exclusion of such prospectus, so as to call for the reversal of the judgement. 8. Same—Evidence—Harmless error. Where the defendant has given his version of a conversation, and the interpreter gives his version after the witness has left the stand, wherein he substantially corroborates the defendant, and the complainant does not contradict this evidence, the exclusion of the testimony of a witness, who understands only English, offered to show what the Italian party to such conversation learned from it, cannot prejudice the defendant.
12 N.Y. Crim. 333People v. Jarvis (1897)
Appeal from a judgment of the county court affirming a judgment of a police justice.
12 N.Y. Crim. 351People v. Abraham (1897)
1. Statute — Construction. Penal statutes should be construed strictly and not extended by implication ; but, where the statute is made for the public good, though it is penal, it should receive an equitable construction. 2. Druggist — Sale of drugs. la case of a person not a registered pharmacist, the prohibition, contained in c. 273 of 1886, applies to medicines in the original packages of the manufacturer.
12 N.Y. Crim. 357People v. Barry (1897)
January 6, 1896, the defendant was arrested, and taken before A. Dunham, a justice of the peace of the town of Manchester, charged with the crime of assault and battery in the third degree; and in the justice’s minutes, it is stated that the defendant “was informed by me of his right to counsel, witnesses, and a trial by jury. Defendant asked for time to procure counsel and witnesses and pleads not guilty.
12 N.Y. Crim. 362People v. Oishei (1897)
Motion to quash indictment for forgery and demurrer to the indictment for deceit.
12 N.Y. Crim. 405People v. Metropolitan Traction Co. (1897)
1. Criminal law — Indictment—Motion to set aside. Motion to set aside indictment maybe made on the ground that the grand jury received illegal evidence which presumably influenced the finding, or that the indictment was found without sufficient"evidence. 3. Same. An indictment may be set aside for proper cause other than those specified in § 313 of the Criminal Code. 3. Same. The amendment of 1897 to § 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure works an entire change in the law upon this subject.
12 N.Y. Crim. 423People v. Barberi (1896)
1. Criminal law—Insanity. When insanity is set up as a defense to an alleged criminal act, and the defendant offers evidence tending to prove that he was insane at the time of the homicide, the legal presumption of sanity is rebutted, and the prosecution must prove sanity by a preponderance of evidence. 2. Same. So, if defendant’s evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time of the homicide, the people must remove such doubt by a preponderance of evidence. 3. Same—Epilepsy. In order that a psychical epileptic attack shall constitute a defense in a prosecution for homicide, it must deprive the defendant, for the time, of reason, and cause him to act in an automatic and unconscious manner, without understanding the nature and quality of the act or that it was wrong. 4. Same—Expert testimony. Where an expert states precise facts in science as ascertained or settled, or states the invariable conclusion, which results from the facts stated, his opinion is entitled to great weight; When he gives only the probable inference from facts stated, his opinion is of less importance; but, where his opinion is speculative, theoretical, and states only his belief, it is entitled to but little weight in the minds of the jury. 5. Same—Reasonable doubt. A doubt, to justify an acquittal, must be a reasonable one and arise from a careful, candid investigation of all the evidence in the case. If, upon a consideration of all the evidence, with such presumptions and inferences as fair-minded and intelligent men have a right to draw from the established facts, the jury have such a conviction of the defendant’s guilt that a prudent man would feel safe to act upon it in matters of the highest concern and importance to himself, they may safely find that the case is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
12 N.Y. Crim. 469People v. Cramer (1897)
Appeal from a judgment of the Schuyler county court, affirming a judgment of the court of special sessions, convicting defendant of the offense of selling intoxicating liquor without a license.
12 N.Y. Crim. 472People v. Bliskey (1897)
Appeal from a judgment, convicting defendant of being a disorderly person in not supporting his wife.
12 N.Y. Crim. 473People v. Crotty (1897)
1. Indictment—Exceptions. If there is an exception, not in the enacting clause, but in a subsequent clause or'statute, the indictment need not negative it, but it is matter of defense to be shown by the defendant. 2. Criminal law—Exception. In the absence of an exception to any particular portion of the charge a general exception, taken by the defendant, presents no question for review. 3. Same—Charge. A charge, which does not deprive the jury of the exclusive right to judge of and decide the questions of fact, does not, in this respect, constitute reversible error.
12 N.Y. Crim. 476People v. Rogers (1897)
Grand Larceny—Insufficiency of Evidence. 0 The evidence in this case, was held insufficient to warrant a conviction of grand larceny.
12 N.Y. Crim. 549People v. Flanagan (1897)
1. Evidence—Robbery. Where, upon the trial oí an indictment for robbery, evidence has been given tending to identify the defendant and another as the persons who had participated in the transaction, though they were not seen together on the day or occasion when it was committed, it is competent to show that they were associates a short time before the occasion in question, though they were not at that time apparently engaged in any unlawful enterprise, especially where the defendant claims that they were strangers. 2. Same—Remark of district attorney. A statement by the district attorney in his opening address to the jury, that the defendant and an alleged associate had conducted themselves “very suspiciously ” on an occasion prior to the robbery, is not objectionable, where it is simply his construction of the evidence which he proposed to introduce. 3. Same—Objection. An exception to incompetent evidence, whose admission adds nothing to what the witness had before testified without objection, requires no consideration.