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12 R.I. 99

Hazard v. Durant

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Decided March 19, 1878

Supreme Court of Rhode Island · decided 1878-03-19

Bilu in Equity charging fraudulent conversion of funds and praying for an account and injunction. The facts and previous proceedings are reported in 9 R. I. 602 and 11 R. I. 195.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ The defendant entreats for leave to answer, denying them [the averments of the bill], . ... Shall we then proceed as if they were true, because the defendant, .being in contempt, and unable to relieve himself, cannot make his denial effectual by answer or defence? The question is novel; but we think it admits of but one solution. The court must be careful not to become an instrument of injustice, even against a person who has forfeited all claims upon its favor. We decide, therefore, that the cause must go to a master to inquire into the truth of the inculpating allegations of the bill, and if he finds them true to any extent, to take the account accordingly, making, for the sake of dispatch, one report of the entire matter. We also decide that in making the inquiry, the master shall not be confined to testimony furnished by the complainants,, but shall notify Durant, so that he may be present, if he sees fit, to aid the inquiry, and to testify himself, and furnish the testimony of others.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hovey v. Elliott

Cited in Ballentine's (1916)’s definition of “Document” · Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Documents”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1878-03-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 1953

2 state decisions

10187818801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1This cause was recently sent to a master to inquire into the truth of the inculpating allegations of the bill. The defendant Durant now moves the court to direct the master in making the inquiry to exclude ex parte affidavits and require the witnesses to testify either orally or by deposition, with opportunity for cross-examination. The complainants claim the right to use any affidavits *103 which they have already used in the hearings before the court under Rule 72 in equity. The rule is as follows, to wit:

¶2"All affidavits, depositions, and documents, which have been previously made, read, or used in the court, upon any proceeding in any cause or matter, may be used before the master."

¶3In the published rules this rule follows a rule that regulates accounting before a master, and, therefore, the defendant contends that it was intended to apply only when a master is taking an account. The argument is not convincing. The rule purports to be a rule for "any cause or matter," and contains no reference to the preceding rule. We must allow it to have its obvious meaning. Adams' Equity, 383.

¶4But while we think the affidavits are admissible under the rule and therefore cannot instruct the master to exclude them, nevertheless we think it is within the power of the master to require the production of other testimony if he is not satisfied with them. He has the power under Equity Rule 69, which expressly gives him, besides other powers, authority "to direct the mode in which matters requiring evidence shall be proved before him." Under this rule the master will of course exercise a judicial discretion, which we will not attempt to control in advance otherwise than by remarking that it is his duty under the decree to allow the defendant, Durant, to cross-examine the affiants, whose affidavits are introduced, either orally before him or by deposition.

¶5In the hearing before the court the report of a committee of Congress, with appended exhibits and testimony, was read as evidence by consent. The complainants claim the right to use it before the master as a document, under the rule above recited. The report is a congressional document, but it is not, in our opinion, a document within the meaning of the word as used in the rule. What the rule means is some writing like a deed, a will, a letter, or an account rendered or stated, which is evidence as soon as it is authenticated, independently of the consent of parties. We think, therefore, that the master will do right not to admit the report or its exhibits as evidence unless in the course of the hearing they should become admissible in connection with other testimony and on other grounds.

¶6Order accordingly.

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