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12 Tex. 88

Able v. Chandler

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1854

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1854-07-01

This was a suit upon a sealed note. The defendant answered by a general denial, and pleas impeaching the consideration of the note, in which he in substance, alleged, that the note sued on was given for the purchase money of a certain negro, sold by the plaintiff as administrator of one Griffin ; that at the sale the plaintiff, with intent to cheat and defraud the defendant, falsely and fraudulently represented that the negro was well disposed, trustworthy and obedient, and…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1854-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently June 1975

6 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Wheeler, J.

¶1The questions presented by the record, in this case, are settled by the previous adjudications of this Court.

¶2It is true, that the plaintiff, in his representative character, could not bind the estate by his warranty. (Lynch v. Baxter, 4 Tex. R. 431:) And so much of the answer as set up and relied on his alleged warranty, was rightly stricken out. But it is also true, that, though the administrator of an estate cannot bind the estate by his warranty, or render it responsible in damages for frauds or torts, committed by him, yet in his dealings with third persons, in respect to the estate, he is not, by his representative character, absolved from the universal *93obligation to observe the dictates of natural justice and common honesty, which require that he shall act fairly and not fraudulently. ¡Nor can the estate which he represents be permitted to derive an unjust and unconscientious advantage, to the injury of those with whom its legal representative contracts, by means of his unauthorized fraudulent conduct. (Crayton v. Hunger, 9 Tex. R. 285.) If the averments of the answer were true, they entitled the defendant, if not to a rescission of the contract by reason of his not having asked a rescission with appropriate averments, at least to an abatement of the price contracted to be paid for the negro, in so far as his value was diminished by reason of the vices and unsoundness concealed by the false and fraudulent representations of the plaintiff. To that extent the averments of the answer were a defence to the action; and the Court erred in sustaining the the exceptions to the entire answer.

¶3The Court also erred in rendering judgment for the want of an answer, and without the intervention of a jury, when the defendant had answered by a general denial. Though the general denial did not put the plaintiff upon proof of the execution of the note, it required its production, (Hatossy v. Frosh, 9 Tex. R. 610, 613,) and it precluded the plaintiff from taking judgment by default, for the want of an answer. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

¶4Reversed and remanded.

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