Case: 24-30119 Document: 44-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/28/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 28, 2024
No. 24-30119 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
David Stanley,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Scott Morgan; Wayne Griffin; Thomas Glover; Monte
Potier; City of Lafayette; Consolidated Government of
Lafayette,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6:22-CV-1655
______________________________
Before Jones, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
The Lafayette Police Department suspended police officer David
Stanley (“Stanley”) and transferred him to another unit following an
investigation into two of his Facebook posts. Over one year, one
administrative appeal, and two state court petitions later, Stanley sued four
police chiefs, the City of Lafayette, and the Consolidated Government of
Lafayette (collectively, “LPD”) in federal court for alleged First
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Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
the claims as prescribed.
Stanley appeals, hoping to rewind the prescription clock on two
grounds. First, he insists that his § 1983 claims could not have accrued until
an administrative appeal of the adverse actions concluded. Second, and
alternatively, he contends that his state court petitions interrupted
prescription under Louisiana law. Because United States Supreme Court
precedent forecloses his first argument, and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in Kling v. Hebert cuts against the second, we AFFIRM.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Stanley posted on Facebook opposing a Louisiana bill and praising the
LPD in connection with a traffic stop. On August 11, 2020, following notice
of an investigation into the first post’s potential violations of LPD policies,
LPD informed Stanley that he would be suspended for fourteen days.
Distressed by LPD’s decision, Stanley took sick leave for approximately one
year before the suspension took effect.
The following week, while on leave, Stanley appealed his suspension
to the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board (“Civil Service Board”)
pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2501. On August 20, 2020, Stanley filed a Petition
for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction in
state court, seeking to enjoin LPD from imposing the suspension. The state
district court granted the TRO, and LPD appealed. On September 18, 2020,
also during his leave, LPD transferred Stanley from the K-9 division to the
Uniform Patrol division.
Later that fall, the state appellate court dismissed LPD’s TRO appeal,
finding that the TRO had dissolved by operation of law. Stanley then re-filed
his petition with the state district court on November 20, 2020, seeking an
injunction regarding both the suspension and the transfer from the K-9
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division. In the spring of 2021, the state district court held a hearing on the
petition and ultimately granted LPD’s exception of prematurity, finding that
Stanley was required to first finalize the appeal of his suspension and transfer
with the Civil Service Board.
Stanley returned to work on June 11, 2021. That day, he received and
signed formal written notice of the suspension. The suspension became
effective on June 14, 2021.
On February 9, 2022, the Civil Service Board heard Stanley’s appeal.
The Civil Service Board upheld Stanley’s transfer but reduced the
suspension from fourteen to three days. Stanley then appealed to the state
district court.
On June 14, 2022, Stanley filed suit in federal district court, seeking
damages pursuant to § 1983 based on the alleged violations of his First
Amendment rights and retaliation. LPD filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, arguing that Stanley’s claims were prescribed. The magistrate judge
agreed. The magistrate judge found that the applicable one-year prescriptive
period commenced when Stanley was notified of each disciplinary action,
which occurred—at the latest—on the date he signed notice of the
suspension, June 11, 2021. The claims were therefore prescribed when he
filed suit on June 14, 2022. The magistrate judge also concluded that
Stanley’s state court petitions did not interrupt prescription because they
failed to assert any federal claims or seek monetary damages. Stanley filed
objections to the Report and Recommendation. He asserted for the first time
in the objections that his § 1983 claims did not accrue until February 9, 2022,
when the Civil Service Board adjudicated his appeal.
The district court stayed the proceedings pending resolution of this
court’s certified question to the Louisiana Supreme Court concerning
interruption. See Kling v. Hebert (Kling I), 60 F.4th 281 (5th Cir. 2023).
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Following an answer from the Louisiana Supreme Court in Kling v. Hebert
(Kling II), 378 So. 3d 54 (La. 2024), the district court reopened Stanley’s case
and accepted supplemental briefing on Kling II’s application. The district
court then adopted the Report and Recommendation, dismissing Stanley’s
claims as prescribed. Stanley timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review orders on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss de novo.
Petrobras Am., Inc. v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 9 F.4th 247, 253 (5th Cir.
2021). “Dismissal is appropriate if it is clear from the face of the complaint
that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”
Harris v. Hegmann,
198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Taylor v. Bailey
Tool Mfg. Co.,
744 F.3d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2014) (“A motion to dismiss may
be granted on a statute of limitations defense where it is evident from the
pleadings that the action is time-barred, and the pleadings fail to raise some
basis for tolling.”).
III. Analysis
Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Instead, § 1983 borrows its limitations period
from state law. Redburn v. City of Victoria,
898 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 2018).
In Louisiana, the limitations period is referred to as the “prescriptive
period.” See Brown v. Pouncy,
93 F.4th 331, 332 n.1 (5th Cir. 2024). The
prescriptive period for personal injury actions is one year. LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3492 (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one
year.”).1 So Stanley had one year from the date his § 1983 claims accrued to
file his complaint.
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1
Article 3492 was repealed and replaced by LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493.1, which
took effect on July 1, 2024. Article 3493.1 extends the prescriptive period for delictual
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a. Stanley’s § 1983 claims accrued upon notice of the adverse action.
“Federal law governs when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues.”
Redburn, 898 F.3d at 496. “The limitations period for federal claims begins
to run when a plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know’ of the injury, or in this
case, when [Stanley] received notice of the alleged [unconstitutional]
decision that is also the basis of his . . . claims.” McGregor v. La. State Univ.
Bd. of Sup’rs,
3 F.3d 850, 863 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Burrell v. Newsome,
883
F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)). In other words, the accrual date “is judged not
from the date the injury ceases, but from the earliest date a plaintiff was or
should have been aware of his injury and its connection with the defendant.”
Brossette v. City of Baton Rouge,
29 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
Stanley posits a different point for accrual. He contends that when an
employee chooses to participate in an elective administrative appeal of the
adverse employment decision, a § 1983 claim arising from that action cannot
accrue until the appeal is complete. In his view, this is because the adverse
action for which he seeks redress “does not become ‘final’ until the Civil
Service Board has acted.” He therefore could not have filed his § 1983 claims
until February 9, 2022, when the Civil Service Board acted on his
administrative appeal.2 Decades of Supreme Court precedent dictate
otherwise.
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actions to two years. But because the extended period “shall be given prospective
application only and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this
Act,” the one-year prescriptive period applies here. Tort Actions, 2024 La. Acts 423.
2
Stanley raised this argument for the first time in his objections to the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation. As such, the argument is forfeited. Shambaugh &
Son, L.P. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2024) (The court “considers
arguments forfeited if they are not raised before a magistrate judge, even if they are
subsequently raised before the reviewing district court in objections to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation.”). Nevertheless, we have “considerable discretion in
deciding whether to consider an issue that was not raised below” if the issue is “a purely
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It is a “settled rule” that “exhaustion of state remedies is not a
prerequisite to an action under § 1983.” Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180,
185 (2019) (citations omitted). Quite the opposite, § 1983 provides
“individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any
provision of state law to the contrary.” Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131, 147
(1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla.,
457 U.S. 496,
504 (1982)). It does not require individuals to “seek redress in the first
instance from the very state officials whose hostility to those rights
precipitated their injuries.”
Id. Thus, exhaustion does not determine accrual.
If there were any doubt about the matter, the Supreme Court obviated
it in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980). In Ricks, the
Supreme Court held that limitations periods for employment-based civil
rights claims “commence when the employer’s decision is made.”
449 U.S.
at 261 (addressing limitations in the Title VII context); 3 see also Chardon v.
Fernandez,
454 U.S. 6, 7–8 (1981) (per curiam). The employer’s decision is
not made any less final—and accrual is not delayed—by the existence of a
grievance process. Indeed, the process “by its nature, is a remedy for a prior
_____________________
legal matter and failure to consider the issue will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Rollins
v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2021). The issue is purely a legal matter, but
it is less clear that failure to consider it will result in a miscarriage of justice. Stanley
provides no explanation for his failure to make this argument before the magistrate judge,
and there was ample opportunity to do so. See Dellucky v. St. George Fire Prot. Dist., No 23-
30810,
2024 WL 3688722, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2024). Still, out of an abundance of
caution, we address his argument on appeal and determine that it fails on the merits.
3
Employment discrimination claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 are similar to those
brought under Title VII. Indeed, § 1983 claims arising in the employment discrimination
context “are analyzed under the evidentiary framework applicable to claims arising under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Lawrence v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at
Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1999). Ricks therefore applies to the § 1983 claims at
issue in this employment case. See id.; see also Velez-Velez v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth.,
795 F.3d 230, 235 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying the Ricks limitations analysis to a § 1983 claim
based on political discrimination in the employment context).
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decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made.”
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261. For this reason, the “pendency of a grievance, or some
other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll
the running of the limitations periods.”
Id.
We previously concluded that Ricks foreclosed delayed accrual and
equitable tolling arguments based on an employee’s decision to pursue an
administrative appeal. See, e.g., Holmes v. Tex. A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 685
(5th Cir. 1998) (“Holmes deserves no equitable tolling for the pendency of
his university grievance procedures, a remedy which he need not have
pursued.”); West v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
37 F. App’x 712 (5th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam) (Employee was not entitled to equitable tolling on the basis that
“state law required her to exhaust internal grievance procedures before filing
a complaint with the EEOC”). We see no basis to depart from this longsettled principle here, and Stanley provides none.4
In sum, a § 1983 claim, which seeks to vindicate violations of
constitutional rights, exists separate and apart from any collateral review
process. The clock starts ticking for an employment-based § 1983 claim when
the employee receives notice of the adverse action, and an elective
administrative appeal cannot stop or turn back the clock. Thus, Stanley’s
appeal to the Civil Service Board neither forestalled accrual nor tolled
limitations. Because Stanley filed his § 1983 suit on June 14, 2022, over one
year after receiving written notice of his suspension, time is not on Stanley’s
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4
Stanley does not address Felder or Ricks. Instead, he largely relies on cases
involving § 1983 due process claims based on alleged defects in the administrative appeals’
procedures. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Houston, 619 F. App’x 291, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam); Arezzo v. City of Hoboken,
719 F. App’x 115, 117–18 (3d Cir. 2018); Reid v.
City of Flint,
7 F.3d 234, 234 (6th Cir. 1993). Because Stanley does not assert a procedural
due process claim or challenge the administrative appeals process itself, these cases are
inapposite.
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side. Unless the Louisiana doctrine of interruption revives it, the § 1983
claims are prescribed.
b. Stanley’s state court petitions did not interrupt prescription.
Prescription may be interrupted “by the filing of suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction and venue.” Cichirillo v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 917 So.
2d 424, 430 (La. 2005); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 3462. If the suit interrupts
prescription, interruption “continues as long as the suit is pending.” Id.; see
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3463, 3466. Stanley contends that his August 20, 2020
and November 20, 2020 state court petitions interrupt prescription here.
The test for interruption has not always been clear to us. See Kling I,
60 F.4th at 283. In Kling I, an employee was terminated, allegedly for
submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations.
Id. at
282–83. He sued his employer for violating Louisiana’s constitutional right
to free expression but asserted no federal claims.
Id. Eight years after his
termination, he filed a § 1983 claim on the same facts, asserting that his state
court suit—which did not bring First or Fourteenth Amendment claims—
interrupted prescription. Id. at 283. He contended that the failure to assert
the federal claims in his state court suit was of no moment because Louisiana
takes a broader view of the phrase “cause of action,” defining it to include
“the operative facts at issue.” Id. at 286.
Though we found no support for the employee’s definition under
Louisiana law, we noted cloudy authority on the question whether a previous
suit could interrupt prescription on an unasserted claim. Id. Although
virtually every federal district court to consider the issue had held that “a
pending state action does not interrupt prescription as to unasserted federal
causes of action,” Louisiana appellate courts were less uniform, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court had yet to speak clearly on the issue. Id. at 286–87.
We then certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Kling I,
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asking when a suit “interrupt[s] prescription as to causes of action,
understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not
asserted in that suit?” Id. at 288.
The Louisiana Supreme Court answered in Kling II, instructing that
“[p]rescription is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully apprise the
defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of
the defendant.” 378 So. 3d at 55–56. The court explained that interruption is
not so broad as to include “all causes arising out of the same operative facts
identifying the same right/duty and the same violation of the legal theory
pleaded irrespective of the source of the legal obligation.” Id. at 56–57.
Neither is it so narrow “such that the actions in the two suits must be the
same to provide notice to a defendant.” Id. at 57. Instead, the “essence of
interruption” is “notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on
the claim involved.” Id. Where “two suits [are] instituted by the same
obligee,” and “deal[] with the same underlying obligation and present[] the
same demand,” a prior suit may interrupt prescription. Id. at 58 (citing
Thompson v. Town of Jonesboro, 222 So. 3d 770, 774 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2017)).
To illustrate this flexible concept, the Louisiana Supreme Court
“[e]xamin[ed] the spectrum of jurisprudence” on interruption. Id. The line
of interruption cases considered the extent of the similarity between the two
suits, including the parties, facts, claims asserted, the source of the
defendant’s obligation, and the demand made.
Id. While none of the
considerations alone appear to be determinative, the court placed particular
emphasis on the source of the obligation and the demand. See
id. at 57–59.
For example, a workers’ compensation tort suit for damages against an
employer interrupted a later tort claim for damages against the liability
insurer because the initial suit placed the insurer on notice of its legal and
monetary obligations arising from the same underlying tort and facts.
Id. at
58 (citing Parker v. S. Am. Ins. Co.,
590 So. 2d 55, 56 (La. 1991)). But a
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plaintiff’s initial mandamus suit could not interrupt his subsequent claim for
damages because a suit for mandamus relief failed to “put defendant on
notice of a possible claim for monetary damages.” Id. at 59 (citing Thompson,
222 So. 3d at 774).
A comparison of Stanley’s state court petitions and his federal
complaint demonstrate that the petitions failed to provide adequate notice of
his § 1983 claims. While there is parity between the parties, the facts, and
references to the Constitution, Stanley’s state court petitions merely sought
an injunction to prevent discipline.5 His § 1983 suit is in another category
entirely. A creature of tort liability, § 1983 permits recovery of compensatory
damages, attorney’s fees, and when appropriate, even punitive damages. See
Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1990). Stanley’s state suit seeking
to prevent LPD from implementing a suspension and transfer failed to
provide LPD adequate notice of a potential tort suit for money damages. See
Thompson,
222 So. 3d at 774. Because the state court petitions failed “to fully
apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff,” and
especially what would be “demanded of the defendant,” interruption does
not apply. Kling II, 378 So. 3d at 55–56.
IV. Conclusion
Stanley’s race against the clock for a timely § 1983 claim ended no
later than June 11, 2022. Because he filed suit three days later, the district
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5
Despite contending throughout briefing that he could not seek damages until he
completed his administrative appeal, Stanley asserted for the first time at oral argument
that his petitions did seek monetary damages. We discern none. And even if a singular
request for “sick leave with pay in full, and . . . attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs” in
connection with an injunction could qualify as such, it is not a demand for damages of the
sort available under § 1983.
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court correctly dismissed the complaint as prescribed on its face.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
11
