120 Md. App. 141 - Chase v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In order to establish that an in-court identification of a defendant was a violation of the defendant’s due process rights, that defendant must first demonstrate that the identification was unduly suggestive. If the defendant can demonstrate that an identification was unduly suggestive, the court reviewing his claim must then look to see whether the suggestiveness of the identification was sufficiently outweighed by factors of reliability. The most important of these factors of reliability, set forth by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), are “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ [sic] degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 199-200 , 93 S.Ct. at 382 . If the suggestive identification is sufficiently outweighed by these factors of reliability, then the identification is deemed to be valid. Whether an in-court identification of a defendant is unduly suggestive is a matter of dispute among courts. Some courts have held that in-court identification, because of the way the defendant is isolated at the counsel table, is inherently unfair, particularly when the witness has never identified the defendant before. See United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 232 (6 th Cir.1992). Others, most notably this Court in Green v. State,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 129 Md. App. 360 - Parker v. State

2. “[AJppellant argues that the circuit court erred by admitting the DNA evidence in this case because that evidence was developed through polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques. According to appellant, at the time of trial, Md. Code, § 10-915(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article only allowed DNA evidence developed through fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis to be used to identify a defendant. We disagree. As the Court of Appeals recognized in Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38 , 673 A.2d 221 (1996), § 10-915 essentially eliminates the need for a court to conduct an inquiry into the general acceptance of the DNA techniques listed therein. Id. at 66, 673 A.2d 221 . Such an inquiry would otherwise be required pursuant to Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978). Id. at 54 , 673 A.2d 221 . This, however, does not mean that DNA evidence not included in § 10-915 is inadmissible. It simply means that that evidence must be. subjected to the inquiry outlined in Reed before it may be admitted. Here, the circuit court conducted such an inquiry, and it ultimately concluded that PCR evidence is admissible. Thus, we perceive no error in the lower court’s admission of that evidence.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 134 Md. App. 528 - State v. Gross